Rule of law and human rights issues in social media content




























have	clearly	 indicated	that	 it	 is	 the	work	of	others	(in	which	case	the	extent	of	any	work	
carried	out	jointly	by	me	and	any	other	person	is	clearly	identified	in	it).		
The	copyright	of	this	thesis	rests	with	the	author.	Quotation	from	it	is	permitted,	provided	














































at	 university	 students	 to	 global	 phenomena	 that	 have	 impacted	 almost	 every	 facet	 of	
ordinary	life,	from	politics	to	entertainment,	social	relationships	to	consumer	marketing.	But	
even	as	these	companies	were	refining	their	technologies,	adding	more	functionalities,	and	
expanding	 their	 user	 base,	 they	 were	 also	 developing	 another	 set	 of	 processes:	 content	
moderation.	 Content	 moderation	 actually	 represents	 a	 bundle	 of	 practices	 at	 platforms:	





moderation	 is	 actually	 the	 real	 commodity	 platforms	 offer,	 an	 online	 experience	 that	 is	
“curated,	organised,	archived,	and	moderated.”1		
The	current	approach	to	content	moderation,	however,	poses	problems	for	lawyers	
and	 policymakers.	 These	 problems	 are	 themes	 that	 will	 appear	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 contexts	
throughout	the	thesis.	The	first	issue	is	that	these	are	private	companies	making	decisions	
that	affect	human	rights.	This	thesis	will	use	the	International	Bill	of	Rights	as	its	source	for	
any	 substantive	discussions	of	human	rights.	This	 is	 the	 collective	name	of	 the	Universal	
Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR),	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	
(ICCPR,)	and	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR).	










	 Social	media	 platforms	 can	 cause	or	 contribute	 to	 a	wide	 variety	of	 human	 rights	






to	advocate,	 incite,	 or	gather	 information	 for	 the	purposes	of	 causing	physical	harm.	For	
example,	Permitting	(or	even	featuring	in	the	case	of	curated	content)	content	that	features	







needs	of	 children	should	 include	reference	 to	the	Convention	on	 the	Rights	of	 the	Child,8	
where	Article	17(e)	states	 that	appropriate	guidelines	 for	 the	protection	of	children	from	
“information	and	material	injurious	to…well-being”	should	be	developed.	Article	19	of	the	




















prohibitions	 against	 discrimination	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 protected	 characteristics,	 and	 this	
could	be	an	 issue	when	social	media	 companies	 fail	 to	address	persistent	harassment	or	
create	 and	 enforce	 rules	 that	 have	 a	 discriminatory	 effect.	 Privacy	 issues	 are	 covered	 by	
Article	12	of	the	UDHR	and	Article	17	of	the	ICCPR,	which	covers	privacy	of	the	individual,	
family,	 home,	 and	 correspondence,	 as	well	 as	attacks	 on	 a	 person’s	 reputation,	 and	 both	
surveillance	and	defamation	are	issues	on	social	media.	Fair	trial	rights	(Article	14	ICCPR)	







major	 outlet	 for	 expression,	 accessing	 information,	 and	maintaining	 connections	 and	 the	
implications	 of	 this	 dependence	 must	 be	 investigated.	 Our	 lived	 reality	 of	 expression	 is	
increasingly	moving	 online	 and	onto	 platforms	 controlled	 by	 private	 companies	 and	 this	
could	diminish	human	rights	protections.	While	 this	 thesis	will	discuss	a	wide	variety	of	
human	rights	issues	relevant	to	social	media	content	moderation,	special	attention	will	be	
paid	to	 freedom	of	expression	as	 it	 is	so	profoundly	connected	to	the	activities	platforms	
carry	out.		










and	 the	 Article	 7	 ICESCR	 right	 to	 just	 and	 favourable	 working	 conditions.	 Content	
moderators	would	also	have	rights	under	labour	laws,	which	includes	right	to	form	and	join	
trade	 unions	 and	 initiate	 collective	 bargaining.10	This	 has	 been	 just	 a	 brief	 summary	 of	
human	rights	 issues	 in	social	media	platforms	but	one	can	safely	conclude	that	 there	are	
many	 potential	 problems	 in	 the	 world	 of	 content	 moderation.	 Businesses	 have	 a	
responsibility	to	respect	all	“internationally	recognised	human	rights”	because	they	can	have	
an	impact	on	“virtually	the	entire	spectrum”	of	rights.11		





of	 the	solutions	that	will	be	proposed	 in	this	 thesis	are	directed	to	enhancing	procedural	
protections	on	social	media	platforms.	These	ideas	are	foundational,	creating	a	solid	bedrock	
for	subsequent	substantive	regulations	and	helping	to	address	the	nuanced	situations	where	
companies	 engage	 in	 regulatory	 initiatives.	 The	 final	 issue	 is	 that	 policymakers	 are	
considering	 various	 approaches	 to	 regulating	 social	media	 companies	 but	many	 of	 their	
solutions	(such	as	a	social	media	duty	of	care)	fail	to	address	(or	may	even	exacerbate)	these	
rule	 of	 law	 issues.	 Government	 reforms	 can	 also	 incentivise	 censorship	 as	 well	 as	 the	
diminishment	of	other	human	rights	protections	in	the	online	environments.	This	thesis	will	
investigate	 how	 these	 companies	 are	 regulating	 their	 platforms	 and	 why	 their	 current	
approaches	 to	 content	moderation	pose	 serious	problems	 for	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	human	
rights	principles.	It	will	also	consider	what	reforms	could	be	introduced	by	the	platforms	and	
by	UK	lawmakers	to	address	the	issues	identified	throughout	this	thesis.	













quasi-public,	 and	 Business	 and	 Human	 Rights	 (BHR)	 ideas	 and	 engage	 with	 the	
counterarguments	 on	 this	 issue.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 issue	 because	 insisting	 on	 a	 strict	
Westphalian	 notion	 of	 human	 rights	 will	 lead	 to	 the	 impoverishment	 of	 human	 rights	
protections	 in	 a	world	 that	 is	 increasingly	 dominated	 by	 privatisation	 and	multinational	
companies.		
The	body	of	the	thesis	is	comprised	of	three	chapters	that	reflect	the	three	distinct	
stages	 of	 the	 content	moderation	 process:	 Creation,	 Enforcement	 and	Response.	 Chapter	
Three	 covers	 the	 Creation	 stage,	 which	 entails	 the	 development	 of	 rules	 dictating	 what	
content	 is	 and	 is	 not	 permissible	 on	 the	 platform.	 It	will	 argue	 that	 the	 rules	 are	 vague,	
occasionally	 incoherent,	 and	 lack	 transparency.	 The	 consequence	 for	 users	 and	 activists	




media	 companies	and	argue	 that	greater	oversight	 is	needed	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	 the	
standards	are	detailed	and	transparent,	and	that	they	broadly	reflect	rule	of	law	principles.			
The	 Enforcement	 stage,	 which	 is	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Four,	 concerns	 how	 social	
media	 companies	 police	 their	 platforms.	 It	 will	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 the	moderator	 (both	
human	and	algorithmic),	the	process	of	enforcement,	and	identify	a	number	of	issues	related	
to	 the	 inconsistent	nature	of	 the	enforcement.	When	 rules	are	 created,	 a	 tacit	promise	 is	


































generally).	 The	 objective	 is	 to	 require	 companies	 to	 transition	 from	 “generalised	
commitments”	to	human	rights	to	the	“operationalisation	of	these	commitments-to	the	rules	
that	 give	 effect	 to	 them.” 14 	This	 proposal	 will	 address	 the	 issues	 of	 transparency,	
accountability,	 and	 legitimacy	 that	 have	 been	 raised	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 and	 offer	 a	
workable	solution	that	still	preserves	the	benefits	of	the	current	self-regulatory	system	but	
with	effective	oversight	from	a	business	and	human	rights	regulator.	
This	 thesis	 concludes	 in	Chapter	Eight	 that	 the	 challenges	 in	 social	media	 content	
moderation	must	be	addressed	in	a	way	that	maximises	the	positive	benefits	social	media	
offers	to	society.	Instead	of	allowing	platforms	free	rein	to	govern	their	platforms	however	




























This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 social	 media	 companies	 should	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	
human	rights	 issues	on	their	platforms.	This	assertion	may	be	supported	by	a	number	of	
different	 theoretical	 approaches	 including	 the	 argument	 that	 a	 platform	 has	 state-like	
responsibilities,	 that	 it	 could	 be	 considered	 a	moral	 agent,	 or	 should	 be	 required	 to	 face	
accountability	mechanisms	to	prevent	abuses.	It	will	also	outline	the	orthodox	approach	to	
human	 rights	 and	 business	 and	 explain	 why	 that	 theory	 allows	 some	 exceptions.	 Some	
people	may	 ask	why	 platforms	 should	have	 human	 rights	obligations	 as	opposed	 to	 just	
being	subjected	to	further	forms	of	regulation.	In	answer,	rights	are	standards	against	which	
we	 can	 judge	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 regulations	 and	 offer	 a	 “normative	 vocabulary”	 to	












The	 orthodox	 approach	 is	 that	 companies	 (as	non-state	 actors)	 do	 not	 typically	 have	
human	 rights	 responsibilities.	 Human	 rights	 obligations	 are	 traditionally	 viewed	 as	
Westphalian,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 duties	 of	 states.	 Indeed,	 a	 few	 decades	 ago	 “the	
responsibility	of	businesses	 for	human	rights	was,	 at	best,	 a	marginal	 topic	among	 those	
concerned	 with	 the	 ethics	 of	 business.	 Some	 doubted	 whether	 business	 could	 have	 any	
ethical	responsibilities	at	all.”19	There	are	a	number	of	justifications	for	this	view	such	as	the	
fact	 that	no	businesses	(or	 indeed	NGO’s)	have	signed	any	documents	that	constitute	the	
International	 Bill	 of	 Rights,	 which	 is	 an	 indication	 that	 there	 was	 no	 expectation	 that	
companies	be	bound	by	these	obligations.20	Indeed,	some	of	the	human	rights	identified	by	
the	UN	 could	only	 apply	 to	 parties	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 determining	 their	 nationality	 and	
immigration	 status	 or	 passing	 legislation,	 conduct	 which	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 relevant	 in	 a	
commercial	setting.21	
There	 is	 a	 spectrum	of	 different	 viewpoints	 that	 fall	 under	 the	 orthodox	 approach	 to	
business	and	human	rights.	At	 its	most	 liberal	 conceptualisation,	 some	business	scholars	
have	 argued	 that	 while	 human	 rights	 obligations	 should	 not	 be	 directly	 assigned	 to	
companies,	 it	 is	 perfectly	 plausible	 to	 develop	 a	 firmer	 approach	 to	 complicity,	 with	
companies	 being	 held	 accountable	 for	 their	 involvement	 in	 human	 rights	 violations	 by	


















public	 have	 therefore	 been	 offered	 an	 opportunity	 to	weigh	 in	 on	 how	 corporations	 are	




social	 responsibility	 [CSR]	 or	 which	 focus	 on	 the	 “business	 case	 for	 human	 rights.”	 CSR	
typically	 relies	 on	 corporate	 voluntarism	 and	 the	 notion	 that	 corporations	 should	 act	 as	
“voluntary	 and	 affirmative	 contributors	 to	 human	 rights	 realisation.”27	CSR	 began	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	World	War	Two,	when	 leading	business	scholars	began	to	conceptualise	 the	
responsibilities	 of	 an	 ethical	 corporation.28	It	 is	 often	 linked	 to	 self-regulatory	 schemes,	





















for	 victims	 of	 corporate	 human	 rights	 abuses.29 	Companies	 should	 not	 be	 permitted	 to	
acquire	 wealth	 through	 human	 rights	 violations	 (such	 as	 violations	 of	 labour	 rights,	
cooperation	with	autocratic	regimes,	or	maintaining	unsafe	working	conditions)	and	then	
off-set	those	negative	images	through	corporate	philanthropy.	It	is	admirable,	for	example,	


















































idea	 is	 best	 exemplified	 by	 Clay	 Shirky’s	 famous	 quote	 that	 the	 “Internet	 is	 not	 a	 public	
sphere.	It	is	a	private	sphere	that	tolerates	public	speech.”37	This	argument	might	have	been	
less	 problematic	 in	 the	 earlier	 days	 of	 the	 internet,	 where	 users	were	 spread	 across	 an	
endless	number	of	online	enclaves.	Then	users	were	able	to	“vote	with	their	feet”	if	they	felt	
their	rights	were	being	disrespected.	However,	now	that	a	small	number	of	tech	companies	












Cass	 Sunstein	 and	 Eli	 Pariser,	 who	 have	written	 extensively	 on	 the	 balkanisation	 of	 the	
internet.38	This	 privatisation	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 represents	 a	 fundamental	 shift	 in	 the	
availability	of	opportunities	for	expression	and	one	that	necessitates	a	re-evaluation	of	the	














using	 social	media.	 In	 the	 judgement,	 Kennedy	 J	 (providing	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	majority)	
stated	that	social	media	platforms	are	“websites	integral	to	the	fabric	of	our	modern	society	

































to	 further	 social	 goals.46	This	 argument	 can	 lapse	 into	 hyperbole	 (that	 corporations	 are	
designed	to	 further	human	rights	specifically47)	but	 its	specific	application	appears	valid:	
that	companies	should	assume	“some	responsibility”	to	ensure	that	their	business	activities	




















generate	 (innovation,	 resources	 for	 further	 study	 etc)	 and	 argues	 that	 they	 have	 a	










appealing	 to	 the	 self-interest	 of	 the	 business,	 and	 enlarging	 complicity	 rules,	 but	 these	
solutions	 seem	 unsatisfactory	 when	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 problem	 is	 so	 large.	 When	 one	
contemplates	 recent	 scandals	 such	 as	 the	 BP	 oil	 spill,	 the	 Rana	 Plaza	 collapse,	 and	 the	
electoral	manipulations	 perpetrated	 by	 Cambridge	 Analytica,	 adages	 about	 shareholders	
and	profits	seem	outdated,	perhaps	even	toxic.	There	may	be	ways	to	moderate	the	orthodox	
theory,	making	exceptions	 for	 companies	 that	 assume	responsibility	 for	human	rights	or	
benefit	 from	 their	 affiliation	 with	 human	 rights	 values.	 There	 should	 also	 be	 greater	
expectations	of	how	companies	conduct	their	activities	even	if	some	theorists	refuse	to	make	
human	rights	a	priority.	At	the	minimum,	for	example,	the	public	should	be	guaranteed	some	










corporate	 human	 rights	 obligations	 should	 exist.	 Orthodox	 theorists	might	 condemn	 the	
introduction	of	such	laws	but	it	should	be	noted	that	“almost	no	management,	finance,	or	
economics	scholars	explicitly	defend	the	idea	that	companies	should	violate	the	law	in	the	
interest	 of	 additional	wealth	 creation.”50	Therefore,	 if	 these	 obligations	were	 introduced	
then	orthodox	theorists	would	conclude	that	the	appropriate	response	must	be	compliance.	












to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 people	 are	 entitled	 to	 exercise	 their	 rights	 (most	 notably	 free	
expression)	as	if	it	were	a	public	space.51	These	spaces	are	sometimes	termed	“pseudo-public	
spaces”	as	there	is	no	legal	authority	designating	them	as	public	spaces	even	if	there	is	some	
form	 of	 “geographical/cultural/media”	 understanding	 of	 them	 as	 public. 52 	A	 similar	















organisations	 as	 falling	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 HRA.53	There	 is	 a	 certain	 logic	 to	 these	
approaches	and	that	intuitive	sense	has	informed	the	development	of	a	pragmatic	body	of	
case-law	 and	 theoretical	 discussion.	 This	 school	 of	 thought	 moderates	 the	 orthodox	
approach	by	acknowledging	that	private	companies	may	be	treated	as	having	human	rights	
obligations	in	certain	circumstances.	This	section	will	attempt	to	describe	the	themes	that	cut	
across	 this	 area	and	show	why	 the	unique	 status	of	social	media	platforms	warrants	 the	
imposition	of	human	rights	obligations.54	
2.3.2:	The	vanishing	town	square		
The	 first	 theme	 that	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 this	 field	 is	 that	 the	 public	 sphere	 is	 being	
supplanted	by	the	private	sector.	This	could	be	more	specifically	construed	as	the	notion	that	
the	town	square	(as	a	symbolic	embodiment	of	civil	society)55	is	vanishing	and	that	civic	life	
is	 increasingly	 shifting	 into	 privately	 owned	 spaces	 in	 both	 the	 physical	 world	 (such	 as	
shopping	malls)	and	virtual	space	(such	as	social	media	companies).56	Jørgensen	argues	that	
while	 private	 domains	 have	 always	 had	 a	 place	 in	 public	 life,	 such	 as	 in	 coffee	 shops	 or	
through	newspapers,	the	current	situation	is	different	in	scope	as	the	“vast	majority	of	social	
interactions”	online	 occur	 on	 platforms	 provided	 by	 private	 companies.57	This	migration	






















began	 to	 be	 challenged.	The	 border	 between	 the	 two	 categories	 became	more	porous	 as	




increasing	 power	 of	 corporations	 has	 oxygenated	 the	 quasi-state	 argument,	 with	 many	
academics	pointing	to	this	newfound	power	in	the	international	political	system	as	evidence	
that	“political	authority	should	imply	public	responsibility.”59			
There	 is,	 therefore,	 an	 instinctive	 sense	 that	 the	 power	 and	 control	 that	 a	 private	
company	wields	can	approach	a	certain	threshold.	After	 this	 threshold	 is	reached,	 justice	
demands	 that	 these	 companies	 be	 given	 commensurate	 obligations.	 An	 early	 case	 that	
exemplifies	this	situation	is	Marsh	v	Alabama	(1946).60	This	case	concerned	a	company	town	
(a	town	which	is	owned	by	a	private	company	that	provides	the	majority	of	jobs,	housing,	
and	 amenities)	 that	 prohibited	 Jehovah’s	 Witness	 members	 from	 distributing	 religious	
literature	on	the	town’s	sidewalks.	The	American	Supreme	Court	treated	the	town	like	a	state	
actor,	holding	that	that	the	private	property	rights	of	the	company	did	not	“justify	the	State’s	
permitting	 a	 corporation	 to	 govern	 a	 community	 of	 citizens	 so	 as	 to	 restrict	 their	
fundamental	 liberties.” 61 	This	 functional	 equivalency	 approach	 has	 only	 grown	 more	
appealing	as	our	concerns	changed	from	company	towns	to	multinational	corporations.62		













Social	 media	 platforms	 are	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 how	 a	 privately	 owned	 space	 can	
become	essential	to	free	expression,	as	well	as	facilitating	accountability	of	the	state	through	







The	second	theme	is	 that	as	 these	companies	grow	more	powerful,	 their	activities	
begin	to	impact	on	the	public	in	such	significant	ways.	In	addition,	the	scale	and	severity	of	





opportunity	 to	 connect	 to	 large	 audiences,	 and	 are	 open	 to	 anyone	 with	 the	 requisite	
technology	(which	is	becoming	more	affordable	every	year).	Platform	governance,	therefore,	
can	have	serious	impacts	on	people	because	deciding	which	content	to	permit	or	which	users	
should	 be	 allowed	 to	 remain	 on	 the	 platform	 will	 affect	 people’s	 ability	 to	 express	
themselves,	access	 information,	protect	 their	privacy,	and	take	part	 in	cultural	 life.	These	
impacts	 are	 comparable	 to	 the	 effects	 that	 public	 authority	 decisions	 could	 have	 on	 a	
person. 66 	The	 power	 companies	 exert,	 therefore,	 can	 move	 from	 influence	 to	 de	 facto	
























and	 was	 therefore	 capable	 of	 violating	 human	 rights.	 They	 argued	 that	 AOL	 acts	 like	 a	
government	from	the	perspective	of	the	user	and	has	created	a	virtual	town	square	where	
“public	discourse,	conversations	and	commercial	transactions	can	and	do	take	place.”69	The	




Cyber	 Promotions	 was	 likely	 unsuccessful	 because	 AOL	 did	 not	 seem	 powerful	
enough	 to	be	 comparable	 to	a	 state.71	Since	 then,	however,	 technology	has	become	more	
integrated	into	society	and	power	has	concentrated	into	a	handful	of	tech	companies.	This	
has	resulted	in	a	number	of	cases	from	multiple	jurisdictions	affirming	the	public	role	of	tech	











held	 that	 blocking	 access	 to	Google	was	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 10	 of	 the	 ECHR	 and	 that	 the	
Internet	“has	now	become	one	of	 the	principal	means	by	which	 individuals	exercise	their	
right	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression…”72 	The	 implications	 of	 this	 case	 seem	 to	 be	 that	 some	
Internet	companies	are	so	important	to	the	public	that	denying	access	to	them	is	a	violation	
of	human	rights.	This	argument	is	hard	to	reconcile	with	assertions	that	Internet	companies	
do	not	occupy	a	 special	place	 in	 society.	Another	 case	 that	 is	pertinent	 to	 this	point	was	
already	 introduced	 (at	2.2.2),	Packingham	v	North	Carolina.73	This	 case	 came	 to	a	 similar	
conclusion	as	Yildirim	on	the	issue	of	prohibiting	registered	sex	offenders	from	using	social	








decisions	 of	 private	 actors	 are	 being	 made	 and	 that	 they	 should	 not	 have	 unbounded	
discretion	in	how	they	order	their	activities.	Wettstein	in	particular	argues	that	transnational	
corporations	 have	 become	 quasi-state	 entities	 and	 that	 it	 is	 therefore	 appropriate	 to	


















Another	 case,	 Knight	 First	 Amendment	 Institute	 v.	 Donald	 J.	 Trump 77 	appears	 to	
illustrate	 this	 expansion.	 This	 case	 argued	 that	 blocking	 them	 from	 viewing	 President	
Trump’s	Twitter	account	because	they	disagreed	with	his	political	views	was	a	violation	of	
their	First	Amendment	rights.	The	plaintiffs	argued	that	this	account	was	a	public	forum	and	
that	 they	were	 being	prevented	 from	accessing	 information	about	 the	many	government	
decisions	announced	first	on	Twitter.	Both	the	lower	court	and	appeals	court	held	that	that	






against	a	state	 that	had	passed	a	 law	excluding	certain	 individuals	 from	social	media	and	















interference	with	 their	 ability	 to	 carry	out	activities	on	 social	media	 so	 it	does	not	 seem	




struggled	 to	decide	whether	private	 companies	are	behaving	 like	public	 authorities,	with	
Lord	 Neuberger	 once	 commenting	 that	 the	words	 “functions	 of	 a	 public	 nature”	 are	 “so	
imprecise	in	their	meaning	that	one	searches	for	a	policy	as	an	aid	to	interpretation.”81	Which	
companies	 would	 merit	 this	 treatment	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 predict.	 It	 seems	 easier	 to	
conclude,	for	example,	that	Google	and	Facebook	have	the	requisite	power	and	influence	to	
be	 treated	 as	 exercising	 public	 functions	 but	 what	 about	 Pinterest	 or	 Snapchat?	 This	
approach	is	also	problematic	when	it	comes	to	new	and	emergent	social	media	companies	
as	during	their	emergent	phase	they	might	adopt	policies	and	engage	in	activities	that	will	
later	 be	 identified	 as	 in	 conflict	 with	 human	 rights	 responsibilities	 once	 they	 become	
successful.	 This	may	 give	 an	 unfair	 advantage	 to	 smaller	 companies,	 and	 could	 result	 in	
controversial	 practices	 that	 may	 become	 embedded	 in	 their	 business	 culture.	 Another	
complication	 of	 applying	 notions	 of	 the	 quasi-public	 is	 that	 it	 results	 in	 social	 media	
companies	 being	 subject	 to	 both	 “public	 and	 private	 content	 controls	 spanning	multiple	
jurisdictions	and	differing	social	mores.”82	This	is	of	less	concern,	however,	because	social	
media	 companies	 are	 already	 subject	 to	 a	 range	 of	 different	 laws	 around	 the	world	 and	
harmonisation	of	these	regulations	is	unlikely	to	be	achieved	anytime	soon.	Ultimately,	the	
quasi-public	 idea	 (and	 the	 other	 related	 ideas	 detailed	 above)	 is	 very	 important	 as	 it	
identifies	 themes	that	are	very	relevant	 to	regulating	social	media	companies.	One	might,	
however,	 achieve	 a	 more	 uniform	 and	 predictable	 response	 by	 adopting	 a	 process	 that	








explicitly	 identifies	which	 companies	would	be	 subject	 to	 these	 rules	and	what	would	be	
required	of	these	platforms.		





companies	 and	 human	 rights	 is	 nuanced	 and	 should	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 one-size-fits-all	
situation.	Special	care	should	also	be	taken	when	examining	self-regulatory	or	co-regulatory	





While	 these	 ideas	may	 not	 be	 sufficient	 in	 and	 of	 themselves	 to	 inform	 regulation,	 they	























Accordingly,	 while	 states	 may	 impact	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 corporate	 human	 rights	
responsibilities	 (either	 in	 positive	 or	 negative	 ways),	 these	 responsibilities	 “will	 not	 be	
conditioned	by	 flowing	through	the	state.”91	Therefore,	 it	becomes	irrelevant	whether	the	
American	 government	 (or	 any	 other	 government	 for	 that	matter)	perceives	 social	media	
platforms	as	having	human	rights	obligations	as	the	state	interpretation	would	not	affect	the	
existence	of	moral	agency.	 It	 is	also	 irrelevant	 that	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	 impose	human	





and	 not	 being	 predicated	 on	 any	 specific	 human	 rights	 legislation,	 thus	 rendering	 it	
irrelevant	 that	 this	 or	 that	 social	media	 companies	 did	 not	 ratify	 any	 such	 documents.93	
















Instead,	 the	 state-centric	 view	 of	 human	 rights	 obligations	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	
historic	period	in	which	human	rights	theories	developed,	rather	than	any	specific	limitation	
inherent	in	conceptions	of	human	rights.94	Raz	exemplifies	this	argument	when	he	explains	





There	are	a	number	of	different	 reasons	 (which	 should	be	 considered	distinct	but	
complementary)	why	businesses	could	be	considered	moral	agents.	The	 first	argument	 is	
that	companies	have	powerful	 impacts	on	employees,	customers,	 the	community,	and	the	
environment	 and	 that	 agents	 who	 have	 impacts	 on	 others	 usually	 also	 have	 moral	
responsibilities	 for	 those	 impacts.96 	Sorrell	 refers	 to	 these	 impacts	 as	 the	 “moral	 risks	
associated	with	one’s	commercial	and	other	activities”	and	argues	that	it	is	appropriate	to	
justify	 corporate	human	rights	 responsibilities	on	 the	basis	of	 these	 risks.97	Social	media	
platforms	can	affect	the	human	rights	of	their	users	and	the	general	public	in	a	myriad	of	




has	 fundamentally	 altered	human	 society	 in	 a	 comparatively	 short	period	 of	 time.	 These	
technologies	 have	 become	 an	 accepted	 part	 of	 life	 and	 have	 become	 the	 norm	 in	many	
Western	societies	but	also	in	many	developing	countries	as	well.	It	seems	difficult,	therefore,	





























This	 interpretation	 distorts	 the	 argument	 for	 corporate	 human	 rights	 obligations:	
transforming	 the	 contention	 that	 businesses	 must	 align	 their	 corporate	 activities	 with	
human	 rights	 principles	 to	 the	 radical	 assertion	 that	 businesses	 must	 now	 become	
replacement	 governments	 and	 care	 for	 all	 the	 citizenry	 of	 a	 particular	 jurisdiction.	 One	
should	 not	 assume	 that	 corporations	would	 somehow	 supersede	 states	 in	 human	 rights	
governance	when	at	most	corporations	would	only	complement	state	protections.	Arnold	
criticises	this	argument	for	being	resistant	to	a	multi-actor	system	of	human	rights	and	for	
“arguing	 for	 a	 Westphalian	 model	 in	 a	 post-Westphalian	 era.” 100 	Ultimately,	 the	


















effective	 control	 over	 transnational	 enterprises.” 102 	Wettstein	 also	 contends	 that	 the	
capacity	of	states	to	govern	human	rights	issues	is	“shrinking”	in	the	face	of	globalisation	and	
that	 consequently,	 the	 human	 rights	 obligations	 of	 businesses	 have	 become	 more	
important. 103 	This	 is	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “third	 agency	 problem”	 where	 the	
principal	(society)	can	no	longer	control	its	agent	(a	business).104		
Since	 this	 diminishment	 of	 states	 has	 occurred	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 emerging	
ascendency	 of	multinational	 corporations	 it	may	 be	 argued	 that	 such	 companies	 have	 a	
moral	 duty	 to	 involve	 themselves	 in	 human	 rights	 issues. 105 	Indeed,	 the	 invocation	 of	
globalisation	is	a	frequent	theme	in	any	discussion	of	corporate	human	rights	obligations.	
For	example,	the	introduction	to	the	UN	Protect,	Respect,	and	Remedy	Framework,	devised	
by	 Professor	 John	 Ruggie	 in	 his	 capacity	 as	 UN	 Special	 Representative	 for	 Business	 and	
Human	Rights,	states	that:	
“The	 root	 cause	 of	 the	 business	 and	 human	 rights	 predicament	 today	 lies	 in	 the	
governance	 gaps	 created	 by	 globalisation—between	 the	 scope	 and	 impact	 of	
economic	 forces	and	actors,	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 societies	 to	manage	 their	 adverse	
consequences.	 These	 governance	 gaps	 provide	 the	 permissive	 environment	 for	




















caused	 numerous	 problems	 domestically	 even	 without	 the	 exacerbating	 influence	 of	
borderless	activities.	That	being	said,	the	majority	of	the	social	media	companies	discussed	
in	 this	 thesis	 are	 global	 companies	 and	 their	 unique	 ability	 to	 be	 ubiquitous	 while	







role	 in	 combatting	 particularly	 egregious	 types	 of	 content	 such	 as	 Child	 Sexual	 Abuse	
Material	 (CSAM).	 Human	 rights	 obligations	 do	 not	 appear	 fundamentally	 different	 from	







other	 forms	 of	moral	 responsibility	 that	 social	media	 companies	 possess	 and	which	 are	
reflected	in	commensurate	legal	obligations.108		
In	conclusion,	this	section	has	examined	the	moral	agency	argument	and	concluded	
that	 social	 media	 networks	 are	 moral	 agents	 that	 have	 human	 rights	 obligations.	 This	
contention	was	based	on	the	impacts	of	social	media	companies,	their	ability	to	shoulder	a	
“fair	 share”	 of	 the	 responsibility	 of	 facilitating	 the	 exercise	 of	 rights,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	
platforms	already	have	other	 forms	of	moral	 responsibility.	Ultimately,	 the	moral	 agency	
argument	 is	 very	 compelling	 but	 it	 can	only	 be	 a	 point	 of	 inspiration	 as	once	 this	moral	







obligations	 on	 social	media	 companies	 because	 of	 their	 status	 as	moral	 agents	 or	 quasi-




ethical	 or	moral	 justifications	 for	 such	 actions.109	While	 it	 lacks	 some	 of	 the	 intellectual	
richness	of	more	established	schools	of	thought,	there	is	an	appealing	simplicity	in	a	BHR	
approach,	which	agitates	 for	 the	 creation	of	 “facts	on	 the	ground.”	 If	moral	 agency	 is	 the	













that	 state	 involvement	 is	 essential	 in	 creating	 and	 enforcing	 corporate	 human	 rights	
obligations.112	Palombo,	 for	example,	 argues	 that	 states	 (at	 least	 in	Europe)	already	have	
duties	 to	 protect	 people	 from	 human	 rights	 violations	 by	 private	 parties	 and	 duties	 to	
progressively	prevent	such	abuses.113	BHR	is	distinct	from	the	quasi-state	approach	because	
it	envisions	human	rights	obligations	as	applying	to	all	businesses	instead	of	 just	a	select	
range	 of	 companies	 that	 have	 state-like	 features.	 Instead	 of	 adopting	 a	 case-by-case,	
specialised	 approach,	 the	BHR	 school	 of	 thought	 is	 a	 broad	 church,	where	 human	 rights	
obligations	are	universally	applied.	Finally,	BHR	appears	to	be	the	product	of	all	the	failures	
of	 earlier	 theories,	 which	 have	 been	 unable	 to	 curb	 serious	 corporate	 human	 rights	





could	 be	 ‘subjects’	 of	 international	 law…	 are	 yielding	 to	 new	 realities.	 Corporations	












Guiding	Principles,	 (UNGP’s)	which	 focussed	more	on	consensus.	As	discussed	earlier	 (at	
2.2.1),	Ruggie	perceived	his	work	on	the	UNGP’s	as	a	“principled	form	of	pragmatism”	which	
he	 saw	 as	 combining	 human	 rights	 principles	 with	 a	 pragmatic	 approach	 to	 securing	
widespread	support	and	adoption	of	his	principles.116	This	pragmatism	has	been	criticised	
by	BHR	scholars,	who	argue	that	there	was	always	pragmatism	in	human	rights	but	only	in	
relation	 to	 implementation	 and	 the	 UNGP’s	 should	 not	 have	 compromised	 in	 identifying	
human	 rights	 norms.117 	The	 UNGP’s	 may	 be	 perceived	 as	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 a	 new	
approach	but	 the	 field	of	BHR	now	has	 radically	different	expectations	 from	 the	Protect,	
Respect,	 and	 Remedy	 framework	 devised	 by	 Ruggie.	 The	 language	 of	 the	 UNGP’s	 is	 a	
particular	issue,	with	critics	pointing	out	that	using	words	like	“responsibility”	and	“impact”	
rather	 than	 “duty”	 and	 “violation”	 diminishes	 the	 development	 of	 the	 “legal	
constitutionalisation	of	corporate	human	rights	obligations.”118	BHR	academics	were	highly	
critical	 of	 the	 convoluted	 reasoning	 in	 the	 Guiding	 Principles,	 arguing	 that	 if	 states	 are	
required	to	ensure	businesses	comply	with	human	rights	obligations	(as	part	of	their	duty	to	
protect)	then	this	must	mean	that	businesses	“are	themselves	obligated	to	comply	with	such	
requirements.	 Indeed,	 if	 the	third	parties	were	not	bound	by	 international	 law	to	comply	

























human	 rights.	 Compliance	 with	 these	 regulations	 would	 be	 a	 “precondition	 to	 doing	
business”121	for	social	media	platforms.	BHR	is	a	developing	field	and	focusses	on	combining	
the	philosophical	 and	 the	applied,	 “looking	back	and	 forth	between	 the	 two	and	 treating	
them	 as	mutually	 supportive,	 in	 a	 kind	 of	 reflective	 equilibrium.”122	This	 dual	 approach	
would	 fit	 well	 with	 regulating	 social	 media	 as	 one	 needs	 to	 be	 able	 to	 anticipate	 new	
developments	 in	 technology	 (an	 applied	 concern)	 while	 also	 articulating	 normative	
principles	that	would	be	relevant	regardless	of	the	specific	nature	of	these	platforms	(the	
theoretical	 element).	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 challenges	 in	 regulating	 platforms	which	will	 be	
discussed	in	Chapters	Six	and	Seven.		
BHR	 will	 also	 likely	 influence	 discussions	 of	 holding	 social	 media	 companies	
accountable	for	human	rights	violations	because	the	field	is	developing	at	the	same	time	as	
discussions	 about	 regulating	 platforms	 proliferate.	 Focussing	 on	 accountability	 and	
enforcement	 are	 also	 essential	when	 effectively	 regulating	 human	 rights	on	 social	media	
platforms	 as	 their	 transnational	 character	 can	 make	 them	 difficult	 to	 regulate.	 BHR	 is	
eminently	practical	and	focusses	on	what	Deva	terms	the	“three-fold	challenge”	(the	why,	
what,	and	how)	in	corporate	human	rights	obligations.123	This	thesis	will	attempt	to	answer	



















inevitable	 conclusion	 must	 be	 that	 “there	 are	 multiple,	 compelling	 and	 overlapping	
justifications	of	corporate	human	rights	obligations.”125	Therefore,	one	must	conclude	that	
human	rights	obligations	should	be	applied	to	social	media	companies	because	they	derive	






2015	that	 the	role	of	private	actors	is	one	of	 the	most	pressing	human	right	issues	 in	 the	
digital	 age.126	Platforms	 facilitate	 an	 exchange	 of	 information,	 the	 creation	 of	 enterprise,	
charitable	 funding	 campaigns,	 safety	 notifications	 after	major	 incidents,	 and	many	 other	
activities	that	lead	to	a	flourishing	of	civil	society.	Conversely,	platforms	have	also	led	to	a	lot	
of	 problems,	whether	 one	 is	 considering	 electoral	manipulation,	 fake	 news,	 extrajudicial	









of	moral	 responsibility	 but	 the	 subsequent	 conclusion	 that	 this	 responsibility	 should	 be	
translated	 into	a	set	of	 legal	obligations.	This	chapter,	however,	has	been	focussed	on	the	
justification	of	imposing	human	rights	obligations	on	social	media	platforms.	Chapter	Seven	







The	 first	 step	 in	 the	 content	moderation	 process	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 rules	 that	
govern	what	content	is	and	is	not	permissible	on	the	platform.	These	rules	comprise	part	of	
the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	platform	even	though	they	are	often	given	softer,	less	formal	









created	 embody	 rule	 of	 law	 principles	 (as	 a	 set	 of	 standards	 reflecting	 good	 regulatory	
practice)	and	human	rights	protections.		
This	 chapter	 will	 focus	 more	 on	 rule	 of	 law	 ideas	 than	 human	 rights	 principles	
(although	there	will	be	still	be	some	discussion	of	rights)	as	rule	of	law	scholars	offer	a	wealth	
















These	 terms	 and	 conditions	 are	 illuminating	 as	 they	 offer	 insight	 into	 the	 raison	
d’êtres	of	these	platforms,	how	they	view	their	role	in	society,	and	the	values	through	which	
they	structure	their	world.	These	rules	are	important	both	in	shaping	our	online	experience	



















the	 “authoritative	 allocation	 of	 things	 of	 value” 131 	In	 particular,	 the	 controversy	 of	
misinformation	and	electoral	manipulation	that	engulfed	Facebook	demonstrates	that	these	





private	 spaces	 can	 interfere	 with	 public	 accountability	 and	 decision-making	 as	 well	 as	
individual	 human	 rights.	 This	 thesis	 has	 already	 argued	 that	 platforms	 should	 have	
responsibilities	 to	 the	public.	Creating	terms	and	conditions	that	comply	with	rule	of	 law	
principles	should	be	one	of	those	obligations.		
The	 first	 thing	 to	 understand	 about	 these	 terms	 and	 conditions	 is	 that	 have	 a	
discursive	 power	on	 how	users	 experience	 these	 platforms.132	The	 system	of	 developing	
terms	 and	 conditions	 and	 deciding	 what	 content	 should	 be	 prohibited	 on	 a	 platform	
contributes	to	larger	processes	of	how	we	view	the	world	and	what	we	perceive	as	the	norm.	
Platforms,	 therefore,	 are	 “of	 particular	 importance	 in	 the	 production	 of	 culture	 and	
meaning.”133 	It	 would	 be	 erroneous	 to	 accept	 the	 narrative	 that	 social	 media	 platforms	
merely	 allow	 us	 to	 share	 our	 everyday	 lives	 or	 are	 just	 a	 natural	 evolution	 of	 other	
technologies.134 	Rather,	 as	 Van	 Dijck	 explains	 “A	 platform	 is	 a	 mediator	 rather	 than	 an	
intermediary:	it	shapes	the	performance	of	social	acts	instead	of	merely	facilitating	them.”135		
This	section	will	explore	how	terms	and	conditions	subtly	shape	and	structure	perspectives	





































Revolutionary	 technologies	 such	 as	 the	 printing	 press	 and	 the	 television	 often	
unleash	 a	 flood	 of	 information	 which	 necessitates	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 information	
management	 systems	 to	 act	 as	 control	mechanisms.142	These	 systems	 delineate	 between	
what	information	is	and	is	not	relevant	and	valued	in	order	to	create	order	from	the	influx	of	
data	and	as	a	result	they	become	entrenched	in	our	society.	Postman	gives	the	example	of	
school	 curriculums	 that	 “categorises	 knowledge”	 and	 “systematically	 excludes”	 certain	
information	 as	 illegitimate. 143 	Social	 media	 platforms	 also	 have	 a	 number	 of	 different	
information	management	systems	such	as	the	algorithms	governing	newsfeeds,	the	hashtags	


















process	 based	 on	 how	 content	 is	 categorised	 and	 what	 value	 is	 assigned	 to	 various	
categories.	 Crawford	 and	 Gillespie	 have	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 different	 approaches	 to	
structuring	terms	and	conditions,	all	of	which	relate	to	the	mission	of	the	platform	and	what	




way	 that	 it	 escapes	 notice.	 Langdon	Winner	 argues,	 that	 “the	 same	 careful	 attention	one	
would	give	to	the	rules,	roles,	and	relationships	of	politics	must	also	be	given	to	such	things	
as	 the	 building	 of	 highways,	 the	 creation	 of	 television	 networks,	 and	 the	 tailoring	 of	
































historically	 and	materially	 contingent	 process	 through	which	 understandings	 of	 self	 and	
society	are	formed	and	reformed.”151	
To	conclude,	social	media	is	an	excellent	example	of	how	societies	are	impacted	first	
by	 a	 new	 media	 technology	 and	 then	 again	 by	 the	 entrenchment	 of	 an	 information	
management	 system	 that	 changes	 perspectives	 and	 re-allocates	 value.	 Pfaffenberger,	 for	
example,	argues	that	the	new	interpretations	and	societal	restructuring	that	occurs	is	not	a	
natural	 by-product	 of	 the	 technological	 innovation	 but	 rather	 instigated	 by	 the	 “design	
constituency”	(the	people	and	companies	introducing	this	invention	into	society)	in	order	to	
encourage	 society	 to	embrace	 the	 innovation	 (a	process	he	 calls	 “regularisation”).152	This	



















engine,	 not	 a	 camera;	 it	 doesn’t	 just	 reflect	 realities—it	 actively	 creates	 them.” 153 	It	 is	
important	 to	 remember	 how	much	 is	 negotiable	when	 exploring	 the	 various	 issues	with	
terms	 and	 conditions	 discussed	 throughout	 this	 chapter.	 What	 seems	 to	 be	 natural	 or	







was	 created	 in	 2006	 but	 it	 wasn’t	 until	 2009	 that	 the	 company	 created	 rules	 about	 the	
content	permitted	on	the	platform.154	YouTube	spent	its	first	year	of	existence	with	nothing	
more	 than	 a	 one	 page	 bullet-pointed	 list	 for	 its	 moderators	 and	 assessors	 who	 found	
themselves	 frequently	 asking	 each	 other	 “can	 I	 share	 this	 video	with	my	 family?”	 as	 the	
litmus	test	for	regulation.155	This	de-prioritisation	of	good	regulation	means	that	terms	and	
conditions	were	(and	often	continue	to	be)	written	very	broadly	and	use	language	that	make	
the	 scope	 of	 the	 terms	 difficult	 to	 identify.	 Users	 are	 forced	 to	 accept	 these	 terms	 and	
conditions,	as	they	know	that	there	is	no	opportunity	to	renegotiate	or	modify	these	terms.156		
This	section	will	 explore	how	platforms	 fail	 to	provide	users	 certainty	by	drafting	
rules	 that	 are	 vague	 and	 difficult	 to	 interpret.	 Rules	 that	 are	 clear	 to	 everyone	 are	 the	
foundation	of	a	coherent	system	of	regulation,	“one	of	the	essential	ingredients	of	legality.”157	
This	is	Bingham’s	first	principle	of	the	rule	of	law,	that	“the	law	must	be	accessible,	and	so	










are	not	 instituting	such	 laws,	choosing	 instead	to	create	terms	and	conditions	that	are	so	
vague	that	a	“Kafkaesque	uncertainty”	emerges	online.159	If	the	goal	of	regulation	is	to	bring	
about	a	change	in	behaviour	then	the	objective	of	the	terms	and	conditions	created	by	the	
platforms	 should	 be	 to	 help	 users	 understand	what	 behaviour	 they	 should	 avoid	 on	 the	
platform,	not	merely	providing	a	basis	for	content	removal.	Clarity	then,	becomes	a	tool	to	








example,	YouTube	prohibits	 content	 it	 terms	as	 “sexualisation	of	minors”	which	 includes	
videos	“featuring	minors	involved	in	provocative,	sexual,	or	sexually	suggestive	activities.”161	
There	 is	 no	 further	 explanation	 of	 what	 such	 a	 broad	 statement	 entails	 and	 only	 a	 few	
minutes	of	searching	on	YouTube	was	able	to	produce	three	videos	that	seemed	to	plausibly	
entail	 the	 sexualisation	 of	minors.	 The	 first	 clip	was	 from	 a	Korean	 talent	 TV	 show	 and	
featured	 a	 boy	 and	 girl	who	 could	 not	 be	more	 than	 eight-years-old	 doing	 a	 sexy	 dance	
routine	on	stage	complete	with	grinding	and	twerking.	The	video	was	even	titled	“Sexy	Kid-
Another	Troublemaker.”162	The	second	clip	is	an	infamous	scene	from	the	American	reality	
show	 ‘Toddlers	 and	 Tiaras’	 (about	 child	 beauty	 pageants)	 where	 a	 four-year	 old	 girl	
performs	 a	 routine	 dressed	 as	 Julia	 Roberts’	 sex	worker	 character	 from	 ‘Pretty	Woman’	













as	 to	 allow	 almost	 any	 kind	 of	 regulation”	 that	 a	 social	 media	 platform	may	 choose	 to	
pursue.165	In	 the	 meantime,	 YouTube	 is	 perceived	 as	 condemning	 child	 sexualisation	 in	
principle	 without	 creating	 practical	 guidelines	 that	 provide	 certainty	 for	 the	 users	 who	
access	the	platform	and	protection	of	a	child’s	right	not	to	be	exploited	or	to	view	material	
that	is	“injurious	to	his	or	her	mental	and	physical	well-being.”166	





and	 therefore,	 the	 concept	 of	 loopholes	 seems	 wholly	 inapplicable.	 In	 addition,	 the	
demonization	of	law	is	especially	frustrating	as	there	is	a	tendency	by	social	media	policy-
makers168	and	 overly-optimistic	 academics169	to	 compare	 these	 terms	 and	 conditions	 to	
laws	 (replete	 with	 the	 same	 procedural	 assurances)	 without	 considering	 what	















































transparent	policies,	one	might	 cynically	ask	 if	moderating	 content	on	Pinterest	 could	be	
compared	to	playing	a	video	game	on	“easy	mode”	as	the	platform	is	most	famous	for	boards	






devoted	 to	 planning	 weddings,	 recipes,	 craft	 projects,	 interior	 design,	 and	 aspirational	
“dream	boards.”	While	the	platform	is	forced	to	deal	with	some	of	the	same	issues	that	affect	
all	 social	 media	 sites, 173 	they	 have	 largely	 escaped	 the	 high-profile	 scandals	 that	 have	
embroiled	 other	 platforms	 in	 controversy,	 such	 as	 fake	 news,	 election	 manipulation,	
extremist	activity,	and	the	harassment	of	women	and	minorities.			
Another	 common	problem	 is	 that	 platform	 terms	 and	 conditions	 are	 replete	with	
language	that	renders	the	scope	of	their	limitations	uncertain	and	imprecise.	This	makes	it	
harder	for	users	to	know	if	they	are	complying	with	the	rules,	a	determination	that	might	
only	 become	 clear	when	 content	 is	 flagged	 and/or	 removed.	 Since	many	 platforms	 have	
underdeveloped	appeals	mechanisms	(which	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Five)	it	is	more	
pressing	that	they	create	clear	regulations	that	provide	users	with	a	measure	of	certainty.	








Another	 example	 is	 OnlyFans’	 (a	 British	 platform	 for	 monetised	 profiles)	 prohibition	 on	
content	or	behaviour	that	“causes	annoyance,	inconvenience,	or	needless	anxiety	or	is	likely	
to	 upset,	 embarrass,	 alarm,	 or	 annoy	 any	 other	 person.” 176 	While	 this	 prohibition	 is	
incredibly	 broad,	 the	 term	 that	 seems	 particularly	 mystifying	 is	 “needless	 anxiety”	 as	 it	


















to	 changing	 societal	 responses	 without	 publicly	 amending	 their	 rules	 or	 making	 any	
announcements. 177 	Crawford	 and	 Gillespie	 argue	 this	 opaqueness	 allows	 social	 media	
companies	to	retain	the	ability	to	make	judgements	in	high-profile	cases	“based	on	ad	hoc	
and	 often	 self-interested	 assessments	 of	 the	 case	 at	 hand.”178 	This	 flexibility	 can	 be	 an	
advantage	of	private	standard-setters	as	“they	adjust	standards	over	time	and	can	respond	
to	 issues	quicker”179	but	 that	would	be	 the	 case	even	 if	 social	media	platforms	published	
detailed	rules	and	then	engaged	in	public	revisions.	As	platforms	are	only	legislating	for	their	
community,	 they	 would	 still	 be	 able	 to	 respond	 much	 more	 quickly	 than	 traditional	
lawmakers.	These	features	are	further	supplemented	by	unilateral	modification	clauses	in	
the	terms	and	conditions,	which	underscore	to	users	that	they	have	no	ability	to	negotiate	
the	current	 terms	and	conditions	that	 they	are	agreeing	to	but	 they	must	also	consent	 to	
these	rules	being	changed	without	their	consultation	in	the	future,	all	of	which	makes	“any	
meaningful	user	consent	largely	illusory.”180	Unfortunately,	this	elasticity	is	provided	at	the	













exercise	 and	 will	 actually	 render	 the	 laws	 normatively	 weaker.	 Reed	 argues	 that	 “laws	
drafted	in	terms	of	broad	and	open	textured	rules	have	a	much	stronger	normative	force,	at	
least	in	the	longer	term.	Their	underlying	aims	and	purposes	are	more	easily	understandable	
by	 the	 law	subjects,	 even	 if	 it	 is	not	necessarily	 clear	precisely	what	needs	 to	be	done	to	
comply	with	the	 law.”181	This	is	a	problematic	argument	because	 it	would	only	be	true	 in	
situations	where	users	perceive	the	rule	as	being	inherently	legitimate	and	actively	strive	to	















the	 lack	 of	 clear,	 coherent	 rules.	 Social	 media	 platforms	 should	 revise	 their	 terms	 and	
conditions,	 eliminating	 unclear	 language	 and	 providing	 guidance	 notes	 to	 explain	 each	
provision	in	enough	detail	that	users	can	understand	what	compliance	looks	like	before	they	












Transparency	 is	 an	 important	 element	 in	 any	 plan	 for	 reforming	 how	 social	 media	
platforms	approach	content	moderation.	It	facilitates	all	other	objectives	because	a	platform	
cannot	 be	 held	 accountable	 if	 parties	 outside	 the	 platform	 are	 unable	 to	 understand	 the	





should	 be	 prepared	 to	 communicate	 this	 externally.”188 	Transparency	 will	 be	 discussed	





really	 big	 aspirations	 around	making	 the	 world	 a	more	 open	 and	 transparent	 place.”189	
Transparency,	however,	is	not	a	reciprocal	action	on	social	media	but	rather,	as	Van	Dijck	












argues,	 surprisingly	one-sided.190	Users	are	 increasingly	encouraged	 to	 share	as	much	as	
possible	 on	 social	media	 platforms,	 an	 action	 that	 not	 only	 populates	 the	 platform	with	
original	content	but	also	provides	valuable	data	that	can	be	sold	to	third-party	advertisers.191	
Meanwhile,	social	media	companies	continue	to	perform	the	proverbial	dance	of	the	seven	
veils,	 obscuring	 their	 actions	 in	 code	 and	 proprietary	 arguments.	 Farrand	 and	Carrapico	
contrast	the	“secretive	negotiation	process”	of	social	media	platforms	with	the	“overt	law	
making”	which	public	regulatory	bodies	engage	in,	arguing	that	a	lack	of	transparency	poses	





tech	 companies	 represent	 only	 the	 latest	 challenge	 for	 regulators	who	 are	 faced	 with	 a	




concept	 that	 encompasses	 more	 than	 just	 openness.	 There	 must	 be	 an	 element	 of	
intelligibility	in	order	to	facilitate	understanding	by	ordinary	users	of	how	these	terms	and	
conditions	work.		
Transparency	 is	 an	 important	 principle	 for	 anyone	 seeking	 to	 understand	 and	 even	
reform	the	practices	of	platforms.	This	normative	value,	however,	must	be	translated	into	
concrete	 objectives	 that	 platforms	 can	 implement.	 Platforms	 should	disclose	 information	
about	how	much	content	violating	each	specific	 rule	has	been	 flagged	and	removed.	This	











and	 impacted	 users	 (where	 apparent).” 195 	Currently,	 social	 media	 platforms	 generally	
disclose	the	amount	of	content	removed	after	government	requests	but	not	the	content	that	
violates	their	terms	and	conditions,	and	not	broken	down	by	country.	One	justification	for	
this	omission,	 according	 to	 Jørgensen’s	 interviews	with	Facebook	employees,	 is	 that	 they	
don’t	perceive	their	actions	as	controversial	or	a	human	rights	issue	when	they	stem	from	
the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 government	 request. 196 	This	 explanation	 is	





veneer	 of	 being	 a	 community	 space,	 “relying	 upon	 their	 privileged	 position	 as	 private	






for	 review.	 These	 rules	 would	 leave	 moderators	 with	 a	 lot	 of	 discretion	 but	 instead,	
moderators	are	provided	with	thick	content	assessment	manuals	(internal	rules)	designed	
to	cover	every	potential	nuance	 in	moderation.	At	many	platforms	such	as	Facebook	and	
YouTube,	 these	 internal	 rules	were	 created	 before	 the	 external,	 public-facing	 terms	 and	
conditions	and	are	updated	much	more	frequently.198	This	is	another	problematic	example	
of	how	the	experience	of	users	trying	to	navigate	the	rules	of	a	platform	is	not	prioritised	as	









These	manuals	are	not	 typically	disclosed	publicly,	which	 is	why	the	manuals	 that	
were	 leaked	 to	 The	 Guardian	 in	 2017	 were	 so	 fascinating.	 One	 particularly	 interesting	
example	was	the	content	assessment	manual	on	terrorism.	The	manual	was	highly	detailed,	
splitting	 terrorist	 content	 into	 a	 huge	 number	 of	 sub-categories	 (all	 of	 which	 required	
different	approaches)	such	as:	Contemporary	Activity	Primary	Focus,	Contemporary	Activity	
Incidental	 Focus,	 Symbols/Leaders:	 Primary	 Focus,	 Symbols/Leaders:	 Incidental	 Focus,	
Historical	 Activity	 and	 Historical	 Artefacts. 199 	This	 detailed	 guide	 on	 terrorism	 would	
complement	 the	 moderator’s	 own	 knowledge	 as	 it	 was	 disclosed	 to	 The	 Guardian	 that	
moderators	are	also	provided	with	a	44-page	document	 featuring	the	names	and	faces	of	
terrorist	 leaders	 and	 their	 groups,	 and	 are	 expected	 to	 familiarise	 themselves	 with	 this	
information	(along	with	the	other	aspects	of	content	moderation	such	as	the	importance	of	
context)	within	the	 first	 two	weeks	of	 the	 job.200	All	of	 this	should	be	contrasted	with	the	
information	 that	 is	 given	 to	 Facebook	 users	 about	 what	 kind	 of	 terrorist	 content	 is	
prohibited.	 Facebook	 states	 that	 they	 don’t	 allow	 “organisations	 or	 individuals	 involved	
in…terrorist	activity”	and	that	they	also	“remove	content	that	expresses	support	or	praise	
for	groups,	 leaders,	or	 individuals	 involved	 in	these	activities.”	201	No	 list	of	organisations	
considered	terrorist	by	Facebook	is	provided	and	no	further	definitions	of	what	expressing	
“support	or	praise”	entails	can	be	found	on	the	platform.	The	detailed	information	provided	
to	 moderators	 in	 no	 way	 reflects	 the	 information	 provided	 to	 users.	 This	 is	 especially	
important	as	social	media	becomes	more	universal	as	there	is	a	significant	amount	of	debate	





























read	more	 like	 detailed	 terms	 and	 conditions,	 a	 definite	 improvement	over	what	 existed	
before	on	the	platform	but	still	largely	devoid	of	the	examples	and	contextual	information	to	
truly	make	these	rules	accessible	to	users.	These	guidelines	were	released	in	2018	during	
the	 Cambridge	 Analytica	 scandal	 so	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 this	 bid	 for	 transparency	was	 a	
political	decision	although	it	failed	to	capture	the	public’s	attention.		













This	discussion	 should	not	be	perceived	 as	a	 specific	 criticism	of	Facebook	as	 the	













made	 to	 the	 adherents	 that	 these	 are	 the	 rules	 that	 will	 be	 applied	 to	 their	
actions.207Applying	a	different	set	of	rules	is	a	serious	breach	of	the	rule	of	law	and	is	widely	
condemned	 by	 Bingham.208	This	 continuity	 allows	 people	 to	 ascertain	 prohibitions	 with	
certainty	and	adjust	their	behaviour	to	avoid	sanction.	The	creation	of	these	rules	is	clearly	
very	important	and	platforms	should	ensure	that	they	constitute	good	regulation	and	reflect	
the	 basic	 principles	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 such	 as	 clarity,	 stability,	 and	 publicity.209 	These	
principles	are	 focused	on	the	ability	of	citizens	to	comply	with	the	 law	but	 there	are	also	
other	considerations	such	as	the	procedural	protections	owed	to	subjects.210	Unfortunately,	
this	theme	of	the	publicly-shared	content	moderation	policies	and	processes	being	treated	
as	 ancillary	 to	 the	 actual	 task	 of	 regulating	 platforms	will	 be	 reiterated	 throughout	 this	
thesis.		









It	might	 seem	 strange	 for	 social	media	 platforms	 to	 refuse	 to	 share	 their	 content	
assessment	manuals	with	 the	 public	 but	 this	 practice	 offers	 a	 number	 of	 benefits	 to	 the	
companies.	First,	this	secrecy	means	that	platforms	are	not	forced	to	justify	to	the	public	the	
strange,	often	arbitrary	distinctions	they	make	when	assessing	content.	In	2012,	Facebook	
hired	 an	 outside	 firm	 to	 create	 a	 content	 assessment	 manual	 for	 their	 content	 teams.	




similar	 backlash	 against	 the	 2017	 leak	 of	 Facebook’s	 updated	 content	 assessment	
manuals. 213 	Of	 course,	 media	 derision	 and	 public	 debate	 often	 occur	 when	 democratic	
governments	pass	laws	but	social	media	companies	seem	determined	to	avoid	this	important	
feature	 of	 accountability.	 Klonick	 argues	 that	 this	 lack	 of	 accountability	 “lays	 bare	 our	
dependence	on	these	private	platforms	to	exercise	our	public	rights”214	and	it	is	clear	that	
platforms	 are	 not	 interested	 in	 encouraging	 a	 culture	 of	 justification	 or	 even	 providing	
explanations	for	their	conduct.		
Another	reason	platforms	refuse	to	share	their	internal	guidelines	with	users	is	that	




















but	 this	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 sufficient	 justification	 for	 keeping	 content	 moderation	
guidelines	 secret,	 especially	 when	 publicly	 available	 rules	 might	 actually	 decrease	 the	
amount	of	impermissible	content	on	the	platform.	It	is	arguable	that	some	flagged	content	is	
shared	by	users	who	are	unaware	that	the	content	violates	the	terms	and	conditions.	This	






The	 internal	 moderation	 guide	 should	 be	 made	 available	 to	 the	 public.	 Of	 course,	
platforms	 should	 redact	 any	 graphic	 imagery	 in	 the	manuals	 and	merely	 provide	 verbal	
descriptions	of	any	distressing	content.	This	disclosure	would	help	to	remedy	the	disparity	
of	 information	 between	 the	 platform	 and	 the	 users,	 and	 would	 provide	 a	 much-needed	
element	of	certainty	on	how	these	rules	are	 interpreted	to	users.	 It	would	allow	users	 to	
understand	the	motivations	behind	these	terms	and	conditions	and	then	challenge	the	ones	
that	 seem	 to	 conflict	with	 human	 rights	 values.	Disclosing	 the	 internal	 guide	would	 also	
contribute	 to	 creating	a	 culture	of	 justification	on	 the	platform,	whereby	 those	who	 limit	
freedom	of	expression,	participation	in	cultural	life,	or	the	right	to	privacy	must	justify	those	
limitations	 to	 the	 users.219 	Transparency,	 therefore,	 becomes	 an	 important	 tool	 for	 the	
accountability	of	platforms	but	it	is	one	that	we	must	demand	of	platforms	because	they	are	
unlikely	 to	 engage	 in	 it	 willingly.	 Consequently,	 Bonnici	 and	 De	 Vey	 argue	 that	 until	 we	
acknowledge	 that	 transparency	 is	 not	 a	 priority	 for	 these	 companies	 (and	 that	we	must	
demand	 they	 prioritise	 it)	 any	 plans	 dependent	 on	 these	 platforms	 becoming	 more	
transparent	are	doomed	to	fail.220		
















and	 remedy	 any	 potential	 human	 rights	 issues. 223 	Unfortunately,	 while	 platform	
spokespeople	 often	 engage	 in	 rhetoric	 comparing	 the	 platforms	 to	 communities	 and	
democracies,224	the	actual	governance	style	on	these	platforms	is	much	more	authoritarian.	
In	fact,	the	current	approach	to	the	creation	and	amendment	of	terms	and	conditions	at	most	
social	 media	 platforms	 resembles	 a	 classic	 command-and-control	 structure,	 which	 can	
impoverish	the	legitimacy	and	efficacy	of	the	moderation	process.		
Creating	spaces	where	individuals	can	participate	in	discussions	about	the	rules	that	






























Participation,	 therefore,	 is	 an	 important	 value	 for	 perceptions	 of	 legitimacy	 and	
strengthens	 rule	 of	 law	 principles	 but	 these	 values	 need	 to	 be	 focused	 into	 workable	
strategies	 that	 could	 be	 implemented	 by	 social	 media	 companies.	 First,	 any	 proposals	






content	 that	 is	and	 is	not	allowed	on	the	platform.	These	polls	would	be	an	easy	way	for	
















platforms	 to	 take	 the	 community	 temperature	because,	 as	many	 lawyers	who	work	with	
social	 media	 platforms	 acknowledge,	 the	 norms	 of	 social	 media	 community	 are	 always	
evolving.229	It	could	also	be	likened	to	the	traditional	administrative	law	procedure	of	notice-
and-comment	whereby	agencies	publish	a	rule,	ask	for	comment	from	any	interested	parties	
in	 the	 public,	 and	 issue	 a	 final	 rule	 that	 explains	 their	 reasoning	 and	 responds	 to	 any	
important	comments.230		
Another	way	 for	 platforms	 to	 enhance	 participation	 is	 for	 them	 to	 create	 a	 space	
where	users	can	engage	in	“vital	public	negotiations”	and	debate	various	aspects	of	the	terms	
and	 conditions	 and	 the	moderation	 process.231	These	 discussions	would	 supplement	 the	
formal	moderation	process	and	could	provide	important	information	to	the	policy	teams	at	
the	 platform,	 who	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 forum	where	 they	 could	 identify	 the	 “evolving	
expectations	from	our	community.”232	These	forums	for	participation	would	demonstrate	a	
commitment	 to	 users	 and	 would	 improve	 the	 perception	 of	 platforms	 as	 legitimate	
regulators.	This	idea	will	be	revisited	in	Chapter	Five.			
Finally,	 individual	 users	 should	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 feedback	 on	 the	 terms	 and	
conditions	directly	 to	the	platform.	Currently,	most	social	media	platforms	allow	users	 to	
respond	to	specific	moderation	decisions	made	about	 them	(usually	by	ticking	boxes	and	
choosing	 preselected	 answers)	 but	 do	 not	 provide	 avenues	 for	 concerned	 users	 to	
proactively	 raise	 concerns	about	 the	 content	guidelines	of	 a	platform.233	This	means	 that	
users	can	only	engage	directly	with	the	platform	when	they	post	prohibited	content,	which	
undermines	the	ability	of	 the	majority	of	 rule-abiding	platform	users	 to	 comment	on	 the	
rules	that	govern	the	site.	Some	critics	have	contended	that	users	even	engage	in	“frivolous	
appeals”	 because	 the	 user	 finds	 “certain	 provisions	 of	 in	 the	 company’s	 Terms	 of	 Use	
























should	 create	 channels	 for	 gathering	 input	 from	moderators	 as	 well.	 A	 researcher	 who	
interviewed	a	diverse	sample	of	moderators	discovered	that	many	of	them	were	frustrated	
by	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 expertise	 was	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 and	 their	 suggestions	 about	
policies	were	neither	solicited	nor	valued.237	Instead,	policies	were	drafted	by	senior	staff	at	
social	media	platforms	with	no	input	from	the	individuals	moderating	content	on	a	day-to-

















and	 unambiguous	 terms	of	 service.”238	Unfortunately,	 nine	 years	 later,	 the	 actions	 of	 the	
major	 social	 media	 platforms	 fall	 short	 of	 these	 recommendations.	 This	 is	 problematic	
because	 these	 rules	matter	 in	 a	world	 that	 is	becoming	more	 and	more	 reliant	 on	 social	
media	as	a	mediator	for	the	human	experience.	The	codes	of	conduct	created	by	platforms	
have	an	impact	on	our	lives	and	these	rules	exist	in	an	“interdependent	relationship	with	
legal	 codes”	 because	 “where	 one	 fails,	 the	 other	 is	 under	more	 pressure	 to	 succeed,	 and	
where	 one	 develops,	 the	 other	may	wither.”239	Platforms	 have	 been	 given	 a	 tremendous	
amount	of	discretion	in	how	they	regulate	their	spaces	because	of	their	technical	abilities	to	
handle	 a	 large	 volume	 of	 content	 and	 the	 misperception	 that	 what	 happens	 on	 these	
platforms	is	of	no	real	consequence.	The	current	approach	to	content	moderation,	however,	
has	 created	 a	 lot	 of	 issues	 and	 the	 problems	 that	 exist	 at	 the	 creation	 stage	 are	 further	
exacerbated	by	the	enforcement	stage,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.		
	















content	 should	 be	 visible	on	 the	platform,	 a	 person’s	 account	 should	 be	 suspended,	or	 a	
group	should	be	removed.	The	last	chapter	focused	on	the	creation	of	terms	and	conditions	
and	 a	 number	 of	 problems	were	 identified	 in	how	 these	 standards	were	 developed.	 The	
enforcement	stage	complements	the	creation	stage	and	can	either	help	or	hinder	the	reform	
of	the	creation	process.	Baldwin	and	Cave	capture	this	interplay	between	the	various	stages	

































Silicon	Valley	offices.244	These	 in-house	moderators	still	 exist,	 they	are	 typically	hired	on	
short-term	contracts,	kept	separate	from	other	employees,	and	barred	from	the	attractive	
benefits	packages	that	other	employees	enjoy.245	These	employees	exist	in	a	liminal	space,	














bifurcated	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 company	 despite	 performing	 an	 essential	 role.	 As	 the	




rights.246	While	 contractors	were	 also	 hired	 in	 various	 locations	 in	America,	 Ireland,	 and	




one	 cent	 (US)	 per	 decision.249	Companies	 typically	 use	 a	 hybrid	 approach,	 employing	 in-





the	 number	 of	 content	 moderators	 working	 for	 social	 media	 platforms	 as	 between	




















social	 media	 companies. 255 	These	 teams	 are	 still	 kept	 separate	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
organisation	and	“siloed”	into	“isolated	corporate	enclaves”	both	in-house	at	the	companies	
and	 at	 special	 content	 assessment	 sites	 where	 they	 must	 sign	 strict	 Non-Disclosure	
Agreements	 (NDA’s). 256 	Most	 research	 must	 therefore	 be	 done	 under	 the	 condition	 of	
anonymity	 or	 with	 disgruntled	 employees	 like	 Amine	 Derail,	 the	 man	 who	 leaked	 the	
Facebook	guide	to	Gawker.257	These	NDA’s	can	be	very	problematic	for	employees	who	are	
struggling	with	 the	 upsetting	 content	 they	 view	 at	work	 as	 it	 inhibits	 their	 ability	 to	 get	
support	 from	 friends	and	 family.258	For	example,	 a	 recent	 report	on	Cognizant,	 a	Florida-
based	moderation	 contractor	 for	Facebook,	 found	 that	many	workers	were	 subsequently	
diagnosed	with	Post-Traumatic	Stress	Disorder	(PTSD)	and	were	not	warned	that	these	jobs	
would	be	 ill-suited	 for	 individuals	with	a	history	of	anxiety	and	depression.259	This	raises	
questions	of	whether	their	rights	to	the	“highest	attainable	standard	of	physical	and	mental	




asks	 how	 we	 “effect	 change	 on	 moderation	 practices	 if	 they’re	 treated	 as	 industrial	
secrets?"261		




















Despite	 claiming	 to	 disrupt	 traditional	 power	 arrangements,	media	 platforms	 are	
replicating	 the	 problematic	 practices	 of	many	 large	 corporations.	 These	 companies	 take	
advantage	 of	 the	 power	 disparity	 between	 the	 developed	 and	 the	 developing	 world	 to	
concentrate	the	unsavoury	aspects	of	their	businesses	in	the	Global	South.	These	roles	are	
contracted	 and	 outsourced	 so	 that	 they	 can	 be	 kept	 separate	 from	 the	 more	 attractive	
aspects	of	work	 in	Silicon	Valley	and	 in	order	to	give	platforms	a	measure	of	distance,	or	
plausible	deniability,	from	the	emotional	disturbances	and	trauma	that	the	moderators	they	
employ	 will	 experience. 262 	Roberts	 likens	 this	 separation	 of	 the	 roles	 at	 a	 social	 media	
company	to	Western	practices	of	shipping	garbage	to	the	Global	South,	calling	the	content	













of	 the	 places	 in	 the	world	 for	which	 the	 content	 is	 destined”	 and	 therefore	must	 situate	
themselves	as	an	 imagined	member	of	 that	community,	regardless	of	 their	own	beliefs	or	
experiences.	Roberts	calls	this	a	“phenomenon	of	cultural	and	linguistic	embodiment”266	and	
likens	it	to	out-sourced	call-centres	but	the	analogy	is	debatable	as	one	interacts	with	call-










fact	 that	 the	 cultures	 they	 inhabit	 on	 social	 media	 can	 be	 distressing,	 such	 as	 when	 a	
moderator	must	 become	 “steeped	 in	 the	 racist,	 homophobic,	 and	misogynist	 tropes	 and	
language	of	another	culture”	in	order	to	make	decisions	about	the	context-heavy	category	of	
hate	 speech.267	These	moderators	 work	 in	 Special	 Economic	 Zones,	 places	which	 Saskia	
Sassen	explains	are	where	“an	actual	piece	of	land	becomes	denationalised”268	and	so	too	the	










in	 content	 moderation.	 For	 example,	 algorithms	 facilitate	 ex	 ante	 moderation,	 which	
prohibits	objectionable	 content	 from	being	posted	or	 flags	 it	 for	 consideration	by	human	
moderators	as	soon	as	it	is	processed.269	It	is	estimated	that	one-third	of	all	content	flagged	













required	 to	 remove	 (such	 as	 CSAM,	 copyright	 violations,	 and	 certain	 categories	 of	 hate	
speech)	because	programmers,	who	often	have	no	legal	background,	interpret	regulations	in	











extended	 to	 also	 apply	 to	 extremist	 content.	 The	 programme	works	 by	 attaching	 unique	
digital	fingerprints	(called	hashes)	to	each	piece	of	content	that	has	been	deemed	CSAM	or	





to	 monitor	 the	 database	 and	 also	 for	 transparency	 on	 how	 decisions	 about	 prohibiting	
content	are	made.275	These	assertions	are	reasonable	but	unlikely	to	be	fulfilled	by	a	group	
of	 companies	 that	 has	 consistently	 engaged	 in	 secretive	 regulation	 with	 no	 impartial	
contributions.	The	PhotoDNA	system	also	raises	concerns	that	after	content	has	been	added	
to	the	hash	database	then	there	will	be	a	presumption	in	favour	of	removal	communicated	



























we	 might	 have	 to	 critique	 and	 demand	 changes	 to	 algorithmic	 processing. 278 	These	
algorithmic	 processes,	 therefore,	 lack	 transparency,	 which	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	
procedural	 protections	 that	 underlie	 any	 regulatory	 bid	 for	 legitimacy. 279 	This	
unintelligibility	 is	 rendered	 more	 absolute	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 unlike	 human	 moderators,	















content	 regulation	 on	 social	 media	 platforms:	 transparency.	 Both	 the	 actions	 of	 human	
moderators	 and	 algorithmic	 moderators	 are	 kept	 hidden	 from	 ordinary	 users	 and	 are	
rendered	impervious	to	investigations.	This	is	problematic	because	these	moderators	have	
a	significant	 impact	on	the	world	we	experience	on	social	media	and	yet,	 the	policy	 from	
senior	members	of	 these	platforms	 is	 to	 share	as	 little	 information	about	how	content	 is	
regulated	with	the	public	as	possible.	Martin	Ammori,	who	takes	an	overly	optimistic	view	
of	these	social	media	platforms,	claims	that	“fifty	years	from	now,	though,	we	will	remember	
these	 lawyers	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 how	 millions	 of	 people	 experience	 freedom	 of	
expression.”281	This	 assertion	 is	 contradicted	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 users	will	 never	 be	 able	 to	
remember	 something	 that	 they	 never	 knew	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Unlike	 landmark	 free	
expression	 cases	 that	 were	 fought	 in	 an	 open	 courtroom	 and	 publicly	 reported,	 the	
moderators	of	 social	media	 live	 in	a	 shadow	world	of	NDA’s	and	proprietary	knowledge.	

















Questionable	 content	 on	 the	 platform	 is	 identified	 by	 users	 or	 algorithms	 that	 flag	
content	as	potentially	violating	the	content	guidelines.	A	large	volume	of	content	is	uploaded	
to	services	like	YouTube	and	Facebook	and	the	report-and-remove	mechanism	mobilises	the	
equally	 vast	 numbers	 of	 users	 to	wade	 through	 the	 deluge.	 The	 flag	 is	 a	 symbol	 of	 user	
condemnation,	 an	 attempt	 to	 codify	 complaints	 and	 translate	 a	 sense	 of	 distaste	 into	 an	
actionable	 data-point.283	This	 flagging	 process,	 however,	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	






hour	of	dissemination.285	Morozov	calls	 this	process	 “crowd-sourced	censorship”286	but	 a	
more	apt	description	may	be	crowd-sourced	enforcement,	as	everyday	users	help	to	police	
the	 site.	 Users	 are	 integral	 to	 the	 flagging	 system,	making	 them	 “uncompensated	 digital	
labourers”	who	are	unaware	of	the	services	they	deliver	to	the	platform	along	with	access	to	
their	 valuable	 personal	 data.287	The	majority	 of	 social	media	 platforms	 use	 this	 flagging	
system,	reviewing	content	only	when	it	is	brought	to	their	attention.	One	major	exception	is	
the	secret-sharing	app	Whisper,	which	reviews	all	content	posted	on	the	site,	approving	each	












post	before	 it	becomes	publicly	available.288	One	wonders,	however,	 if	 this	would	ever	be	
feasible	for	larger	platforms	like	Facebook	or	YouTube.		
Once	the	content	is	flagged	(whether	by	a	human	or	an	algorithm)	content	moderators	
decide	whether	 it	should	be	 retained,	 removed,	 and/or	whether	 the	disseminator	should	
have	their	account	suspended.	These	decisions	are	usually	made	by	low-level	staffers,	who	
use	internal	content	manuals	(see	3.4.2),	combined	with	information	they	have	committed	
to	 memory	 in	 order	 to	 speed	 up	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 These	 moderators	 are	
expected	to	evaluate	content	extremely	quickly.	One	moderator	disclosed	that	staffers	must	
assess	 at	 least	 2000	 pictures	 an	 hour,	 giving	 them	 a	 decision-making	 window	 of	 33	
seconds.289 	This	 astonishing	 pace	 seems	 generous	 compared	 to	 Facebook’s	 moderation	
teams,	where	users	are	expected	to	make	a	decision	every	ten	seconds.290	These	strict	time-
frames	makes	one	wonder	whether	social	media	regulators	are	really	moderating	on	reflex,	
forced	 to	 react	 instead	 of	 being	 given	 time	 to	evaluate	 and	 consider	 their	 response.	 It	 is	
almost	as	 if	 the	expectations	 for	moderators	are	aligned	with	algorithmic	performance,	 a	
daunting	prospect	for	any	employee.291			
Some	 commentators	 are	 overly	 optimistic	 of	 what	 the	 content-moderation	 process	
entails	and	might	even	go	so	far	as	comparing	it	to	a	fully	functioning	judicial	body.	Klonick	
for	example,	seems	to	afford	the	practices	of	social	media	companies	too	much	deference	and	




trigger	political	bias.293	The	 results	 indicated	 that	 judges,	 and	 to	a	 lesser	degree	 lawyers,	
came	to	consistent	conclusions	free	of	bias	whereas	law	students	(like	the	general	public)	












through	 experience:	 people	 can	 be	 trained	 in	 domain-specific	 areas	 to	 overcome	 their	
cultural	biases	and	to	apply	rules	neutrally.	Just	as	this	truth	is	an	essential	part	of	the	legal	
system,	 it	 is	an	essential	part	of	Facebook’s	moderation	system.”294	Klonick’s	reasoning	 is	
flawed	because	most	moderators	are	only	given	a	couple	of	weeks	of	training	(presumably	
the	law	students	in	the	study	would	have	had	more	education	than	that)	so	it	is	unrealistic	
to	 assume	 that	 these	 moderators	 will	 behave	 as	 objectively	 as	 judges	 and	 lawyers.	
Moderators	are	also	expected	to	make	decisions	within	seconds,	a	parameter	that	would	be	
inconceivable	in	the	legal	world.	Similar	legitimising	arguments	are	made	by	Ammori,	who	
argues	that	“The	terms	of	 these	policies	often	take	the	 form	of	 traditional	 legal	rules	and	
standards…they	 have	 just	 as	 much	 validity.”295	This	 is	 an	 overestimation	 of	 the	 content	
guidelines	 at	 platforms,	which	 Chapter	 Three	 argued	 are	 seriously	 flawed.	 It	 also	 seems	
unlikely	that	a	valid	legal	system	would	be	so	lacking	in	procedural	safeguards.		
Unfortunately,	effective	platform	regulation	has	become	conflated	with	mere	deletion	by	







will	 be	 deterred	 by	 the	 regulator’s	 current	 or	 prospective	 approach	 to	 enforcement.”299	
Removing	content	is	only	a	superficial	remedy	and	offers	no	real	promise	of	a	reduction	of	
antisocial	behaviour	on	the	platform	in	the	future.	The	current	content	moderation	regime,	









therefore,	 does	 not	 represent	 an	 effective	 approach	 because,	 as	 Julia	 Black	 argues,	 good	
regulation	focuses	on	achieving	outcomes	rather	than	technical	compliance.300		
The	majority	of	platforms,	therefore,	fail	to	create	practices	that	can	initiate	change	
in	 the	behaviour	of	 regulatees,	 thus	 failing	 to	 institute	Black’s	 conception	of	outcome-led	





gotten	more	and	more	restrictive	and	that’s	 true	not	 just	at	Facebook	but	 for	all	 the	large	
social	media	companies.”301	Bickert	is	saying	that	this	is	a	positive	change,	that	restrictiveness	












content	prohibited	 is	 to	earmark	a	 species	 for	extinction.	This	 is	not	 to	argue	 that	 social	
media	 platforms	 should	 not	 prohibit	 and	 remove	 content,	 but	 rather	 that	 they	 should	










ecosystem,	 before	 certain	 categories	 of	 expression	 become	 endangered	 species	 on	 social	





media	 behaviour.	 An	 early	 challenge	 for	 platforms	 was	 when	 ISIS	 began	 to	 establish	 a	
presence	on	 social	media,	 creating	a	patchwork	of	violent	videos,	domestic	pictures,	 and	
groups	designed	to	facilitate	the	recruitment	and	transportation	of	both	men	and	women	to	
Iraq	and	Syria.	This	content	was	interspersed	with	seemingly	innocuous	content	designed	to	
normalise	 ISIS	 such	 as	 ‘The	 Cats	 of	Mujahedeen’	which	 featured	 fighters	 in	 combat	 gear	






inherently	 unpredictable,	 difficult	 to	 interrupt,	 and	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 algorithmic	
moderation	because	the	content	is	simultaneously	shared	and	uploaded	to	the	platform.309	
They	 weaken	 the	 power	 of	 the	 moderator	 and	 allow	 some	 of	 the	 most	 disturbing	 acts	















captured	 on	 film	 to	 be	 shared	with	 no	 oversight.	 This	 content	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 incite	
violence	 against	 others,	 is	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 privacy	 rights	 of	 the	 victims,	 and	 if	 shared	
without	restrictions	would	be	accessible	to	children	which	could	be	“injurious	to	his	or	her	




350,000	 times	 (and	 shared	widely)	 in	 the	 twenty-four	hours	 that	 it	 remained	 up	 on	 the	
platform	 before	 it	 was	 finally	 removed.311	Other	 platforms	with	 a	 live-streaming	 feature	
(such	as	Periscope	(later	acquired	by	Twitter),	YouTube	Live,	Instagram	Live,	and	Twitch’s	
Lifestreaming	feature)		have	similarly	struggled	with	the	murders,	sexual	assaults,	physical	
attacks,	 and	 suicides	 that	 people	 choose	 to	 film.	 Surette	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 a	 history	 of	
performative	crime	that	predates	social	media	(terrorist	and	anarchist	groups	for	example	
often	engaged	in	such	behaviour)	but	there	was	also	a	place	for	performative	justice	(most	
notably	 public	 executions)	 that	 no	 longer	 exists	 today. 312 	This	 hearkens	 back	 to	 the	


































This	 failure	 to	 anticipate	 issues	 and	 develop	 new	 methods	 of	 moderation	 resulted	 in	 a	
serious	governance	gap	on	social	media.	It	is	also	a	violation	of	the	UNGP’s,	which	state	that	
business	 should	 “avoid	 causing	 or	 contributing	 to	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts”	 by	
identifying	 and	 preventing	 impacts	 before	 they	 occur. 317 	Finally,	 regardless	 of	 their	

























which	 depicted	 illegal	 acts)	 to	 be	 associated	with	 their	 brand	 and	 stream	 to	 their	users.	
















is	 that	 limitations	 on	 expression	 are	 applied	 inconsistently	 and	may	 replicate	 the	 biases	
experienced	 by	 the	 predominantly	white	 and	male	 staffers	 at	 social	media	 platforms.319	
These	 staff	 members	 devise	 content	 assessment	 strategies	 to	 be	 employed	 by	 content	
assessment	teams	and	algorithms.	Bias	is	a	problematic	quality	in	regulation	because	it	calls	
into	question	the	fairness	of	the	regulations.	It	also	reduces	certainty	as	users	will	be	unable	








section	 can	 only	 provide	 an	 overview	of	 bias	 in	 technology	 it	will	 attempt	 to	 examine	 a	
number	of	ways	that	differential	treatment	infiltrates	the	content-moderation	process.		
Both	 human	 and	 algorithmic	 moderators	 hold	 biases	 because	 the	 prejudices	 and	
assumptions	 that	 organically	 occur	 in	 humans	 are	 held	 by	 both	 moderators	 and	 the	
programmers	 who	 create	 algorithms.	 The	 choice	 of	 training	 data	 and	 the	 definition	 of	
parameters	 for	 algorithmic	 regulation	 are	 not	 neutral	 activities	 and	 can	 result	 in	 biased	
processes	 that	might	only	grow	more	 prominent	 through	machine-learning	processes.320	
There	is	a	perception	that	algorithms	are	inherently	more	objective	than	human	moderators	
but	this	is	a	myth.	As	Brown	and	Marsden	write	“code	is	no	more	neutral	than	regulation,	
with	each	subject	 to	monopoly	and	capture	by	commercial	 interests.”321	No	technology	 is	
neutral,	 it	 is	 embedded	 with	 values	 and	 politics	 that	 differ	 only	 from	 human-centric	
processes	 in	 their	 comprehensibility	 by	 lay-people.	 Pasquale	 contends	 that	 all	 that	
algorithmic	processes	have	done,	therefore,	is	to	“drive	discrimination	upstream.”322	
Human	moderators	 can	 express	 bias	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways.	 The	 first,	 shared	with	
algorithms,	 is	 that	 they	 can	 express	 the	 value-choices	 and	 beliefs	of	 the	 executive	 policy	
teams	at	social	media	platforms.	These	activities	often	reify	the	status	quo	embraced	by	the	
Western	white	males	who	dominate	leadership	positions	in	Silicon	Valley.	A	clear	example	
of	 this	 is	 the	 topic	of	blood.	There	are	a	number	of	 examples	of	platforms	distinguishing	
between	 depictions	 of	 blood	 in	 the	 context	 of	 accidents	 and	 violence	 and	 depictions	 of	
menstrual	 blood.323	It	 might	 be	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 menstrual	 blood	 is	 a	 normal	















feature	 of	 half	of	 the	world’s	 lived	 experience	 and	 is	 related	 to	 important	 topics	 such	 as	
women’s	health	and	should	not	be	sanctioned	on	social	media	platforms.324	It	also	might	be	





aspects	of	 their	 lives	 that	differ	 from	 the	male	experience.	This	means	 that	 it	 is	perfectly	
permissible	in	Facebook’s	moderation	guidelines	to	post	a	picture	of	a	man	shot	in	the	head,	
lying	 in	 a	 pool	 of	 his	 own	 blood	 as	 long	 as	 the	 caption	 is	 “condemning	 rather	 than	




with	 body	 hair	 were	 removed,	 similar	 photos	 of	 slimmer,	 hairless	 women	 remained	



























womanhood	 but	 that	 “it’s	men	 that	 social	media	 giants	 are	 “protecting”	 -	men	who	have	
grown	up	on	sanitised	and	sexualised	images	of	female	bodies.	Men	who	have	been	taught	




platform	 could	 include	 the	 protracted	 harassment	 and	 threats	 of	 sexual	 violence	 levied	
against	female	users.	It	should	be	noted	that	many	social	media	platforms	have	changed	their	
policies	over	time,	making	them	more	responsive	to	the	concerns	of	women	and	persons	of	









large	numbers	of	social	media	users.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	 identify	how	these	beliefs	about	 the	
world	 and	 what	 should	 be	 prohibited	 in	 the	 public	 discourse	 affect	 the	 social	 media	
experience	but	these	assumptions	must	be	identified	and	challenged.	It	is	also	important	to	
agitate	 for	 alternative	 perspectives	 on	 the	 world	 to	 be	 included,	 because	 otherwise,	 as	













Crawford	 writes	 “we	 risk	 constructing	 machine	 intelligence	 that	 mirrors	 a	 narrow	 and	
privileged	vision	of	society,	with	its	old,	familiar	biases	and	stereotypes.”333	
Another	 way	 that	 human	moderators	 can	 express	 bias	 is	 in	 making	 decisions	 in	
relation	to	flagged	content.	Because	moderators	must	make	decisions	so	quickly,	it	is	likely	
that	they	resort	to	heuristics	and	schemas	to	come	to	a	conclusion,	using	what	Kahneman	





particular	 category,	 such	 as	 the	 prohibitions	 against	 hate	 speech,	 terrorist	 content,	 and	
bullying.	This	can	result	 in	differential	outcomes	 for	similar	content,	such	as	 the	research	
finding	that	Islamist	accounts	faced	much	more	suspension	pressure	than	white	supremacist	
ones	on	Twitter.336		
Algorithms	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 be	 more	 problematic	 than	 human	 moderators	
because	while	 they	are	also	 likely	 to	display	embedded	biases,	 they	are	perceived	by	 the	
general	public	as	inherently	objective,	resulting	in	users	placing	more	faith	in	them	than	they	
might	 endow	 a	 human	moderator.	 One	 of	 Kranzberg’s	 six	 laws	 of	 technology	 states	 that	
“technology	 is	 neither	 good	 nor	 bad;	 nor	 is	 it	 neutral.” 337 	Unfortunately,	 too	 often	 the	
partiality	of	technology	is	obscured	by	layers	of	programming	and	faux-objectivity	that	make	
it	harder	to	uncover.	Algorithms	are	programmed	by	people	and	“allow	prejudices	to	become	



















everyday	 algorithmic	 systems.”339	In	 addition,	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 for	 outsiders	 to	 identify	
these	biases	as	the	algorithms	are	designated	by	companies	as	proprietary	knowledge.340		
	 In	conclusion,	it	must	be	presumed	that	the	content	moderation	process	is	suffused	
with	 biases	 and	 it	 would	 naive	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 system	 could	 be	 rendered	 entirely	
impartial	and	objective.	There	is	room	for	improvement,	however,	and	the	first	step	must	
always	be	 transparency.	Details	of	 the	enforcement	process	must	be	made	public	so	 that	
biases	can	be	identified	and	platforms	can	be	held	accountable.	Transparency	is	frequently	





One	 problem	with	 the	 enforcement	 of	 terms	 and	 conditions	 on	 platforms	 is	 that	
whenever	they	are	faced	with	a	new	issue	or	controversy,	social	media	companies	focus	on	
providing	 narrow	 solutions	 centred	on	 efficiency	 rather	 than	 considering	 the	 underlying	
problems	that	they	routinely	face.	For	example,	platforms	often	fixate	on	how	fast	content	
can	be	removed	after	it	is	posted,	a	narrative	that	this	section	will	argue	has	also	influenced	
political	 discussions	 around	 social	 media.	 Arguably,	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 obsession	 with	
removal	is	largely	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	a	simpler	variable	for	social	media	companies	to	
address	 and	 it	 is	 a	 parameter	 that	 can	 be	 measured	 and	 adjusted	 using	 technological	
methods.	 Morozov	 borrows	 a	 term	 from	 architecture	 to	 describe	 this	 behaviour	 as	







with	 sweeping	 technological	 solutions	without	 any	 concerted	 attempt	 to	 examine	 larger	
issues	 at	 play. 341 	Solving	 any	 problem	 (no	 matter	 how	 minor)	 is	 celebrated,	 despite	

















represent	 what	 is	 “efficient	 or	 appropriate	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 system	 being	
developed.”346	Efficiency,	therefore,	becomes	a	clearly	achievable	goal	that	is	amenable	to	all	













technology	 has	 the	 capacity	 and	 the	 performativity	 to	 solve	 all	 problems	 within	 the	
platform.”347 	Clearly,	 larger	 debates	 about	 human	 rights,	 good	 governance,	 and	 societal	
goods	 are	 de-prioritised	 by	 this	 code-centric	 approach.	 This	 echoes	 Thoreau’s	 famous	
pronouncement	 that	 our	 inventions	 are	 but	 improved	means	 to	 an	 unimproved	 end. 348	
Platforms	often	respond	to	scandals	by	increasing	efficiency	especially	in	their	moderation	
procedures.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 examples	 of	 this	 was	 in	 2011,	 when	 Google	 and	 Facebook	
responded	 to	 concerns	 raised	 in	 a	 presidential	 summit	 about	 teenage	 cyber-bullying	 by	
introducing	 systems	 that	 would	 make	 it	 easier	 for	 bullying	 content	 to	 be	 flagged	 and	




will	 reach	 a	 point	 where	 “the	 costs	 of	 further	 enforcement	 are	 not	 justified	 by	 the	
gains.”350This	 pattern	 of	 addressing	 symptoms	 of	 larger	 societal	 conflicts	with	 simplistic	







the	 Network	 Enforcement	 Act	 in	 Summer	 2017.	 The	 law	 requires	 large	 social	 media	
platforms	 to	 remove	 illegal	 content	 (violations	 of	 22	 provisions	 in	 the	 German	 Criminal	












delete	more	 content	 than	 is	 strictly	 necessary,	 a	 risk	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 judicial	
oversight	or	the	right	to	appeal	in	the	legislation.353	Human	Rights	Watch	has	cautioned	that	
this	law	encourages	the	creation	of	“no	accountability	zones”	where	the	state	is	able	to	exert	
pressure	 on	 private	 companies	 to	 censor	 content	 free	 from	 judicial	 scrutiny. 354 	Three	
countries	(Russia,	Singapore,	and	the	Philippines)	have	already	announced	that	they	intend	
to	 draft	 similar	 laws	 and	 this	 is	 particularly	 concerning	 as	 all	 three	 countries	 have	 a	
chequered	 history	 of	 protecting	 human	 rights.	 This	 particular	 strain	 of	 the	 efficiency	
narrative	 is	 especially	 troublesome	 because	 “forcing	 companies	 to	 act	 as	 censors	 for	
government	is	problematic	in	a	democratic	state	and	nefarious	in	countries	with	weak	rule	

























the	 beliefs	 that	 the	 primary,	 if	 not	 the	 only,	 goal	 of	 human	 labour	 and	 thought	 is	
efficiency;	that	technical	calculation	is	in	all	respects	superior	to	human	judgment;	
that	 in	 fact	 human	 judgment	 cannot	 be	 trusted,	 because	 it	 is	 plagued	 by	 laxity,	





























censorship	 (in	a	manner	similar	 to	 the	outsourced	moderation	 that	platforms	employ)361	
represents	a	serious	challenge	to	the	continued	existence	of	a	robust	right	to	free	expression	
at	 the	very	same	moment	that	social	media	 is	being	 lauded	as	an	essential	 forum	for	 free	
speech.362	It	also	misses	the	point	that	platforms	also	permit	content	that	could	be	seen	as	
breaching	rights	to	privacy,	security	of	the	person,	or	hate	speech.	This	avoidance	of	judicial	




that	 in	a	 technological	world,	 “Time,	 in	 fact,	became	an	adversary	over	which	technology	
could	triumph.	And	this	meant	that	there	was	no	time	to	look	back	or	to	contemplate	what	









many	 social	 media	 platforms.	 The	 previous	 chapter	 discussed	 how	 vague	 terms	 and	
conditions	could	be,	and	this	problem	is	exacerbated	by	enforcement	applied	in	a	piecemeal	













harder	 to	 contextualise	 to	 their	 behaviour.	 This	 situation,	 however,	 allows	 platforms	 to	
remain	 flexible	and	able	 to	react	 to	situations	quickly.	Platforms	can	“retain	the	ability	 to	
make	judgments	on	content	removal,	based	on	ad	hoc	and	often	self-interested	assessments	













inconsistent	 enforcement	 and	 is	 caused	 by	 three	 main	 factors;	 popularity,	 accepted	
narratives,	and	newsworthiness.		
The	 first	of	 these	 factors	 that	we	 turn	 to	now	 is	 the	 relative	popularity	of	 flagged	





notorious	 form	 of	 popularity)	 can	 lead	 to	 content	 “queue-jumping”	 in	 the	 moderation	
process.	Twitter,	 for	example,	 states	 in	 the	Twitter	Rules	 that	 “the	number	of	reports	we	







prioritise	 the	 order	 in	 which	 it	 gets	 reviewed.”369 	Factoring	 in	 popularity	 is	 problematic	

















that	 the	 same	 treatment	 should	 be	 applied	 to	 other	 para-military	 groups	 from	Northern	

























in	 a	world	where	 attention	 is	 the	most	 valuable	 resource375	and	 people	mobilise	 around	
certain	issues	on	social	media.	Unfortunately,	no	matter	how	uninterested	in	making	value-




led	 to	 platforms	 making	 exceptions	 to	 their	 rules	 on	 graphic	 violence	 if	 the	 content	 is	
considered	newsworthy	 (a	 factor	 that	 is	never	defined	and	appears	 to	occur	on	a	 largely	
case-by-case	basis).	If	the	first	phase	of	social	media	usage	can	be	characterised	by	largely	
apolitical	content,	 the	Arab	Spring	 in	2011	signalled	a	major	paradigm	shift	which	 forced	
social	media	companies	to	consider	what	role	they	wanted	to	play	in	global	politics.377	The	



















In	 2016,	 the	 Norwegian	 newspaper	 Aftenposten	 announced	 that	 Facebook	 had	
removed	the	famous	“Terror	of	War”	picture	that	it	had	shared	and	called	Mark	Zuckerberg,	
the	 CEO	 of	 Facebook,	 “the	 world’s	 most	 powerful	 editor.” 378 	The	 picture	 depicted	 a	
Vietnamese	girl	(Kim	Phuc)	running	naked	and	crying	after	she	was	burned	by	Napalm.	This	
statement	 caught	 the	attention	of	 the	Norwegian	Prime	Minister	Erna	Solberg,	who	 then	
posted	the	photo	as	an	act	of	solidarity.	It	transpired	that	not	only	had	Facebook	intentionally	
removed	 the	 photo	 but	 also	 that	 the	 picture	 was	 used	 in	 training	 sessions	 of	 content	
assessors	as	an	example	of	a	post	that	should	be	removed	since	it	featured	a	distressed,	naked	
child.379	Once	the	controversy	went	public,	with	major	media	sources	reporting	on	the	issue,	
Facebook	 reversed	 its	decision	and	announced	 that	 it	would	now	weigh	newsworthiness	
more	heavily	in	its	decisions	in	the	future.	In	an	interesting	aside,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	
photo	 is	 so	 compelling	 that	 that	 it	 has	 a	 history	 of	 causing	 media	 companies	 to	 make	
exceptions	 to	 their	 regulatory	 regimes.	 380 	While	 this	 case	 might	 seem	 like	 a	 positive	
development,	 it	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 by	 introducing	 an	 element	 of	 newsworthiness,	
platforms	have	reduced	certainty	and	rendered	their	rules	more	inconsistent.		
Another	 example	 of	 inconsistent	 enforcement	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 newsworthiness	
occurred	in	2018	when	Hungary’s	chief	of	staff	to	Prime	Minister	Viktor	Orban	put	up	a	racist	
video	complaining	about	migrants.	Facebook	 removed	 it	on	 the	grounds	 that	 it	was	hate	














immigrants	who	might	be	 concerned	 that	 the	Hungarian	government	 is	permitted	 to	use	
social	media	to	disseminate	hate	speech.		
	 The	creation	of	the	newsworthiness	exception	may	have	been	done	with	the	best	of	
intentions	 but	 it	 is	 questionable	whether	 another	 vague	 parameter	 being	 added	 into	 the	
content	assessment	process	is	a	positive	outcome.	This	notion	of	what	is	worthy	of	public	
attention	is	also	an	example	of	perpetuating	accepted	narratives	as	social	media	platforms	
are	 privately	 deciding	 what	 is	 so	 important	 that	 the	 public	 must	 be	 able	 to	 access	 it	
regardless	 of	 a	 general	 prohibition	 against	 that	 type	 of	 content.	 This	 lack	 of	 certainty	 is	
further	complicated	by	the	fact	that	users	have	little	understanding	of	what	content	has	been	
treated	as	unworthy	of	the	newsworthiness	exception	and	removed	from	the	platform.	The	





In	 conclusion,	 inconsistent	 enforcement	 seriously	 undermines	 the	 principle	 of	
certainty,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 pillars	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 of	 good	 regulation.	 It	 reduces	 the	
substantive	dimension	of	fairness,	an	aspect	of	regulation	that	Baldwin	and	Cave	define	as	
“the	quality	of	outcomes	of	regulatory	procedures	and	whether	the	actual	policies,	rules,	and	
decisions	 that	 regulators	 arrive	 at	 are	 coherent,	 intelligible,	 and	 fair	 between	 different	
parties.”382	In	order	to	increase	the	fairness	of	their	regulatory	regime	(and	thereby	enhance	






the	 legitimacy	 of	 their	 authority),	 platforms	 must	 make	 more	 explicit	 rules	 with	 more	
detailed	explanations	of	what	they	entail	(and	any	exceptions	or	mitigating	factors	that	could	
be	applicable)	and	then	enforce	these	rules	consistently.	This	should	 increase	the	source,	










both	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 are	 essential	 for	 compliance	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 law	
because	“without	the	accountability	that	derives	from	openness,	enforceable	upon	even	the	
mightiest	 individuals	 and	 institutions,	 how	 can	 freedom	 survive?”385 	Every	 stage	 in	 the	
content	moderation	process,	therefore,	must	be	transparent,	accountable,	and	mindful	of	the	
companies’	human	rights	obligations.	This	is	echoed	by	one	of	the	reports	written	by	David	













Transparency	 and	 accountability	 are	 interrelated	 because	 neither	 objective	 holds	






change. 387 	Farrand	 and	 Carrapico	 contrast	 the	 “secretive	 negotiation	 process”	 of	 social	
media	 platforms	with	 the	 “overt	 law	making”	which	 public	 regulatory	 bodies	 engage	 in,	
arguing	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 transparency	 poses	 a	 fundamental	 legitimacy	 problem	 for	 these	
companies.388	This	 lack	 of	 accessibility	 also	 forces	 would-be	 critics	 to	 rely	 on	 whatever	
content	is	made	public	or	the	unsubstantiated	claims	of	inside	sources.	This	challenge	goes	
to	 heart	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 transparency	 and	 accountability;	 secrecy	 impedes	 reform,	 thus	
undermining	 good	 regulation.	 Accountability	 and	 transparency,	 therefore,	 are	 important	
goals	 for	 anyone	 seeking	 to	 reform	 the	 practices	 of	 platforms.	 These	 normative	 values,	
however,	must	be	translated	into	concrete	objectives	that	platforms	can	implement.		
A	 publicly-available	 body	 of	 precedents	 needs	 to	 be	 created	 to	 detail	 how	
enforcement	occurs	on	social	media	platforms.	To	make	this	set	of	precedents	user-friendly,	
they	would	 be	 organised	 according	 to	which	provision	 in	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 they	
















when	changes	 in	 the	content	policy	 for	 the	platform	are	 introduced.	This	 tool	would	give	
users	 the	 knowledge	 and	 resources	 to	 participate	 effectively	 in	 appeals	 of	 moderation	
decisions	and	in	larger	campaigns	to	change	how	a	platform	regulates	certain	categories	of	





There	 is	 a	 database	 that	 shares	 some	 similarities	 with	 this	 body	 of	 precedents	
proposal.	The	Lumen	database	is	a	joint	project	between	the	Berkman	Klein	Centre	and	a	
number	 of	 independent	organisations,	 some	 of	which	 are	 law	 clinics	 at	 universities.390	It	





My	 proposed	 body	 of	 precedents	would	 include	 all	 subjects	 in	 the	 platforms’	 terms	 and	
conditions	 including	 substantive	 topics	 like	 terrorism,	 nudity,	 and	 hate	 speech.	 Second,	
Lumen	does	not	include	an	explanation	of	what	decision	was	made	and	they	are	unable,	of	




the	 everyday	 user.	 The	 body	 of	 precedents,	 however,	 would	 be	 organised	 according	 to	
specific	terms	and	conditions	and	would	try	to	illuminate	these	decisions	for	users.	Finally,	
Lumen	 is	 a	 voluntary	 body	 that	 collects	 cease-and-desist	 letters	 people	 send	 them,	 it	
therefore	may	not	be	reflecting	the	most	important	or	controversial	decisions.	While	Lumen	










media	 platform,	 as	 they	 are	 responsible	 for	 outlining	 the	 content	 moderation	 rules	 and	
determining	how	cases	that	hover	on	the	border	of	permissibility	will	be	decided.	The	policy	
team	will	also	be	best-suited	to	keep	the	precedents	updated	as	minor	policy	changes	can	







by	 Press	 Councils	 (self-regulatory	 bodies	 for	print	 journalism)	 across	 Europe.393	Such	 an	
approach	 would	 enhance	 procedural	 fairness	 on	 the	 platform	 by	 making	 the	 regulatory	
process	more	open,	transparent,	and	accessible	to	the	public.394In	fact,	“publication	of	basic	
regulatory	 data”	 is	 considered	 “a	 generally	 accepted	 standard	 for	 transparency	 of	
regulation”	particularly	when	human	rights	are	involved.395	Issues	of	bias	and	inconsistent	
enforcement	could	be	 identified	much	more	easily	and	 it	would	provide	a	benchmark	for	



















This	 would	 not	 be	 a	 judicial	 body,	 it	 would	 a	 policy-based	 scheme,	 but	 it	 would	
strengthen	good	governance	and	rule	of	law	principles	on	the	platforms	as	well	as	signalling	
the	 company’s	 commitment	 to	 transparency.396	The	 body	 of	 precedents,	 however,	would	
have	 some	enforceability	 in	 court.	While	 the	specific	decisions	 in	 the	body	of	precedents	
would	 not	 be	 justiciable,	 there	 would	 be	 a	 legal	 requirement	 that	 platforms	 enact	 and	
maintain	a	set	of	procedural	protections,	and	this	would	include	the	body	of	precedents	(this	
will	 be	 discussed	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 Seven).	 Creating	 a	 body	 of	 precedents,	
therefore,	would	be	a	simple	but	powerful	way	for	social	media	platforms	to	indicate	that	
they	value	users	and	are	willing	to	move	beyond	a	rhetoric	of	democracy	into	the	adoption	






















of	 ‘case-law’	 to	 illuminate	 and	 empower	 user	 inter-	 actions	with	 social	media	 platforms.	
These	User-Empowerment	Tools	(UET’s)	are	an	important	aspect	of	the	central	question	for	
social	 media	 companies	 today:	 should	 platforms	 be	 a	 reflection	 of	 reality	 (with	 all	 the	
ugliness	and	disturbing	content	that	entails)	or	an	idealised,	utopian	place	where	negative	










This	 chapter	will	discuss	 appeals,	 both	 the	 internal	 processes	 that	 exist	within	 social	
networks	to	handle	appeals	and	the	external	channels	that	activist	groups	access	when	they	
cannot	 appeal	 through	 the	 company	 to	 initiate	 change.	 The	 central	 theme	 running	









The	 previous	 two	 chapters	 have	 shown	 that	 content	 moderation	 is	 inconsistent	 and	
unpredictable.	 The	 line	 between	what	 is	permitted	 and	what	 is	 prohibited	 advances	 and	
recedes	constantly	 in	relation	to	public	concern,	geopolitical	events,	media	coverage,	and	
governmental	 pressure.	 Content	 moderation	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 dialogue	 between	 a	






























opinion	 about	 finding	 the	 facts	 or	 about	 formulating	 or	 applying	 rules	 of	 law.”402	It	 can	
prevent	miscarriages	 of	 justice	 and	 ensure	 the	 affected	 parties	 receive	 a	 fair	 hearing.403	
These	 systems	 also	 empower	 individuals	 by	 dignifying	 the	 participants	 and	 making	
“meaningful	the	interaction	between	individuals	and	the	state.”404	











An	 appeals	 system	 strengthens	 a	 regulatory	 institution	 because	 it	 encourages	
consistency	 in	 hearings	 and	 uniformity	 in	 decisions.	 405 	Uniformity	 in	 decision-making	
contributes	to	a	sense	that	the	institution	is	fair	and	that	there	is	an	element	of	accountability,	
which	increases	the	perceived	legitimacy	of	the	decision-making	body.406	Appellate	review	
has	 the	 added	 benefit	 of	 helping	 to	 clarify	 and	 interpret	 the	 relevant	 regulations,	





conceptualisation	 and	 these	 procedural	 protections	 are	 essential	 in	 creating	 an	 effective	
regulatory	system.409	These	rules	are	even	more	important	in	systems	that	are	not	directly	
governed	 by	 the	 courts	 because	 “procedural	 due	 process	 and	 the	 promise	 of	 fairness,	
transparency,	 and	 accountability	 has	 often	 served	 as	 replacements	 for	 individual	
adjudications.”410	Appeals	 systems	 can	 also	 function	 as	 a	 form	 of	 grievance	 mechanism,	


























has	 received	 significantly	 less	 academic	 analysis	 and	media	 attention	 than	 the	 first	 two	
stages.	This	stage	is	arguably	not	being	respected	by	companies	as	one	study	of	150	social	
networking	 platforms	 found	 that	 88%	 of	 platforms	 “explicitly	 foresee	 that	 platforms	
providers	may	terminate	a	specific	user	account	without	previous	notice	or	the	possibility	
to	 challenge	 the	 decision.” 413 	It	 can	 also	 be	 difficult	 for	 even	 a	 diligent	 user	 to	 find	




oriented	moderation	 process.	 An	 appeals	 system	provides	 an	 assurance	 to	 all	 users	 that	
content	 that	 has	 been	 erroneously	 removed	will	 be	 restored	 and	 that	 the	 rules	 they	 are	
expected	to	obey	are	applied	consistently.	From	a	practical	perspective,	appeals	would	also	





















users.	 It	now	allows	users	 to	appeal	 individual	pieces	of	 content	 that	were	 removed	and	
states	that	reviews	will	occur	by	a	person	“typically	within	24	hours.”418	Most	intriguingly,	
Facebook	indicates	that	it	is	currently	developing	a	separate	appeal	process	whereby	people	
who	 have	 reported	 content	 can	 appeal	 a	 decision	 to	 allow	 the	 content	 to	 remain	 on	 the	
platform.419		





























data	even	 if	 it	has	been	 suspended—Twitter	will	 fully	disable	accounts	only	 in	egregious	
cases	of	abuse.”(as	opposed	to	Instagram	which	will	not	allow	a	user	to	export	their	data	if	
their	account	is	deactivated).423		
A	 robust	 appeals	 system	 will	 also	 be	 of	 central	 importance	 to	 two	 particular	
categories	of	users:	social	media	entrepreneurs	and	activists.	An	increasing	number	of	users	
have	 found	ways	 to	earn	money	 from	 their	 activities	on	 social	media.	The	most	 common	
method	 is	 creating	 content	 that	 meets	 a	 particular	 threshold	 of	 popularity	 and	 is	 then	
“monetised”	 so	 that	 users	 earn	 income	 from	 the	 advertisements	 displayed	 with	 their	
content.424	Other	methods	are	 creating	 content	 for	 subscription	 services	 (such	as	Spotify	
Premium	or	YouTube	Red),	operating	a	voluntary	patronage	option	through	platforms	like	
Patreon,	displaying	merchandise	that	could	be	purchased,	or	diverting	users	 to	a	website	
where	 the	 entrepreneur	 offers	 other	 services	 or	 products	 and	 advertises	 events.	 The	
deletion	of	content	(whether	that	is	a	full	profile	or	just	individual	posts)	or	the	decision	to	
de-monetise	a	profile	can	therefore	have	a	significant	impact	on	an	entrepreneur.425	It	begins	
to	 resemble	 an	 employment	 issue	 and	 one	 that	 is	 certainly	 deserving	 of	 an	 oversight	
mechanism	to	ensure	a	decision	was	made	correctly.	An	unreliable	appeals	system	can	cause	
quite	a	lot	of	uncertainty	for	social	media	entrepreneurs	and	when	uncertainty	of	regulatory	


















outcomes	 becomes	 endemic,	 “not	 only	 are	 people’s	 expectations	 disappointed,	 but	
increasingly	they	will	find	themselves	unable	to	form	expectations	on	which	to	rely,	and	the	
horizons	of	their	planning	and	their	economic	activity	will	shrink	accordingly.”426	
	 Activists	would	also	specifically	benefit	 from	a	 robust	appeals	system	because	 the	
content	 they	 post	 may	 be	 in	 the	 grey	 area	 between	 what	 is	 permissible	 and	 what	 is	











war	 crimes	 in	 Syria.429 	When	 platforms	 remove	 this	 content	 and	 do	 not	 have	 robust	
appeals	systems,	the	effect	on	future	evidence-gathering	abilities	is	disastrous.430	In	2013,	
over	 80%	 of	 the	 content	 showing	 the	 Syrian	 regime	 using	 chemical	 weapons	 on	 the	
civilians	 of	 Damascus	was	 deleted	 from	Facebook,	 destroying	 content	 that	might	 have	
been	 essential	 to	 future	 legal	 operations.431	There	 is	 an	 interesting	 tension	at	play	here	
















where	 social	 media	 platforms	 often	 benefit	 from	 their	 associations	 with	 human	 rights	
activists	(it	gives	them	legitimacy	and	adds	credence	to	the	notion	that	they	are	worthy	of	a	
certain	protected	status)	but	 the	 infrastructure	of	 the	platforms	do	not	accommodate	the	
specific	needs	of	these	activists.	In	addition	to	the	problems	of	the	uncertain	evidence	locker,	
pseudonymous	 accounts	may	 be	 deleted	 because	 they	 run	 afoul	 of	 “real-name	 policies,”	
(which	 could	 be	 a	 privacy	 rights	 issue)	 and	 users	may	 be	 suspended	 from	 platforms	 as	
suspected	spammers	because	they	sent	too	many	messages	or	friend	requests.432		
	 While	the	conflict	between	a	platform’s	interest	in	serving	humanitarian	activists	and	
other	 considerations	will	 likely	 continue,	one	 important	 safeguard	 for	 the	 people	 risking	
their	lives	to	gather	evidence	and	raise	awareness	is	an	appeals	process	that	will	assure	them	
that	if	their	profiles	are	erroneously	deleted	because	they	triggered	an	automated	spammer	
alert	or	 their	 content	was	 flagged	as	 “terrorist	 content”	by	pro-government	 flaggers	 then	





















YouTube	 has	 publicly	 encouraged	 users	 to	 appeal	 demonetisation	 decisions	 to	 help	 the	
algorithms	improve	but	the	platform	also	announces	that	it	will	prioritise	videos	that	had	
more	 than	 1000	 views	 in	 the	 last	 seven	 days	 and	 that	 it	 will	 not	 consider	 appeals	 of	
demonetisation	if	a	channel	has	less	than	10,000	subscribers.435	This	is	problematic	because	
YouTube	 seems	 to	 be	 relying	 on	 its	 appeal	 process	 to	 compensate	 for	 a	 sub-standard	
algorithm	and	putting	the	burden	on	users	to	correct	these	errors.	This	issue	is	compounded	
by	YouTube’s	indication	that	it	will	not	consider	the	appeals	of	users	with	less	subscribers	
even	 though	 they	 seem	 just	 as	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 algorithmic	 errors	 as	 the	 larger	
channels.	A	weak	or	non-existent	appeals	system	sends	a	clear	message	to	users	that	their	
contributions	to	the	platform,	the	value	they	generate	for	other	users,436	and	the	personal	
and	 career	 development	 they	 have	 generated	 for	 themselves	 is	 not	 valued	 and	 can	 be	
arbitrarily	 diminished.	 This	 deficit	 exacerbates	 other	 issues	 in	 content-moderation,	








lack	 certainty	 but	 they	 also	 lack	 transparency	 and	 accountability.	 All	 of	 these	 principles,	
which	are	fundamental	to	a	regulatory	system	that	embodies	rule	of	law	principles	leads	to	
a	 deficit	 of	 legitimacy	 at	 these	 platforms.	 Legitimacy	 is	 best	 construed	 as	 “the	 collective	






















the	 deletion	 of	 entire	 profiles	 or	 pages.442	Instagram	 and	 Google+	 (when	 it	 still	 existed)	
do/did	 not	 permit	 appeals	 on	 individual	 removals	 and	 neither	 did	 Facebook	 until	 April	
2018. 443 	While	 the	 motives	 for	 this	 limitation	 are	 obvious	 (lowering	 the	 number	 of	
prospective	 appeals	 that	 the	 platform	 has	 to	 consider),	 the	 impact	 on	 users	 appears	
disproportionate.	 A	 single	 video	may	 have	 taken	 between	 10	 and	 60	 hours	 of	 editing444		
while	a	single	post	on	 Instagram	may	have	 taken	up	 to	an	hour-and-a-half	 to	 stage.445	Of	
course,	the	amount	of	time	spent	on	content	must	not	outweigh	any	clear	violations	of	the	
rules	but	users	should	be	afforded	the	chance	to	appeal	a	decision	if	they	believe	that	the	





























appeals	 process	 on	 social	 networks.	 Currently	 a	 successful	 appeal	 will	 result	 in	 the	
reinstatement	 of	 content	 (or	 a	 profile)	 on	 the	 platform.	 In	 some	 cases,	 this	 will	 be	 an	
adequate	remedy	and	will	rectify	any	damage	caused	by	the	original	decision.	Some	content,	
however,	is	particularly	time-sensitive	and	a	subsequent	decision	to	reinstate	the	content	
will	 be	 too	 late	 as	 the	 “window”	 in	 which	 this	 content	 was	 relevant	 and	 could	 inspire	
collective	action	will	have	closed.	Youmans	and	York	give	the	example	of	videos	depicting	
current	events	being	removed	and	then	reinstated	on	appeal.	They	argue	“even	when	videos	






probably	 been	 and	 gone,	 so	 you've	 lost	 out	 on	 the	 majority	 of	 your	 income	 from	 that	
video."449	The	UN	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 free	 expression	 has	 also	 raised	 these	 concerns,	
calling	the	scope	of	remedies	available	on	platforms	as	“limited	or	untimely	to	the	point	of	











non-existence”	 and	 arguing	 that	 reinstatement	 was	 an	 insufficient	 remedy	 if	 removal	
resulted	 in	 a	 specific	 harm	 (whether	 physical,	 reputational,	 or	 financial)	 to	 the	 person	
posting	the	content	or	if	the	suspension	occurred	during	a	time	of	political	protest	and	could	
have	 influenced	 the	 debate.450	He	 therefore	 recommends	 that	 remediation	 programs	 be	
created	that	include	as	options	“reinstatement	and	acknowledgment	to	settlements	related	
to	 reputational	 or	 other	 harms.”451 	The	 UNGP’s	 outline	 a	 number	 of	 different	 types	 of	
remedy:	 satisfaction	 (confirmation	and	apology),	 restitution,	 guarantee	of	non-repetition,	
rehabilitation	(providing	resources	to	restore	the	victim),	and	compensation.452	These	types	








other	 formal	 avenues	where	 users	 could	make	 these	 arguments,	 but	 they	 are	 noticeably	
lacking453	(with	the	exception	of	an	obscure	option	at	Facebook,	which	will	be	discussed	at	

















would	 characterise	 this	 discouragement	 of	 policy	 appeals	 as	 a	 “command	 and	 control”	
approach	 to	 regulation,	 which	 ignores	 the	 essential	 role	 that	 argumentation	 over	 norms	
plays	in	the	rule	of	law.	He	writes	that	“we	don’t	just	obey	them	or	apply	the	sanctions	that	
they	ordain;	we	argue	over	them	adversarially,	we	use	our	sense	of	what	is	at	stake	in	their	









of	 appeals	 is	 so	 opaque	 that	 the	 NGO	 Onlinecensorship.org	 has	 even	 begun	 collating	
information	 on	 how	 users	 can	 appeal	 to	 each	 social	 network,456 	a	 clear	 indication	 that	




and	 follow	 the	 on-screen	 instructions	 to	 lodge	 an	 appeal. 457 	This	 is	 not	 particularly	
illuminating	for	users	who	have	not	been	blocked	and	just	want	more	information.		
This	informational	asymmetry	puts	users	at	a	substantial	disadvantage	when	trying	
to	 engage	 with	 these	 platforms	 and	 Pasquale	 contends	 that	 this	 lack	 of	 transparency	 is	
entirely	by	design.	He	 argues	 that	 “the	 challenge	of	 the	 “knowledge	problem”	 is	 just	one	
example	of	a	general	truth:	What	we	do	and	don’t	know	about	the	social	(as	opposed	to	the	
natural)	world	is	not	inherent	in	its	nature,	but	is	itself	a	function	of	social	constructs.”458	








an	elite	 is	able	 to	control	 the	dissemination	of	knowledge	and	the	power	that	knowledge	






Other	platforms	also	offer	 limited	 information	about	appeals	with	one	platform	 in	
particular	being	a	notable	violator.	When	Onlinecensorship.org	began	to	collate	information	
about	 the	 appeals	 processes	 at	 social	 networks,	 Flickr	 not	 only	 refused	 to	 explain	 their	
appeals	process	but	also	would	not	confirm	that	an	appeals	system	even	existed.461	This	is	









a	 problem	 because	 accountability	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 an	 appeals	 system	 that	 respects	 a	
procedural	 rule	 of	 law.463	If	 there	 is	 an	 imbalance	 of	 resources	 or	 access	 to	 information	

















on	Business	 and	Human	Rights,	which	 states	 that	when	 a	 company	 identifies	 a	 situation	
where	 it	 has	 caused	 or	 contributed	 to	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 human	 rights	 then	 it	 has	 a	
responsibility	 to	 engage	 in	 remediation	 of	 these	 impacts. 465 	These	 principles	 and	 their	
connection	to	remedial	systems	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	Seven.	The	NGO	
“Ranking	 Digital	 Rights”	 has	 also	 suggested	 that	 as	 governments	 are	 putting	 increasing	
pressure	 on	 social	media	 platforms	 to	 respond	 quickly	 to	 violent	 content	 (and	 negative	










may	 have	 about	 content	 moderation.	 Parties	 may	 have	 general	 concerns	 about	 the	
availability	 of	 certain	 categories	 of	 content	 (something	 that	 an	 individual	 appeal	 cannot	
















platforms,	 some	 of	which	have	 a	 user	 population	 in	 the	millions	 (and	 even	 billions),	 are	
unlikely	to	consider	an	individual	user’s	policy	concerns,	even	if	those	concerns	are	about	a	
discriminatory	police	that	reduces	a	marginalised	group’s	visibility.		
Users,	 therefore,	 lack	 the	 ability	 to	 register	 their	 complaints	 through	 the	 social	
network’s	 formal	 processes	 and	 without	 participation,	 users	 are	 disempowered,	 power	
being	 understood	 as	 “an	 actor’s	 capability	 to	 enact	 favoured	 decisions”	 in	 an	 “often	
asymmetrical	relationship	among	social	actors.”468	Pfaffenberger’s	 theory	of	 technological	
drama	states	that	the	final	stage	of	the	process	of	technology	adoption	is	“designification”	





















methods	 of	 achieving	 their	 goals.	 Some	 collective	 campaigns	 are	 seeking	 to	 permit	 a	
previously	prohibited	category	of	content	on	the	platform	such	as	the	campaigns	demanding	
that	images	of	breastfeeding	and	female	nipples	be	allowed.	Other	campaigns	argue	that	a	
certain	 category	 of	 content	 is	 problematic	 and	must	 be	 banned,	 such	 as	 eating	 disorder	
content	 and	 cyber-bullying.	 These	 campaigns	 might	 be	 protesting	 about	 social	 media	
practices	but	they	also	benefit	from	the	advantages	social	media	provides	activists.	A	study	
of	how	social	media	was	used	by	pro-democracy	protesters	in	a	number	of	countries	found	
that	 it	 could	 bolster	 collective	 action	 by	 making	 it	 easier	 for	 disaffected	 citizens	 to	 act	
publicly	 in	 coordination	 and	 dramatically	 increasing	 publicity	 through	 diffusion	 of	
information	to	regional	and	global	publics.471				
Feminist	groups	have	been	particularly	successful	at	recruiting	members,	securing	
media	 attention,	 and	 pressuring	 advertisers,	 often	 coordinating	 their	 efforts	 on	 the	 very	
platforms	they	are	trying	to	change.	These	campaigns	are	often	laudable,	an	example	of	what	
Laidlaw	 argues	 is	 the	 internet’s	 main	 contribution	 to	 democracy:	 a	 facilitator	 of	
participation.472	The	first	major	success	by	one	of	these	campaigns	was	when	three	female	






its	 moderators	 on	 the	 issue. 474 	The	 activists	 were	 successful	 by	 raising	 awareness,	













Media	 attention	 can	 result	 in	 rapid	 changes	 from	 social	 media	 companies.	 For	
example,	in	2012,	a	number	of	large	outlets	(such	as	the	Huffington	Post	and	The	Atlantic)	







which	 was	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Four.	 After	 the	 controversy,	 Sheryl	 Sandberg	 publicly	
apologised	to	the	Norwegian	Prime	Minister	Erna	Solberg	for	removing	her	post	of	the	photo.	
The	apology	is	particularly	strange	in	light	of	the	fact	that	Facebook	had	a	sound	justification	
for	 removing	 the	 photo	 and	 any	 subsequent	 decision	 to	 change	 their	 policies	 did	 not	
necessitate	a	public	apology.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	apologising	only	to	the	most	high-
profile	individual	in	the	campaign	instead	of	all	the	activists	who	demanded	the	photo	be	
available	 was	 not	 the	 highpoint	 of	 Facebook’s	 democratic	 pedigree. 478 	This	 case	 study	
provides	 insight	 into	 how	high-profile	 controversies	 can	 force	 platforms	 to	 contort	 their	
practices,	making	exceptions	for	issues	that	are	sufficiently	popular.	This	may	seem	laudable,	
but	the	next	section	will	discuss	some	of	the	issues	with	this	situation.		











on	 social	media	 companies’	 power,	 these	 campaigns	 should	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 reliable	
solution.	First,	these	campaigns	may	have	a	democratic	element	(in	the	sense	that	they	are	
majoritarian)	but	 they	 cannot	be	 construed	as	a	 complete	 solution	 for	protecting	human	
rights	on	any	given	platform.	This	avenue	for	reform	is	only	accessible	for	causes	that	have	
popular	 support	 and	 is	 not	 a	 suitable	 substitution	 for	 human	 rights	 law,	 which	 is	 often	
employed	 to	 protect	 unpopular	 speech	 and	 minority	 groups. 479 	Offline	 inequalities	 are	
accordingly	replicated	online	as	 the	same	groups	that	are	unable	to	secure	resources	and	
align	social	interests	in	their	favour	are	equally	unable	to	initiate	change	online.480	Langvardt	
makes	 this	 point	 when	 he	 argues	 that	 “the	 most	 likely	 reason	 that	 Facebook’s	 content	
moderation	policies	are	so	broadly	accepted	is	that	most	of	the	burden	falls	on	marginal	or	
unpopular	 speakers—exactly	 the	 speakers	 whom	 the	 law	 of	 free	 speech	 is	 traditionally	
concerned	 with	 protecting.” 481 	Minority	 causes	 will	 be	 unable	 to	 secure	 the	 necessary	
resources,	 public	 support,	 and	 media	 attention	 to	 force	 a	 response	 from	 a	 social	media	





reform	 of	 the	 content-moderation	 system.	 A	 clear	 example	 of	 piecemeal	 reform	 was	
















exception	 to	 their	 rules	 governing	 permissibility	 if	 the	 content	 in	 question	was	 deemed	





often	 entails	 “an	 open	 process	 characterised	 by	 evolutionary	 adjustment” 484 	but	 these	
adjustments	 must	 occur	 in	 a	 reasoned	 and	 rational	 way	 rather	 than	 just	 as	 reactionary	














York	 argue	 that	 “social	 media	 provide	 the	 tools	 for	 organised	 dissent	 yet	 can	 constrain	














rights	 issues	 in	social	media	because	as	a	 solution,	 it	 lacks	 source,	outcome,	 and	process	
legitimacy.486	What	is	required	is	solutions	that	offer	greater	accountability.	Morozov	sums	
up	the	deficit	that	online	activism	embodies	when	he	argues	that	the	internet	(particularly	
social	 media)	 “may	 have	 made	 the	 revolutions	 of	 the	 Arab	 Spring	 possible,	 but	 “the	













Principles	 terms	 “access,	 procedures	 and	 outcomes”	 of	 the	 “remedial	 process.” 489 		 The	
proposals	will	include	a	stronger	appeals	process,	a	forum	for	participation,	and	an	industry-











current	 deficits	 of	 platform	 appeals.	 A	 good	 starting	 point	 would	 be	 the	 Santa	 Clara	
principles,	which	were	created	by	academics,	industry	representatives,	and	NGO’s	as	general	
guidelines	 for	 content	moderation.	These	principles	are	quite	brief	 (and	do	not	explicitly	
discuss	human	rights)	but	 they	do	 recommend	 that	appeals	 include	 “human	review	by	 a	
person	or	panel	of	persons	that	was	not	involved	in	the	initial	decision,	an	opportunity	to	
present	 additional	 information	 that	 will	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 review,	 notification	 of	 the	
results	 of	 the	 review,	 and	 a	 statement	 of	 the	 reasoning	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 the	 user	 to	
understand	the	decision.”490	Users	need	to	be	provided	with	information	about	the	appeals	









improve	 their	 policies	 and	 processes.	 Integrating	 due	 process	 principles	 into	 a	 private	
regulatory	scheme	can	consequently	lead	to	stronger	and	more	efficient	standards.491			
The	 possible	 remedies	 available	 should	 also	 be	 expanded	 beyond	 reinstatement	 (or	
removal)	of	the	content	or	profile.	The	UN	Guiding	Principles	identifies	a	litany	of	potential	
remedies	 including:	 “apologies,	 restitution,	 rehabilitation,	 financial	 or	 non-financial	






well	 as	 the	 prevention	 of	 harm	 through,	 for	 example,	 injunctions	 or	 guarantees	 of	 non-
repetition.”492	While	not	all	of	these	remedies	may	be	feasible	(or	desirable)	in	the	case	of	








bury	 these	 corrections.494	These	public	 acknowledgements	would	also	provide	 important	
data	for	academics	and	journalists	trying	to	understand	social	media	content	moderation.	It	







continuous	 learning,	 and	 based	 on	 engagement	 and	 dialogue.495	Platforms	 should	 assess	
their	 appeals	 systems	against	 these	principles	and	provide	 transparency	 reports	on	how	
their	processes	measure	up	and	how	they	will	rectify	any	deficits.	These	principles	provide	





























connected,	 as	 attention	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 “the	 levels	 of	 participation	 that	 regulatory	
decisions	 and	 policy	 processes	 allow	 to	 the	 public,	 to	 consumers,	 and	 to	 other	 affected	
parties”	because	of	its	“legitimating	effect.”498			
Facebook	 is	 the	 only	 major	 platform	 which	 has	 created	 a	 forum	 where	 users	 can	
comment	 and	 vote	 on	 proposed	 policy	 changes. 499 	This	 page,	 named	 ‘Facebook	 Site	
Governance’	was	launched	on	the	7th	of	April	2009.	The	2009	video	where	Mark	Zuckerberg	











introduces	 the	Site	Governance	model	references	a	number	of	 important	values	 that	 this	





would	 go	 to	 a	 vote	 on	 whether	 the	 policy	 should	 be	 vetoed	 but	 it	 required	 30%	 of	 all	
Facebook	users	 to	participate	 in	 the	vote	to	make	 it	binding.502	This	experiment	ended	 in	




been	 discontinued,	 this	 policy	 only	 invited	 users	 to	 comment.504	Even	 this	 policy,	 a	Data	
Privacy	 update	 introduced	 only	 eighteen	 days	 after	 The	 Guardian	 broke	 the	 explosive	
Cambridge	 Analytica	 story,	 garnered	 only	 331	 comments	 and	 236	 shares,	 a	 miniscule	
percentage	of	the	users	on	Facebook	in	2018.			
There	are	a	number	of	 reasons	why	the	Site	Governance	experiment	 failed.	First,	 and	
arguably	most	importantly,	was	a	lack	of	publicity.	Most	users	were	and	remain	completely	
unaware	of	the	Site	Governance	page	(which	still	exists	on	Facebook).	Of	the	2.3	billion	of	
users	who	hold	Facebook	accounts,	only	 three	million	users	have	 liked	and	 followed	 the	
page.505	This	feature	is	so	niche	that	it	is	rarely	mentioned	even	in	scholarship	focusing	on	
Facebook.	It	is	surprising	that	Mark	Zuckerberg	does	not	mention	this	forum	in	more	of	his	
















the	 existence	 of	 an	 electoral	 process.	 One	 must	 query	 whether	 this	 feature	 was	 an	
experiment	 in	 participation	 that	was	 designed	 to	 fail,	 or	 at	 the	 very	 least	was	 so	 under-
resourced	 that	 its	 lack	 of	 impact	 was	 inevitable.	 Second,	 the	 Site	 Governance	 model	
introduced	by	Facebook	may	have	simply	expected	too	much	from	its	users.	The	policies	that	
Facebook	posted	on	the	site	were	 lengthy	and	overly	 technical507	and	would	have	proved	
discouraging	 for	 many	 users	 to	 understand	 even	 if	 they	 were	 willing	 to	 make	 the	 time	
commitment.	 Finally,	 the	 required	 numbers	 of	 user	 participation	 were	 too	 high	 when	
considered	 in	combination	with	the	poor	publicity	and	difficult	commitment	that	 the	Site	
Governance	model	represented.	Today,	Facebook	has	over	two	billion	users	so	it	would	be	




participation	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 case-study	 replete	with	 valuable	 lessons	 they	 could	 employ	
when	 developing	 their	 own	 participatory	 forums.	 Indeed,	 Gillespie	 argues	 that	 the	 Site	



















participation)	 “allow	users	minimal	 influence	or	 control,	but	only	at	 the	discretion	of	 the	
platform	 owner.”510 	The	 ability	 of	 users	 to	 effect	 change	 is	 thus,	 highly	 conditional	 on	
platform	acquiescence	and	cannot	act	as	a	complete	safeguard	for	important	human	rights	
considerations.	A	greater	assurance	of	accountability	and	oversight	is	required	as	the	human	





further.511	Their	only	other	option	 is	 to	engage	 in	campaigning	and	attempt	to	get	 	media	
attention,	but	many	users	will	be	unwilling	or	unsuccessful	at	employing	this	strategy.	The	
lack	of	a	higher	body	to	adjudicate	moderation	decisions	is	problematic	because	users	have	
no	 real	 assurance	 that	 the	platform	 is	behaving	 impartially	or	 that	 an	appeal	 constitutes	
anything	more	than	a	rubber-stamping	of	the	original	decision	made	by	the	platform.	This	
concern	was	echoed	by	the	Guiding	Principles,	which	concludes	by	stating	“Since	a	business	
enterprise	 cannot,	 with	 legitimacy,	 both	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 complaints	 and	 unilaterally	
determine	 their	 outcome,	 these	 mechanisms	 should	 focus	 on	 reaching	 agreed	 solutions	
through	dialogue.	Where	adjudication	 is	needed,	 this	 should	be	provided	by	a	 legitimate,	
independent	 third-party	 mechanism.” 512 	An	 independent	 appeals	 body	 could	 make	
assessments	 using	 a	 modified	 form	 of	 judicial	 review	 and	 explore	 how	 a	 decision	 was	
reached	 in	 an	 impartial	 manner. 513 	Ideally,	 the	 decisions	 it	 would	 make	 would	 also	 be	














online	 raised	 the	 possibility	 of	 “company-specific	 or	 industry-wide	 ombudsman	
programmes”	such	as	“an	independent	‘social	media	council,’	modelled	on	the	press	councils	
that	 enable	 industry-wide	 complaint	 mechanisms	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 remedies	 for	








the	 relevant	 information	 and	 their	 representations.	 Of	 course,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 “build	
disincentives	 into	 the	 framework	 to	 dissuade	 the	 casual	 complainer.” 517 	The	 appeals	




An	 industry-wide	 appeals	 board	 would	 have	 a	 number	 of	 advantages:	 they	 are	
capable	of	efficiently	handling	a	large	volume	of	cases	(as	compared	to	a	normal	court)	and	
they	 can	 provide	 adjudicators	 that	 have	 specialised	 knowledge	 in	 the	 relevant	 subject.	
























platform.	This	 is	 also	a	more	accessible	solution	 than	encouraging	users	 to	use	 the	 court	
system	as	the	appeals	board	could	accept	digital	applications	and	users	would	not	be	barred	
from	making	 appeals	 because	of	 location	or	 financial	 resources.	 An	 independent	 appeals	





poor	 appeals	 decisions,	 such	 as	 activists	 and	 entrepreneurs.	 The	 creation	 of	 a	 separate	
tribunal	would	be	a	positive	step	for	social	networks	and	would	offer	users	a	higher	degree	
of	certainty,	increased	transparency,	and	heightened	accountability.		




This	 social	 media	 appeals	 board	 would,	 therefore,	 transform	 the	 current	 single-
appeals	systems	at	platforms	into	an	interlocking	set	of	review	mechanisms.	It	would	offer	
assurances	 to	users	 of	 impartiality	 and	 accountability,	 and	would	 be	 a	 positive	 publicity	
move	for	platforms	as	well	as	an	opportunity	to	share	best	practices.	This	expanded	appeals	
system	will	 sit	within	 a	 larger	 set	 of	 regulatory	 reforms	 that	will	 be	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	
Seven.	
5.4.4:	Case	Study:	Facebook	Oversight	Board	
Facebook	 has	 already	 debuted	 a	 second	 level	 of	 appeals,	 an	 idea	 that	 was	 first	
suggested	by	Mark	Zuckerberg	in	2018	as	a	“supreme	court”	for	Facebook.521	The	Facebook	
Oversight	Board	(which	will	be	composed	of	forty	experts	in	relevant	fields	from	around	the	
world)	 considers	 individual	 appeals	 from	 users	 who	 have	 had	 content	 removed	 and	
exhausted	 earlier	 appeals	 and	 also	 “significant	 and	 difficult”	 cases	 referred	 by	 Facebook	
itself.522	Facebook	can	also	request	a	policy	advisory	statement	from	the	board	clarifying	a	
previous	decision	or	providing	guidance	on	possible	changes	to	Facebook’s	policies.523	The	
decisions	made	 by	 the	Oversight	 Board	would	 be	 binding	 except	 for	 the	 policy	 advisory	
statements.524	The	Board	will	also	make	all	decisions	publicly	available	in	a	database	of	case	
decisions	(which	was	an	idea	touted	by	Chapter	Four	of	this	thesis)	and	will	release	annual	
reports	 that	 detail	 number	 and	 type	 of	 cases,	 case	 summaries,	 the	 region	 and	 source	 of	
referral,	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 issues	 in	 the	 cases,	 and	 how	 Facebook	 has	
implemented	their	decisions.525	The	Oversight	Board	 is	a	very	 interesting	development	 in	
the	world	of	social	media	regulation.	It	is	also	highly	unusual,	with	BSR	explaining	that	“to	
our	knowledge,	no	company	in	any	industry	has	ever	established	an	oversight	mechanism	













to	 boost	 transparency,	 accountability,	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 its	 services,	 offering	 users	 an	
impartial	second	opinion	from	a	diverse	group	of	reputable	experts.		
There	are,	however,	some	concerns	about	the	Oversight	Board	that	can	be	identified	
at	 this	 stage,	 although	 some	 of	 these	 issues	may	 be	 ironed	 out	when	 the	 Board	 is	 fully	











as	 the	 only	 appropriate	 recourse.	 The	 Bylaws	 do	 state	 that	 in	 the	 future	 “subject	 to	
Facebook’s	technical	and	procedural	improvements”	the	Board	will	be	able	to	assess	other	






The	 board	will	 review	 content	 enforcement	 decisions	 and	 determine	whether	 they	were	
consistent	 with	 Facebook’s	 content	 policies	 and	 values.”530 	This	 thesis	 has	 consistently	








likely	 to	 come	 into	 conflict.	 By	 privileging	 Facebook’s	 values	 as	 the	 primary	 standard	 of	
review,	the	Charter	and	Bylaws	fail	to	explain	the	appropriate	course	of	action	when	these	
values	come	into	conflict	with	human	rights.	This	 is	also	apparent	when	the	Bylaws	state	
what	kinds	of	cases	will	not	be	eligible	 for	 the	Board	to	review.	These	cases	 include	ones	
“where	the	underlying	content	is	criminally	unlawful	in	a	jurisdiction	with	a	connection	to	
the	 content”	 and	 a	 Board	 decision	 could	 result	 in	 either	 criminal	 liability	 or	 “adverse	
governmental	action	against	Facebook.”531	This	means	that	the	Board	will	not	review	cases	
where	content	was	posted	in	countries	that	have	criminalised	certain	forms	of	speech	(such	
as	 blasphemy	 or	 lèse-majesté),	 regardless	 of	 whether	 these	 laws	 would	 comply	 with	
international	human	rights	standards.	The	predicted	consequences	that	preclude	eligibility	
are	also	broad,	with	 “adverse	governmental	 action	against	Facebook”	 indicating	 that	 any	
case	that	might	result	in	Facebook	suffering	any	harm	to	its	business	will	be	precluded	from	
oversight.	This	means	that	the	Oversight	Board	risks	becoming	a	mechanism	that	can	only	
review	 cases	 from	 countries	 that	 already	 have	 broad	 free	 speech	 protections	 and	where	
people	would	have	other	access	to	other	forums	for	sharing	their	opinions.	This	would	just	
reaffirm	the	status	quo	that	already	exists	offline,	negating	the	democratising	effect	of	these	
technologies.	 It	 also	makes	 one	wonder	 if	 the	much-touted	 diversity	 of	Oversight	 Board	
members	will	 be	 largely	 symbolic	 as	 the	Board	will	 primarily	 be	 considering	 cases	 from	
Western	liberal	democracies.		
While	Facebook	has	signalled	a	commitment	to	human	rights	in	the	creation	of	the	
Oversight	 Board,	 some	 of	 its	 decisions	 run	 contrary	 to	 this	 aim.	 Facebook	 hired	 BSR	
(Business	for	Social	Responsibility)	to	conduct	a	Human	Rights	Impact	Assessment	(HRIA)	
on	the	Oversight	Board.	This	shows	an	admirable	commitment	to	transparency	and	human	
rights	 but	 ultimately	 Facebook	 chose	 to	 release	 a	 final	 Charter	 without	 waiting	 for	 the	
completion	 of	 the	 HRIA	 or	 consulting	 with	 BSR.532	One	 wonders,	 therefore,	 if	 the	 HRIA	
exercise	 was	 more	 of	 a	 public	 relations	 exercise	 than	 a	 genuine	 bid	 to	 improve	 their	
processes.	The	final	human	rights	issue	is	that	while	occasionally	referencing	“international	





expression.	 In	 fact,	 the	Bylaws	 start	 by	 saying	 “the	 purpose	of	 the	Oversight	Board	 is	 to	
protect	 freedom	of	expression”	and	the	Charter	states	 that	 the	Board	will	 “pay	particular	
attention	to	the	impact	of	removing	content	in	light	of	human	rights	norms	protecting	free	
expression.”533	It	seems	that	the	decisions	the	Board	makes	will	balance	Facebook’s	values	







as	entirely	within	 their	discretion	 to	make.	 Second,	 an	appeals	board	could	help	 identify	








One	 of	 the	 biggest	misconceptions	 that	 people	 can	make	when	 thinking	 of	 social	
media	is	to	consider	the	activities	that	occur	on	these	platforms	as	trivial	and	undeserving	of	
legal	protection.	This	view	does	not	reflect	the	rich	array	of	activities	that	occur	on	social	
media.	 Users	 engage	 in	 activism	 and	 citizen	 journalism,	 create	 and	 promote	 businesses,	
share	thoughts	and	opinions	about	subjects	that	are	important	to	them,	and	connect	with	
other	 groups	 and	 people	 around	 the	 world.	 Social	 media	 comprises	 a	 rich	 landscape	 of	






Users	 can	 then	connect	 their	 concerns	with	a	broader	discourse	about	human	rights	and	
procedural	due	process,	what	Citron	calls	“a	common	structure	for	debating	and	addressing	
concerns	 about	 the	 propriety	 of	 administrative	 actions.” 534 	A	 regulatory	 body	 may	 still	
decide	that	the	enforcement	decision	was	valid	but	users	will	have	an	assurance	that	they	
can	seek	a	second	(and	even	third)	opinion	to	ensure	that	the	decision	was	justified.	These	
reforms	 would	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 how	 social	 networks	 engage	 in	 content	
moderation	and	would	empower	users	in	their	dialogues	with	the	platforms.		
This	 chapter	has	discussed	 the	response	 stage	of	 the	 content	moderation	process:	
how	 users	 respond	 to	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 that	 are	 created	 and	 the	 enforcement	
decisions	of	 a	 platform.	 These	 responses	 can	be	 categorised	 into	 two	 general	 categories:	
responses	that	occur	within	the	structured	processes	of	the	platform	(primarily	the	appeals	
system	when	an	enforcement	action	 is	 taken)	and	 responses	 that	 come	 from	outside	 the	
platform	(most	notably	collective	actions	by	campaigners).	The	external	campaigning	may	
be	perceived	as	remedying	the	lack	of	participation	in	the	platform	(just	a	robust	appeals	
system	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 mitigating	 factor	 for	 a	 content	 moderation	 system	 that	 has	




and	 a	 commitment	 to	 remedy	 in	order	 to	 protect	 the	 ability	 of	 individuals	 to	use	 online	
platforms	as	 forums	 for	 free	expression,	 access	 to	 information	and	engagement	 in	public	
life.”536	There	will	 be	 errors	of	 course,	 but	 the	 policies	 and	processes	 in	place	 should	 be	
structurally	 sound.	 A	 strong	 appeals	 system	 is	 not	 enough	 if	 users	 must	 grapple	 with	
uncertain	rules,	inconsistent	enforcement,	and	a	general	feeling	that	the	platforms	are	acting	










have	 encompassed	 improving	 internal	 appeals,	 creating	 forums	 for	 participation,	 and	
creating	a	new	appeals	body.	These	solutions	not	only	benefit	users	but	also	the	platforms	
themselves	by	enhancing	their	legitimacy.		
The	 previous	 three	 chapters,	 including	 this	 one,	 have	 explored	 the	 stages	 of	 the	





of	 accountability.	 Whatever	 changes	 are	 suggested	 and	 whatever	 new	 measures	 are	
introduced	by	platforms	will	not	remedy	the	rule	of	law	and	human	rights	issues	that	have	











amounted	 to	a	 single	piece	of	paper,	 folded	 in	half,	with	a	bullet-pointed	 list	of	 things	 to	
remove.	When	moderating	they	asked	themselves	“can	I	share	this	video	with	my	family?”	
as	 a	 benchmark	 for	 moderation.	 Buni	 and	 Chemaly	 observed	 that	 “this	 small	 team	 of	
improvisers	had	yet	to	grasp	that	they	were	helping	to	develop	new	global	standards	for	free	
speech.”539	This	 anecdote	 illustrates	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 in	how	 content	 is	moderated	 by	
social	 media	 companies.	 First,	 content	 moderation	 is	 frequently	 treated	 as	 a	 secondary	
concern	(even	though	it	is	fundamental	to	a	site’s	continued	popularity	and	ability	to	attract	
investment)	with	serious	issues	in	staffing	and	labour	conditions.540	Second,	moderators	are	
referred	 to	as	a	 “team	of	 improvisers”	 and	 that	 same	pattern	of	behaviour	 still	pervades	
content	moderation:	rules	are	developed	or	services	are	introduced	with	little	consideration	
of	 the	 risks	 they	 pose	 or	 how	 negative	 consequences	 could	 be	 mitigated. 541 	Finally,	
moderation	 is	 equated	 simply	 with	 removal,	 with	 no	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 complex	
rights-balancing	exercises	that	content	regulation	should	reflect.		
	 Social	 media	 content	 moderation	 is	 a	 relatively	 new	 phenomenon	 and	 academic	
interest	in	how	companies	can	better	regulate	content	is	growing.542	Postman	writes	that	“it	
is	 inescapable	 that	 every	 culture	 must	 negotiate	 with	 technology,	 whether	 it	 does	 so	













people	 today	who	 believe	 that	 social	media	 content	 should	 not	 be	moderated.	 The	 true	
challenge	 is	 determining	 how	 these	 processes	 should	 occur	 in	 a	way	 that	maintains	 the	
strengths	of	private	regulation	while	still	respecting	the	rights	that	moderation	processes	
can	 imperil.	 The	 objective	 of	 this	 chapter,	 and	 the	 next,	 is	 to	 identify	 solutions	 to	 this	
problem.		











































respect	 human	 rights.	 It	 is	 “intrinsically	 linked”	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 Corporate	 Social	
Responsibility	 (CSR)	 because	 it	 is	 typically	 deployed	 to	 achieve	 CSR	 objectives. 546 	The	
concept	of	self-regulation	encompasses	a	number	of	different	regulatory	arrangements	that	
are	 aligned	 along	 a	 spectrum	 based	 on	 the	 degree	 of	 legislative	 constraint,	 outsider	
participation	 in	 rule	 creation	 and	 enforcement,	 and	 accountability.547	At	 one	 end	 of	 the	
spectrum	is	industry	regulation	by	a	collective	body	made	of	representatives	of	that	industry	
(collective	 self-regulation)	and	at	 the	other	end	of	 the	 spectrum	 is	 the	 situation	where	a	
single	company	governs	itself	(individualised	self-regulation).548	This	section	will	focus	on	
individualised	 self-regulation	 (and	 will	 refer	 to	 it	 as	 self-regulation)	 because	 of	 its	
applicability	to	social	media	companies.	Whilst	collective	self-regulation	is	typical	in	many	














of	 human	 rights	 initiatives	 and	 the	 probability	 that	 companies	 will	 adhere	 to	 the	 self-
regulatory	schemes	they	create	for	themselves.551	There	is	also	a	certain	logic	in	placing	the	
burden	 of	 regulating	 these	 activities	on	 the	 parties	 that	 benefit	 from	 it.	 From	 a	 practical	
perspective	for	states,	self-regulation	also	recognises	that	the	major	social	media	platforms	
have	significant	resources	(including	a	pool	of	intellectual	talent)	and	the	ability	to	deploy	
these	 resources	 in	 an	 efficient,	 scalable	way.	 Generally,	 content	moderation	 processes	 at	
social	media	result	in	very	quick	responses	even	though	they	are	handling	a	large	volume	of	
content,	 an	 efficiency	 that	 is	 unmatched	 by	 other	 regulators. 552 	While	 currently	 these	
processes	 are	 not	 entirely	 human	 rights-compliant,	 the	 same	 efficiency	 could	 be	
advantageous	 in	deploying	a	content	moderation	system	that	respects	human	rights.	 It	 is	




codes	 act	 as	 a	 set	 of	 promises	 from	 companies	 that	 stakeholders	 can	 use	 to	make	 their	
demands.	Advocates	and	rightsholders	can	structure	their	demands	from	companies	using	
the	promises	made	in	these	codes.553	The	most	obvious	advantage	to	concerned	parties	is	
that	companies	will	perceive	the	policies	 they	develop	as	a	 legitimate	expression	of	 their	
objectives	and	might	be	more	inclined	to	adhere	to	these	policies.	Another	benefit	that	self-
regulation	offers	 is	 that	 these	policies	may	offer	more	protection	and	higher	standards	 in	
jurisdictions	 with	 weak	 legal	 controls,	 thus	 providing	 a	 tangible	 benefit	 to	 the	 affected	
















invaluable	 asset	 in	 any	 attempt	 to	 address	 the	 human	 rights	 implications	 of	 private	
companies.	Dan	Danielson	argues	 that	 corporate	governance	 is	often	misunderstood	and	



































new	 Pepsi	 bottling	 plant	 would	 be	 managed	 and	 owned	 by	 black	 South	 Africans. 562	
Throughout	 its	history	 in	South	Africa,	Pepsi	 has	managed	 to	offer	employees	a	working	




Self-regulatory	 policies	 to	 protect	 human	 rights	 can	 also	 offer	 serious	 advantages	 to	
companies.	The	companies	may	benefit	from	an	enhanced	public	image,	thus	reducing	the	



























the	 risk	 of	 litigation	 for	 human	 rights	 abuses	 and	 it	 can	 help	 forestall	 more	 stringent	
mandatory	regulation	being	imposed.566	Another	practical	advantage	that	self-regulation	(in	
service	of	human	rights)	offers	is	that	it	is	the	method	generally	endorsed	by	the	American	
government	 (with	 some	 exceptions	 such	 as	 CSAM)	 as	 it	 complies	 with	 the	 First	
Amendment.567	As	the	majority	of	social	media	companies	began	in	America,	self-regulation	
offers	the	promise	that	the	rules	created	by	these	companies	will	not	be	struck	down	by	the	
courts.568	Companies	 that	respect	human	rights	may	 increase	 their	 customer	base,	 find	 it	
easier	 to	 attract	 and	 retain	 good	staff	 and	 appeal	 to	 institutional	 investors	 and	 potential	
investment	partners	(both	business	and	government)	who	are	all	 increasingly	concerned	
with	 ethical	 investments.569	It	 can	 appease	would-be	 critics	 and	 provide	 assurances	 that	





affect	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 offerings)	 and	 compete	 more	 effectively	 against	 other	
companies.571				
We	can	 see	 that	 a	 self-regulatory	approach	could	offer	some	important	advantages	 in	
protecting	 human	 rights.	 These	 benefits	 are	 accrued	 by	 states,	 companies,	 and	 affected	
parties.	 It	 must	 be	 acknowledged,	 however,	 that	 self-regulation	 has	 some	 serious	
disadvantages	as	an	approach	to	regulating	compliance	with	human	rights	in	the	fields	of	
activity	with	which	this	thesis	is	concerned.		















Even	when	 platforms	make	 their	 own	 rules	 or	 voluntarily	 accede	 to	 codes,	 they	 do	 not	









of	 support.	A	report	by	 the	UN	Working	Group	on	business	and	human	rights	 found	 that	
seven	years	after	 the	 introduction	of	 the	UNGPs,	 the	majority	of	 the	 companies	 they	had	
assessed	did	not	demonstrate	compliance.575	The	scheme	was	designed	to	be	pragmatic	and	
reasonable	 for	 businesses	 to	 adopt,	 but	 one	 must	 remember	 that	 it	 is	 still	 easier	 for	
companies	to	choose	not	to	comply	with	a	voluntary	scheme.	This	section	will	attempt	to	
explain	 why	 companies	 may	 choose	 not	 to	 embrace	 self-regulatory	 schemes,	 but	 it	 is	
important	 to	 remember	 that	 all	 of	 these	 issues	 only	 serve	 to	 illuminate	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
evidence	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 vast	majority	of	 companies	 do	 not	 voluntarily	 adhere	 to	
human	rights	schemes.576		
An	example	of	the	practical	failure	of	self-regulation	is	the	prelude	to	the	introduction	
of	 the	 German	 Network	 Enforcement	 Act.	 In	 2011,	 German	 government	 officials	 and	
stakeholders	 in	 the	tech	sector	announced	that	 that	 they	had	developed	a	self-regulatory	
code	 for	 social	 networks	with	German	users.	The	 code	was	 specifically	 focussed	 on	data	








protection,	 consumer	protection,	 and	 the	protection	of	 children.	 In	2013,	however,	word	
leaked	 out	 that	 Facebook,	 Google,	 and	 LinkedIn	 had	 refused	 to	 sign	 the	 code. 577 	The	
companies	 stated	 that	 they	 preferred	 supporting	 international	 self-regulation	 attempts	
instead	of	national	regimes.578	Google	released	a	statement	explaining	that	the	international	
nature	of	their	services	meant	they	could	not	participate	in	self-regulatory	initiatives	in	each	
country.	The	 question	 remains,	however,	whether	Google	 could	 not	 or	 simply	would	 not	
participate	in	the	scheme.	This	anecdote	might	perhaps	explain	why	Germany	subsequently	




a	 powerful	 example	 that	 self-regulatory	 approaches	 to	 human	 rights	 issues	 in	 content	
moderation	are	not	enough.		
Companies	 may	 show	 an	 initial	 commitment	 to	 respecting	 human	 rights	 but	
translating	that	commitment	into	sustained	action	does	not	always	occur.	Therefore,	even	
when	companies	do	indicate	some	adherence	to	a	human	rights	framework,	this	compliance	
is	 often	 patchy,	 and	 this	 inevitably	 decreases	 in	 effectiveness.579	For	 example,	 in	 a	 study	
conducted	by	Shift,	88%	of	companies	in	their	research	sample	had	a	policy	commitment	to	
respect	 human	 rights. 580 	However,	 when	 it	 came	 to	 activities	 that	 represent	 the	
implementation	 of	 these	 policies,	 the	 numbers	 fell	 dramatically.	 Only	 16%	of	 companies	
evidenced	a	robust	due	diligence	process	and	only	12%	had	a	strong	system	in	place	 for	
assessing	the	human	rights	impacts	their	activities	present.581	While	one	study	may	not	be	a	

















and	 towards	 a	 fully	 integrated	 process.	 This	 is	 another	 weakness	 in	 self-regulation:	 by	
allowing	companies	to	determine	what	compliance	looks	like,	many	platforms	will	fall	short	
of	what	is	actually	required	to	protect	human	rights	in	their	content	moderation	processes.		
A	 further	weakness	of	self-regulation	in	service	of	human	rights	 is	 that	companies	
may	 believe	 there	 is	 a	 business	 case	 for	 noncompliance.	 Voluntary	 codes	 become	 less	
attractive	if	companies	perceive	adherence	with	these	codes	as	putting	them	at	a	competitive	
disadvantage.583	An	example	of	 this	 is	 the	 relative	outcomes	 for	Coke	and	Pepsi	 in	South	
Africa.	As	discussed	previously,	Pepsi	implemented	policies	in	South	Africa	first	to	diminish	
the	 effects	 of	 apartheid	 on	 its	 employees	 and	 then	 to	 help	 encourage	 black	 economic	
empowerment	in	the	post-apartheid	landscape.	Pepsi	hoped	that	its	ethical	position	would	
help	it	to	supplant	Coca-Cola,	the	soft	drink	of	choice	in	South	Africa	during	apartheid.		





but	 there	 were	 even	 allegations	 that	 one	 of	 their	 South	 African	 bottling	 plants	 had	 a	
government	contract	to	use	black	prison	labour	in	the	factory,	a	group	who,	legally,	could	be	
paid	even	 less	 than	other	black	workers.586	In	1978	Coke	refused	 to	 cooperate	with	a	US	
















Cola	divested	 from	South	African	by	selling	 its	holdings	but	 crucially,	Coca-Cola	products	
continued	to	be	sold	in	South	Africa	throughout	the	intervening	years	with	no	change	in	the	
availability	of	the	beverage	or	the	amount	of	advertising.589	At	the	time,	an	anti-apartheid	






company	 in	 South	 Africa	 folded	 only	 three	 years	 after	 it	 opened;	 Pepsi’s	 belief	 that	
consumers	would	 choose	 the	more	ethical	 company	was	shattered.	593	Pepsi	had	 failed	 to	

















































Another	 flaw	 in	 self-regulation,	 as	 previously	 observed,	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 effective	
accountability	 mechanisms.	 Instead,	 platforms	 are	 often	 expected	 to	 assess	 their	 own	
compliance	 and	 change	 their	 practices	 accordingly,	 effectively	 “marking	 their	 own	
homework.”	595	This	approach	seems	inherently	flawed	and	unlikely	to	produce	significant	
changes.	 Danielson	 contends	 that	 as	 private	 companies	 engage	 in	 important	 governance	
activities	“accountability	for	the	social	welfare	effects	of	regulatory	outcomes	should	not	fall	
exclusively	on	“public”	regulators	and	the	actions	and	decisions	of	“private”	corporate	actors	










more	 principled	 than	 completely	 individualised	 self-regulation. 597 	While	 it	 is	 entirely	
possible	 to	 voluntarily	 accede	 to	 legal	 schemes	 which	 then	 mandate	 compliance,598 	the	
organisations	that	platform	join	tend	to	lack	strong	accountability	measures.	One	need	only	
think	 of	 all	 the	 platforms	 that	 are	 members	 of	 the	 Global	 Network	 Initiative	 (such	 as	
Facebook	and	Google)	who	have	voluntarily	agreed	to	abide	by	the	GNI	Guidelines,	which	
requires	(among	other	things)	that	companies	“avoid	or	minimise	the	impact	of	government	
restrictions	 on	 freedom	 of	 expression.” 599 	However,	 there	 are	 ample	 examples	 of	 GNI	
members	entering	into	secretive	agreements	with	states	to	voluntarily	remove	content	that	
would	 likely	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 right	 to	 free	 expression.600	For	 example,	 Facebook	 and	
Twitter	have	both	been	criticised	for	treating	Zionists	as	a	protected	group	and	accordingly	
removing	most	 of	 the	 negative	 content	 referred	 to	 them	 by	 the	 cyber	 unit	 of	 the	 Israeli	
government	while	allowing	incitements	to	violence	and	hateful	content	about	Palestinians	
to	 remain	 available. 601 	Collective	 systems	 of	 self-regulation,	 therefore,	 may	 represent	 a	




























formalities,	private	 regulators	are	 concerned	with	whether	 the	 regulation	 is	 efficient	and	





however,	 economic	 efficiency	 should	 not	 be	 “an	 overriding	 legislative	 goal”	 and	 “social	
obligations	are	 legislative	goals	of	 at	 least	 equal	 importance.”603	It	 is	 clear	 that	one	must	
import	the	perspective	of	these	corporations	into	any	considerations	of	how	a	plan	to	protect	
human	rights	can	be	implemented	on	the	platforms.	However,	being	sensitive	to	practical	
realities	and	allowing	 companies	broad	discretion	 in	how	 they	define	 their	human	rights	
responsibilities	are	very	different	propositions.	Self-regulation	allows	platforms	to	create	a	
hierarchy	of	their	priorities,	a	hierarchy	that	might	differ	quite	markedly	from	the	approach	
legislators	 envisioned.	 Bilchitz	 contends	 that	 self-regulation	 relies	 “on	 an	 ability	 of	
corporations	 to	 think	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 considers	 their	 wider	 social	 impact	 where	 the	
incentives	 for	 their	 decision-makers	 are	 often	 focused	 on	 shorter-term	 profit	
maximisation.”604	This	tendency	would	be	manageable	in	a	more	heavily	regulated	system,	










where	 the	 private	 and	 public	 regulators	 may	 engage	 in	 discourse,	 but	 could	 lead	 to	
ineffective	results	otherwise.		
6.2.3:	Case	Study:	Myanmar	
A	grim	example	of	 the	 futility	of	recognising	and	protecting	human	rights	 through	
self-regulation	may	be	seen	in	Facebook’s	response	to	the	genocide	in	Myanmar.605	In	2017,	




Facebook	 holds	 a	 special	 position	 in	Myanmar	 because,	 as	 a	 recent	 UN	 report	 explains,	
Myanmar	only	came	online	in	2010	and	“for	most	users,	Facebook	is	the	Internet.”607	This	
pre-eminence	of	Facebook	in	Myanmar	is	confirmed	by	a	further	report	that	found	that	users	
in	 Myanmar	 considered	 Facebook	 the	 only	 internet	 entry	 point	 for	 information	 and	 a	
majority	perceived	Facebook	posts	as	news.608	Researchers	have	also	found	that	Myanmar	
suffers	 from	 low	 rates	 of	 digital	 literacy	 (where	 users	 struggle	 to	 identify	 digital	
misinformation)	and	 that	many	of	 	 the	 “legal,	political	 and	cultural	 assumptions	 (such	as	
freedom	 of	 speech	 and	 rule	 of	 law)”	 that	 Facebook’s	 approach	 to	 content	moderation	 is	
predicated	 on	 do	 not	 apply	 in	 Myanmar.609 	Unfortunately,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 all	 of	 this,	 the	
platform	 became	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 military	 figures,	 government	 officials,	 and	 radical	
























In	 2018,	 Facebook	 hired	BSR	 (Business	 for	Social	 Responsibility),	 an	 independent	
NGO,	 to	 conduct	 an	 in-depth	 Human	 Rights	 Impact	 Assessment	 (HRIA)	 on	 Facebook’s	
activities	 in	 Myanmar.	 Facebook	 publicly	 shared	 the	 report,	 a	 positive	 move	 towards	
transparency	 as	 the	 report	 had	 found	 serious	 failings	 and	 human	 rights	 violations	 by	
Facebook	 in	 Myanmar.	 The	 report	 contained	 a	 variety	 of	 recommendations	 on	 how	 the	
platform	 could	 improve	 their	 conduct	 in	 Myanmar	 including	 employing	 Burmese	
moderators,	 creating	a	 secure	 storage	 space	 for	 the	preservation	of	digital	 evidence,	 and	
encouraging	 initiatives	 on	 digital	 literacy. 611 	There	 have	 been	 some	 important	
recommendations,	however,	that	the	platform	has	inexplicably	failed	to	implement.612	These	
oversights,	 which	 will	 be	 detailed	 below,	 highlight	 the	 weakness	 of	 self-regulation	 in	
recognising	and	protecting	human	rights:	no	matter	how	important	the	issue	may	be,	in	a	
self-regulatory	environment	the	platforms	can	always	choose	to	do	nothing.		
First,	 BSR	 recommended	 that	 Facebook	 create	 a	 stand-alone	 human	 rights	 policy.	
This	was	 to	 be	 a	 place	where	 Facebook	would	 publicly	 commit	 to	 abiding	 by	 the	UDHR,	
ICCPR,	 and	ICESCR	as	well	as	other	relevant	human	rights	 treaties.	 It	would	also	provide	














human	 rights	 policies,	 at	 times	 overlapping	 but	 at	 other	 times	 being	 very	 different. 614	
Despite	this	suggestion	being	relatively	easy	to	implement,	Facebook	chose	not	to	create	a	
standalone	 human	 rights	 policy.615	Perhaps	 Facebook	 preferred	 the	 flexibility	 of	 a	 set	 of	































this	 material	 and	 finding	 it	 necessitates	 sifting	 through	 the	 myriad	 of	 press	 releases	
Facebook	produces	on	a	variety	of	different	subjects.	Creating	a	human	rights-specific	area	
with	 a	 regularly	 updated	 collection	 of	 HRIA’s	 would	 be	 an	 incredibly	 useful	 tool	 for	
academics,	 activists,	 and	 concerned	 users,	 although	 perhaps	 it	might	 be	 too	useful	 from	
Facebook’s	perspective.	Just	as	displaying	the	calorie	count	of	baked	goods	at	a	café	might	
make	customers	less	likely	to	purchase	them,	becoming	aware	of	how	many	human	rights	
issues	 really	exist	 at	Facebook	could	 leave	users	disenchanted	and	willing	 to	delete	 their	
accounts.		
Facebook	has	not	only	ignored	some	of	the	recommendations	in	the	BSR	report,	they	
have	 also	 acted	 in	 contradiction	 to	 some	 of	 its	 suggestions.	 In	 February	 2019,	 Facebook	
announced	 that	 it	 had	 banned	 four	 armed	 organisations	 in	Myanmar	 (all	 of	whom	were	
ethnic	independence	movements)	and	would	be	removing	any	content	that	was	in	support	
of	the	groups.619	This	was	a	controversial	decision	and	ran	counter	to	the	recommendations	
in	 the	 HRIA,	 which	 advised	 Facebook	 to	 “narrow	 its	 existing	 definition	 of	 terrorist	
organisations…to	exclude	organisations	considered	to	be	legitimate	combatants	in	conflict,	
such	as	officially	recognised	ethnic	armed	organisations	(EAOs).”620	The	report	emphasised	
that	 this	 was	 particularly	 important	 in	 Myanmar,	 “where	 there	 is	 a	 history	 of	 toxic	
nationalism	and	state-mandated	violent	oppression	of	ethnic	groups,	as	well	as	the	presence	
of	multiple	 legitimate	secession	movements.”621	It	should	be	noted	that	 the	report	wasn’t	
saying	 that	 content	 by	 these	 organisations	 could	 not	 be	 removed	 if	 it	 violated	 other	
prohibitions	(such	as	hate	speech	or	graphic	violence)	but	simply	that	these	organisations	
should	 not	 be	 banned	 entirely	 from	 the	 platform.622 	The	 situation	 in	 Myanmar	 is	 still	
ongoing,	with	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ)	ruling	in	January	2020	that	the	Rohingya	
people	were	at	serious	risk	of	genocide	and	that	Myanmar	must	“take	all	measures	within	its	









power”	 to	 prevent	 it. 623 		 UN	 investigator	 who	 participated	 in	 a	 fact-finding	 mission	 to	





general	 election	 in	2020	and	 the	 coronavirus	pandemic	allows	Myanmar	 to	keep	 foreign	
journalists	out.	
The	Myanmar	 situation	 illustrates	why	 self-regulation	 is	 an	 unsatisfactory	way	 to	
safeguard	human	rights.	A	serious	problem	emerged	in	a	country	with	a	history	of	human	




again	 that	 Facebook	 has	 followed	 some	 of	 the	 report’s	 suggestions,	 such	 as	 banning	 key	
Myanmar	military	figures	in	the	genocide	and	employing	a	hundred	moderators	who	speak	
Burmese.627	These	concessions,	however,	do	not	diminish	the	central	issue	in	this	section.	
Self-regulation	 is	 rife	 with	 discretionary	 decisions	 and	 selective	 adherence.	 A	 voluntary	
commitment	 to	 respect	 human	 rights	 loses	 its	 legitimacy	 unless	 it	 is	 complemented	 by	
accountability	measures,	remedies,	and	contains	some	level	of	independent	monitoring.628		



















of	 content	 that	would	 be	 inconceivable	 to	 traditional	 public	 regulators.629	Any	 successful	
scheme	to	align	content	moderation	practices	with	human	rights	must,	therefore,	involve	the	
cooperation	 of	 social	 media	 companies.	 This	 does	 not,	 however,	 necessarily	 require	 the	
voluntary	 cooperation	 of	 these	 companies	 and	 it	 certainly	 should	 not	 entail	 an	 entirely	
voluntary	scheme	where	companies	determine	every	aspect	of	the	regime,	as	this	has	proven	
to	be	an	unsatisfactory	approach.	Any	proposed	plan	of	action	must,	therefore,	preserve	the	









Substantive	 regulation	 is	 the	most	 common	 trend	 in	 regulating	 the	 harms	 caused	 by	
social	media	platforms.	It	is	predominantly	used	to	alter	the	content	moderation	process	and	
















applications,	 as	 the	 key	 driver	 in	 this	 area	 of	 regulation	 is	 to	 protect	 the	 public	 from	
perceived	harms	on	 social	media	platforms	such	as	 childhood	exposure	 to	 inappropriate	
content,	hate	 speech,	 extremist	 content,	 and	non-consensual	 sexual	 imagery.631	Could	 the	









use	 with	 little	 need	 for	 the	 convoluted	 interpretations	 that	 occur	 when	 old	 laws	 are	
interpreted	for	new	technologies.	A	law,	therefore,	can	be	directly	applicable	to	social	media	
instead	 of	 retrofitting	 an	 old	 law	 that	 concerned	 telephones,	 print	 communications,	 or	
traditional	 media.	 Finally,	 these	 laws	 offer	 the	 practical	 advantage	 that	 their	 specificity	
makes	 it	 easier	 to	 foster	 political	 support	 and	 achieve	 consensus	 as	 opposed	 to	 broad,	
holistic	 regulatory	 schemes	 for	 entire	 industries.	 It	 is	 easier,	 for	 example,	 to	 pass	 a	 law	













regulation	 in	 this	 sphere.	 First,	 it	 must	 be	 acknowledged	 that	 relying	 primarily	 on	
substantive	 regulation	 to	reform	content	moderation	 results	 in	governance	gaps.	 Specific	
regulatory	 regimes	 are	 reactive	 and	 siloed	without	 acknowledging	 that	many	 issues	 are	
interconnected	(to	both	present	and	emerging	situations).633	Patchwork	regimes	are	difficult	
for	the	public	to	understand	and	can	be	contradictory,	thus	reducing	their	certainty	on	what	
is	 permissible	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 It	 will	 be	 recalled	 that	 Fuller	 identifies	 clarity	 and	 the	
avoidance	 of	 contradiction	 as	 two	 of	 his	 criteria	 in	 assessing	 the	 quality	 of	 a	 law	whilst	
Bingham	 emphasised	 that	 the	 law	 should	 be	 “intelligible,	 clear,	 and	 practicable.”634	One	








holistic,	 approach,	 the	 UK	 originally	 singled	 out	 one	 specific	 aspect	 of	 this	 problem,	 the	
disclosure	of	private	sexual	images	or	what	is	often	referred	to	as	“revenge	porn.”636	This	


















was	criminalised	 in	England	&	Wales	 in	Section	33	of	 the	Criminal	 Justice	and	Courts	Act	
2015.	This	provision	specifically	addressed	“disclosing	private	sexual	photographs	and	films	
with	intent	to	cause	distress.”	It	soon	became	clear,	however,	that	the	narrow	scope	of	this	




targeting	 “upskirting”	 images	 in	 The	 Voyeurism	 (Offences)	 Act	 2019. 638 	Upskirting	 is	
colloquially	defined	as	“taking	a	picture	under	a	person’s	clothing	without	them	knowing,	
with	the	intention	of	viewing	their	genitals	or	buttocks.”639	While	laws	like	the	up-skirting	
law	were	widely	 celebrated,640	the	 fact	 remains	 that	by	drafting	 such	 specific	provisions,	
much	of	what	McGlynn,	Rackley,	and	Houghton	term	“the	continuum	of	image-based	sexual	
abuse”	 still	 falls	 outside	 the	 remit	 of	 the	 laws	 on	 revenge	 porn	 and	 upskirting.641	These	
































actions	 include	 sexualised	 photoshopping	 (AKA	 deepfakes), 642 	sexual	 extortion, 643 	and	
down-blousing644	with	the	possibility	 that	other	 image-based	abusive	acts	may	emerge	 in	
the	 future.	McGlynn,	 Rackley,	 and	 Houghton	 argue	 that	 the	 problem	with	 highly	 specific	
statutory	interventions	of	this	sort	is	that	“such	provisions	are	a	clear	demonstration	of	how	
legal	 categories	based	on	 supposedly	 isolated	 forms	of	 conduct	and	 for	specific	purposes	
leave	 many	 victim-survivors	 unprotected.	 Laws,	 as	 currently	 interpreted	 and	 enacted,	
therefore	largely	fail	to	cover	the	range	of	experiences	of	abuse.”645	While	it	takes	longer	to	
draft	a	comprehensive	code	on	a	particular	 issue	(such	as	 image-based	sexual	abuse)	 the	




The	 image-based	 sexual	 abuse	 example	 not	 only	 demonstrates	 the	 complexity	 of	 a	
patchwork	regime,	but	it	also	illustrates	another	issue	with	substantive	regulation:	certain	
situations	will	 be	 unintentionally	 excluded	 from	 the	overlapping	 regulatory	 regimes.	 For	
example,	 by	 focussing	 on	 explicit	 self-harm	 imagery,	 we	 fail	 to	 consider	 how	 these	
technologies	may	contribute	to	mental	health	 issues	on	a	broader	 level.647	After	all,	some	


























result	in	uneven	results.	For	example,	 Islamist	 terrorist	groups	were	 initially	 targeted	 for	
removal	 on	 Twitter	 with	 more	 intensity	 than	 other	 terrorist	 groups. 649 	After	 the	
Charlottesville	rally	and	attack	(which	resulted	in	the	death	of	Heather	Heyer)	many	tech	
companies	 publicly	 pledged	 to	 ban	 white	 supremacist	 groups	 or	 people	 espousing	 that	
ideology.650	Once	 again,	 platforms	 chose	 to	 reactively	 ban	 a	 category	 of	 harmful	 people	
without	considering	whether	there	might	be	other	kind	of	groups	with	similar	qualities	who	










the	 right	 to	 free	 expression	 when	 moderating	 content.	 This	 approach,	 however,	 is	
problematic	 for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	 it	singles	out	a	particular	kind	of	business	as	
having	human	rights	obligations	without	considering	whether	other	companies	should	have	
similar	 responsibilities.	 If	 future	 legislation	 is	 then	 passed	 addressing	 the	 human	 rights	


















them	 being	 covered	 by	multiple,	 potentially	 contradictory	 regimes.652	Second,	 instead	 of	
considering	human	rights	responsibilities	more	broadly,	substantive	regulation	may	focus	
on	a	specific	right	(such	as	free	expression)	which	can	further	complicate	understandings	of	
what	 legal	obligations	 these	 companies	may	have.	This	 is	 especially	problematic	because	
human	 rights	 often	 entails	 rights-balancing	 (when	 rights	 come	 into	 conflict)	 and	 if	
companies	 only	 have	 legal	 obligations	 in	 relations	 to	 some	 rights,	 they	 will	 naturally	
prioritise	 those	 rights	over	other	 rights.653	Any	 subsequent	amendments	 to	 include	more	
rights	will	only	render	the	situation	more	complex.	Instead,	human	rights	legislation	must	
be	 comprehensive	 and	 any	 disparities	 in	 obligations	 on	 different	 business	 sectors	 or	 in	
relation	to	specific	categories	of	rights	must	be	reasonable,	clearly	articulated	and	justifiable.			
Further,	 as	 previously	mentioned,	 substantive	 regulation	 can	 both	underregulate	 and	
overregulate	an	area.	 In	 terms	of	overregulation,	 there	 is	 a	 troubling	 tendency	 to	neglect	
valid	human	rights	concerns	surrounding	censorship	and	 impose	stricter	expectations	on	
platforms	than	on	similar	offline	offerings.	The	government	White	Paper	on	online	harms,	
for	 example,	 identifies	 twenty-three	 discrete	 categories	 of	 harms	 that	 exist	 on	 the	
































on	procedural	protections.	 Its	objective	 is	 either	 the	 specific	prohibition	of	 something	or	
introducing	a	new	obligation	on	social	media	companies.	Little	consideration	is	afforded	to	





























of	 circumventing	 established	 legal	 protections. 660 	One	 example	 of	 this	 was	 the	 2014	
proliferation	 of	 content	 by	 ISIS,	 which	 led	 to	 an	 intense	 interest	 in	 regulating	 terrorist	
content	 on	 social	 media. 661 	France,	 for	 example,	 introduced	 a	 law	 that	 empowered	
government	authorities	 to	order	 Internet	Service	Providers	(ISP’s)	 to	block	websites	 that	
promote	terrorism	without	the	need	for	a	court	order.	662	There	may	be	times	when	new	laws	
are	needed	for	the	online	environment	but	it	essential	to	scrutinise	legislative	attempts	to	
































technologies	 are	 exceptional	 and	 require	 specific	 laws	 they	 are	 building	 in	 a	measure	 of	
obsolescence	that	will	be	quickly	reached.	Regulators	are	then	faced	with	the	challenge	of	
either	 interpreting	 this	 old	 legislation	 for	 technologies	 that	 were	 not	 envisioned	 by	 the	
original	 drafters	 or	 by	 passing	 new	 substantive	 legislation.	 This	 form	 of	 regulation	 is	









amendments	 to	 remain	 relevant.667	They	are	particularly	beneficial	 in	 industries	 that	 are	
rapidly	 developing	 such	 as	 the	 technology	 sector	 and	 they	 allow	 for	 more	 detail	 to	 be	
developed	 through	 guidelines,	 codes	 of	 practice	 and	 certification	 that	 flow	 from	 the	
principles.” 668 	Of	 course,	 making	 laws	 technologically	 neutral	 does	 not	 guarantee	 their	
permanent	relevance	and	laws	regulating	the	digital	sector	will	still	require	more	frequent	
updates	 than	 other,	more	 settled	 areas	 of	 law.669	It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 principles-
based	regulation	provides	slightly	less	certainty	to	companies	(who	may	be	unsure	whether	
they	 are	 in	 compliance)	 but	 this	 uncertainty	 can	 be	 undercut	 by	 affording	 companies	 a	
measure	 of	 discretion	 in	how	 they	meet	 these	 objectives	 and	 focussing	 on	 due	 diligence	





















Holocaust	denial	 in	 those	countries	 that	explicitly	ban	 it.672	Substantive	regulation	can	be	
used	to	rectify	gaps	in	current	regimes	and	can	be	targeted	in	its	application	and	responsive	
to	 emerging	 issues.	 It	 can	 also	 complement	 other	 forms	 of	 regulation	 that	 are	 more	
comprehensive	in	their	application.	The	issue,	however,	is	when	this	checkerboard	regime	
of	substantive	regulation	is	treated	as	a	panacea	for	the	problems	that	exist	on	social	media	
platforms	 and	 when	 societal	 issues	 result	 in	 reflexive,	 piecemeal	 regulation	 from	
governments.	The	objective	instead	should	be	to	introduce	comprehensive	principles-based	
legislation	that	primarily	focusses	on	procedural	issues	in	social	media	content	moderation.	

































advocates	a	harm	reduction	 cycle	where	harms	are	measured,	 changes	are	 implemented,	
then	harms	are	measured	again	and	the	process	continues.679	This	 is	not	an	obligation	to	
eliminate	all	harms	but	 rather	 to	 take	 “sufficient	 care”	 to	avoid	 systemic	 failures	 in	 their	
systems. 680 	They	 emphasise	 safety	 in	 design	 and	 ensuring	 the	 processes	 they	 use	 to	






















































are	 developing	 and	 holds	 them	 responsible	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 foresight.	 This	 approach	 is	 the	
opposite	 of	 the	 Silicon	 Valley	maxim	 of	 “move	 fast	 and	 break	 things”	 and	 could	 help	 to	
prevent	the	controversies	that	can	erupt	from	hastily	introduced	products	(such	as	the	live-











of	 funding,	 implementation,	 and	 sanctions.	 Their	 framework	 emphasises	 due	 diligence	
(although	that	term	is	not	explicitly	used)	and	the	creation	of	a	regulator	to	hold	platforms	










accountable	 and	 ensure	 they	 do	 have	 the	 necessary	 procedures	 in	 place	 to	 prevent	 and	
manage	 issues. 691 	The	 same	 advantage	 exists	 in	 the	 government	 White	 Paper,	 which	
emphasises	the	role	of	codes	of	conduct	and	the	implementation	of	a	“transparency,	trust,	
and	 accountability	 framework”	 by	 the	 regulator.	 The	 White	 Paper	 also	 states	 that	 the	
regulator	 should	ensure	 that	platforms	comply	with	 their	own	 terms	and	conditions	 in	a	
consistent	manner	and	have	effective	“user	redress	mechanisms,”692	which	are	issues	that	









be	 levied	 against	 the	 Online	 Harms	 White	 Paper,	 which	 never	 defines	 harms,	 choosing	
instead	to	provide	examples	of	23	different	kinds	of	harm	and	a	list	of	harms	that	will	be	
excluded	 including	 harms	 to	 organisations,	 harms	 resulting	 from	 data	 protection	 issues,	
harms	 from	 cybersecurity	 and	 harms	 stemming	 from	 the	 dark	 web.694	This	 is	 unfair	 as	
platforms	need	a	measure	of	certainty	as	to	what	they	would	be	required	to	address	to	avoid	























Norms	 using	 the	 poorly	 defined	 “corporate	 spheres	 of	 influence”	 as	 a	 guiding	 principle.	

































harm	 is	 particularly	 challenging	 for	 social	media	 companies	 as	 a	 duty	 of	 care	 is	 usually	







and	 content	 with	 harm	 can	 allow	 for	 more	 regulatory	 eclecticism	 and	 comparison	 to	
industries	 that	 do	 not	 regulate	 speech,	 such	 as	 the	 environmental	 agencies.	 Perrin	 and	




kill.704	It	 is	perfectly	 reasonable	 to	 regulate	 such	 content	 on	 social	media	 platforms	so	 it	
seems	strange	to	claim	to	be	content-neutral	as	a	matter	of	semantics	rather	than	reality.		

















government	 White	 Paper,	 which	 presumes	 that	 everyone	 is	 in	 agreement	 on	 what	
constitutes	 an	 actionable	 harm	 and	 makes	 over-general	 statements	 like	 “illegal	 and	
unacceptable	content	and	activity	is	widespread	online.”706	It	is	also	generally	expected	that	
duties	of	 care	are	applied	 to	 situations	where	the	harm	can	be	 clearly	 identified	when	 it	
occurs	(such	as	physical	injury	or	financial	loss)	or,	in	cases	where	a	broader	set	of	harms	
are	 considered,	or	where	a	 special	 relationship	exists	between	 the	 two	parties	 such	as	a	
relationship	of	employment.707	Instead,	Perrin	and	Woods	briefly	explain	the	precautionary	
principle,	which	states	“on	the	basis	of	the	best	scientific	advice	available	in	the	time-frame	
for	 decision-making:	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 harmful	 effects	 may	 occur	 to	
human,	animal	or	plant	health,	or	to	the	environment;	and	the	level	of	scientific	uncertainty	
about	the	consequences	or	likelihoods	is	such	that	risk	cannot	be	assessed	with	sufficient	




of	 research	 that	 would	 be	 necessary	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 each	 of	 the	 issues	 they	 have	












identified	 is	 having	 a	 harmful	 effect	 on	 humans.	 Instead,	 they	 simply	 conclude,	 without	
further	references:	
“We	 believe	 that	 –	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 evidence	 in	 relation	 to	 screen	 use,	 internet	 use	
generally	and	social	media	use	in	particular	–	there	is	in	relation	to	social	media	“good	
reason	to	believe	that	harmful	effects	may	occur	to	human[s]”	despite	the	uncertainties	
surrounding	 causation	and	 risk.	On	 this	basis	we	propose	 that	 it	 is	 appropriate	 if	not	
necessary	to	regulate…”709		
By	 failing	 to	 properly	 justify	 the	 existence	 of	 social	media	 harm,	 Perrin	 and	Woods’s	
proposals	seem	more	tenuous	and	less	urgent.	The	precautionary	principle	argument	is	just	
a	 claim	 that	 one	 should	 be	 “better	 safe	 than	 sorry”	 and	 while	 that	 might	 be	 perfectly	
reasonable	when	considering,	for	example,	the	safety	of	consuming	alcohol	while	pregnant	
or	 the	 effects	 of	 vaping	 tobacco,	 it	 seems	 less	 reasonable	when	discussing	 speech-based	
issues.	It	is	hard	to	assess	the	validity	of	a	scheme	that	purports	to	be	objective	but	renders	
even	the	definition	of	harm	or	its	existence	in	any	given	scenario	as	subjective.	Even	though	








unit,	 and	 polluting	 company. 711 	The	 one	 analogy	 they	 explicitly	 reject	 is	 the	
publisher/distributer	 analogy	 citing	 “the	 need	 to	 deploy	 regimes	 and	 enforcement	 at	
scale.”712	While	there	is	nothing	inherently	objectionable	in	analogies,	there	are	a	number	of	






issues	 in	 how	 Perrin	 and	Woods	 employ	 them	 to	 explain	 and	 justify	 their	 duty	 of	 care	
proposal.	
First,	 the	 reasoning	 employed	 in	 choosing	 these	 analogies	 is	 inductive	 instead	 of	





instead	 jumps	straight	 to	concluding	that	 it	would	be	expedient	 to	do	so,	stating	that	“an	
appropriate	analogy	for	social	media	platforms	is	that	of	a	public	space.	The	law	has	proven	
very	good	at	this	type	of	protection	in	the	physical	realm.”715	The	analogies	employed	in	the	
report	 (such	as	a	 safety	 issue	at	 a	 theme	park	or	a	 company	dumping	hazardous	waste)	
naturally	 lead	 one	 to	 conclude	 that	 everyone	would	 be	 better	 off	 if	 the	 harm	had	 never	
occurred	and	this	is	concerning	when	it	is	applied	to	content	issues	where	there	may	be	valid	
arguments	on	both	sides.	Indeed,	duties	of	care	typically	assume	that	it	is	“uncontroversial	





This	 is	 reminiscent	of	Orin	Kerr’s	 assessment	of	 the	 tendency	 to	 regulate	 the	 internet	by	
analogy,	and	how	one	must	be	careful	because	the	analogy	we	choose	will	likely	affect	the	


























Perrin	 and	 Woods	 claim	 that	 general	 laws	 requiring	 harm	 reduction	 work	
particularly	well	 in	multifunctional	places	 like	houses,	parks,	 and	pubs	as	 “duties	of	 care	
work	in	circumstances	where	so	many	different	things	happen	that	you	would	be	unable	to	
write	 rules	 for	 each	 one.” 722 	This	 is	 a	 misconception	 as	 the	 harms	 in	 these	 spaces	 are	
relatively	 circumscribed	 (physical	 injury	 and	 damage	 to	 property)	 but	 rather	 it	 is	 the	
methods	of	sustaining	this	harm	that	can	be	diverse	(so	the	law	must	consider	all	kinds	of	






























of	 reasons.	 First,	 platforms	 will	 expend	 more	 energy	 and	 resources	 contesting	 a	 set	 of	
regulations	 that	 they	 perceive	 as	 excessively	 harsh.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 absolute	 barrier	 to	
regulation	but	it	will	make	it	more	difficult	to	achieve	compliance	if	the	regulatory	scheme	is	
not	perceived	as	 legitimate	by	 the	 regulatees	 as	 the	best	 regulatory	 schemes	are	neither	
“solely	deterrent”	nor	“solely	cooperative.”725	Second,	there	are	surely	valid	concerns	as	to	
whether	 it	 is	 even	 possible	 for	 platforms	 to	 comply	 with	 such	 a	 broad,	 heavy-handed	



















action	 before	 activity	 reaches	 the	 level	 at	 which	 it	 would	 become	 an	 offence.” 728 	This	
emphasis	on	 intervening	 before	 conduct	 reaches	 the	 level	 of	 an	 offence	 is	 related	 to	 the	
report’s	assertion	that	“given	the	lax	enforcement	of	the	criminal	law,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	
existence	of	 the	 criminal	offence	has	much	deterrent	effect.”729	This	 seems	 like	an	overly	
critical	assessment	of	criminal	law	and	an	effort	 to	shift	some	of	 the	responsibilities	(and	
compliance	costs)	of	the	criminal	law	system	onto	social	media	platforms,	which	raises	the	



















of	 the	 social	 media	 service,	 which	 would	 already	 be	 difficult	 enough	 as	 they	 would	 be	













opaque	 and	 slow.”734	While	 this	 thesis	 has	 identified	 serious	 issues	with	 transparency	 at	
every	stage	in	the	moderation	process,	it	is	not	accurate	to	call	these	moderation	processes	





of	 them,	and	 indeed	 this	 thesis	has	actually	 criticised	platforms	 for	a	preoccupation	with	
speed	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 more	 nuanced	 concerns	 (see	 4.4.2).	 It	 is	 unclear	 whether	 this	
criticism	was	made	from	a	lack	of	knowledge	or	as	an	attempt	to	justify	the	imposition	of	











stricter	measures	 on	 the	 platforms,	 but	 either	 way	 it	 is	 inaccurate	 and	 overly	 harsh	 on	
platforms.		
6.4.3.iv:.	Free	expression	issues	are	poorly	addressed		






responded	 by	 explaining	 that	 as	 the	 regulator	would	 be	 a	 public	 body,	 section	 six	of	 the	
Human	Rights	Act	1998	(which	requires	public	bodies	to	carry	out	their	duties	in	accordance	
with	 Convention	 rights)	 would	 apply. 740 	This	 is	 a	 weak	 answer	 because	 their	 scheme	
envisions	platforms	having	a	wide	discretion	in	how	they	produce	the	requisite	outcomes	so	
the	real	free	expression	issue	is	not	in	how	the	regulator	applies	the	law	(although	that	would	





















consultation.	 The	White	 Paper	 states	 that	 “The	 regulator	will	 also	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	
protect	users’	rights	online,	particularly	rights	to	privacy	and	freedom	of	expression.	It	will	
ensure	that	the	new	regulatory	requirements	do	not	lead	to	a	disproportionately	risk	averse	
response	 from	companies	that	unduly	 limits	 freedom	of	expression,	 including	by	 limiting	
participation	 in	 public	 debate.” 742 	No	 detail,	 however,	 was	 initially	 provided	 on	 how	
platforms	 should	 address	 the	 competing	 requirements	 of	 protecting	 free	 speech	 and	
targeting	a	variety	of	content	that	does	not	currently	violate	any	laws.	The	response	to	the	
consultation	 then	 explained	 that	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 free	 expression,	 there	 would	 be	













could	 be	 proportionate	 responses	 to	 some	 content. 746 	However,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 many	
platforms,	fearing	a	hefty	fine	(or	some	of	the	other	measures	mooted	by	the	government)	
will	 adopt	 a	 risk-averse	 approach	 and	 choose	 to	 remove	 content	 that	 could	 have	 been	














of	care	scheme	but	very	 few	incentives	to	allow	content	 to	remain	or	 to	encourage	other	
positive	 values	 on	 the	 platform	 such	 as	 citizen	 journalism	 or	 robust	 debate.	 A	 similar	
criticism	was	made	about	the	German	Network	Enforcement	Act	(see	4.4.2)		but	the	duty	of	
care	 framework	 would	 have	 even	 more	 of	 a	 chilling	 effect	 on	 speech	 as	 the	 Network	
Enforcement	 Act	 at	 least	 confined	 itself	 to	 illegal	 content	 whereas	 the	 duty	 of	 care	
encompasses	a	variety	of	legal	content.		
A	final	unsatisfactory	response	is	that	Perrin	and	Woods	argue	that	even	if	the	duty	of	






care	must	 be	 assessed	 against	 its	 own	 impacts,	 and	 not	 dismissed	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	





decision	 that	 something	 is	 extremist	 or	 depicts	 child	 abuse	 will	 result	 in	 it	 being	
technologically	impossible	to	post	on	any	participating	platform.	Accordingly,	it	is	unlikely	









that	 in	 the	 future,	 there	will	 be	much	 difference	 in	which	 content	 is	 available	 on	which	
platform.	Perrin	and	Woods	even	seem	to	acknowledge	and	encourage	this	outcome,	writing	












convincing	 case	 for	 affording	 platforms	 a	measure	 of	 discretion	 in	 how	 they	meet	 their	
obligations	and	explains	how	this	new	regulatory	scheme	would	be	administered.	The	duty	










be	 that	 these	 solutions	 are	 incomplete.	 There	 are	many	 promising	 elements	 that	 can	 be	






the	 compliance	 costs	and	direct	 resources	 to	developing	 scalable	and	efficient	processes.	
Finally,	the	Perrin	and	Woods	social	media	duty	of	care	offers	a	risk-oriented	strategy	that	
compels	 platforms	 to	 consider	 the	 processes	 they	 put	 in	 place.	 Each	 of	 these	 proposals,	
however,	can	only	form	one	part	of	a	grander	plan	to	redesign	how	these	companies	interact	
with	society	and	the	legal	institutions	that	protect	it.		











This	 thesis	 has	 made	 suggestions	 in	 almost	 every	 chapter	 on	 how	 social	 media	
content	moderation	could	be	reformed.	Chapter	Three	argued	that	there	needed	to	be	more	
clarity	and	detail	provided	in	social	media	terms	and	conditions	and	more	opportunities	for	
users	 to	 provide	 feedback	 on	 the	 rules	 (at	 3.5).	 In	 Chapter	 Four,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 body	 of	
precedents	 (which	 would	 provide	 more	 certainty	 for	 users	 and	 would	 act	 as	 a	 User	







across	 every	 stage	 of	 the	 content	moderation	process.	 Transparency	 can	 be	 beneficial	 in	
“mitigating	 threats	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression”	 as	 well	 as	 other	 rights.752 	But	 of	 course,	
without	broader	 reforms,	 transparency	and	disclosure	 requirements	 represent,	 at	best,	 a	
“mild	astringent”	for	social	media	companies.753	To	achieve	true	change	in	how	corporations	
operate,	 would-be	 reformers	 need	 to	 “find	 ways	 to	 affect	 the	 decision-making	 of	 these	












current	 approach	 often	 pays	 lip-service	 to	 human	 rights	 but	 by	 deeming	 the	 removal	 of	
content	 as	 the	 ultimate	 priority,	 concerns	 about	 censorship	 as	 well	 as	 inconsistent	
applications	 of	 other	 rights	 are	 largely	 ignored.	 A	 new	 approach	 is	 needed,	 one	 where	
regulators	 create	 powerful	 legal	 incentives	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 their	 users. 757 	This	
chapter	will	focus	on	the	procedural	nature	of	content	moderation	and	how	reform	in	these	
areas	is	urgently	required.		
This	 thesis	 owes	 a	 debt	 to	 Jeremy	 Waldron’s	 scholarship	 on	 how	 important	
procedural	protections	are	in	upholding	the	rule	of	law	and	how	often	this	area	is	ignored.	
Waldron	defines	procedural	to	mean	that	we	are	concerned	not	with	what	the	law	says	(the	








aligned	 to	 procedural	 protections. 760 	Waldron	 explains	 that	 it	 is	 often	 through	 legal	
procedures	(such	as	court	hearings	or	appeals)	where	people	are	given	the	opportunity	to	
























law	 and	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 they	 offered.	 This	 chapter	 will	 offer	 a	 fresh	
solution	 that	 preserves	 some	 of	 the	 strengths	 the	 other	 solutions	 offered:	 certainty	 for	
companies,	efficient	use	of	resources,	strong	enforcement	methods,	and	an	emphasis	on	a	
procedural	 framework.	 This	 solution	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 mandatory	 human	 rights	 due	
diligence	 [HRDD]	 scheme	 for	 companies.	 This	 chapter	 will	 attempt	 to	 set	 out	 the	
justifications,	 substantive	 content,	 and	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 implementing	 a	 legal	
requirement	that	social	media	companies	engage	in	HRDD.762	Baldwin	and	Cave	write	that	






















instead	 of	 carried	 out	 only	 once.	 Indeed,	 the	 “prophylactic	 element”	 helps	 to	 distinguish	
important	human	rights	due	diligence	projects	like	the	UN	Guiding	Principles	[UNGP’s]	from	
traditional	 enterprise	 liability	 approaches	 which	 focus	 on	 attributing	 “ex-post	
responsibility.”765	Risk,	 therefore,	 is	 a	 term	 describing	 “knowledge	 deficiencies”	 about	 a	
business’s	potential	negative	impact	on	human	rights,	which	a	due	diligence	process	can	help	
to	rectify.766	This	risk	assessment	and	management	strategy	is	a	similar	approach	to	Perrin	
and	Wood’s	 duty	 of	 care	 framework	 (at	 6.4)	 although	 the	 central	 objective	 (addressing	







a	 state	 to	 mandate	 these	 actions	 while	 still	 allowing	 a	 measure	 of	 discretion	 in	 how	
companies	implement	these	practices	and	the	substantive	results.	The	objective,	therefore,	
is	to	catalyse	corporate	reform	by	“constitutionalising”	a	commitment	to	human	rights	in	the	











certainty	 to	 the	 public,	 and	 sustain	 a	 positive	 reputation	 for	 the	 companies	 that	 are	 in	
compliance.770		
The	Protect,	Respect,	Remedy	Framework	and	the	UNGP’s	can	be	a	starting	point	for	an	
actionable	 plan	 on	 human	 rights	 due	 diligence. 771 	There	 have	 already	 been	 important	
initiatives	 in	a	number	of	countries	mandating	human	rights	due	diligence.	These	 include	
both	general	due	diligence	requirements	(in	France	and	soon	in	Germany)	and	due	diligence	
requirements	 on	 certain	 topics	 (modern	 slavery	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 child	 labour	 in	 the	
Netherlands).	 These	 national	 laws	 will	 be	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 section	 as	 well	 as	
developments	at	the	regional	and	international	level.	There	have	also	been	some	important	
academic	 contributions	 from	 scholars	 who	 support	 mandatory	 HRDD.	 These	 academics	




would	 take	 the	 framework	 created	 by	 the	UNGP’s	 and	 use	 them	 to	 inform	 a	 set	 of	 legal	


















obligations	 for	 companies	 operating	 in	 the	 UK	 jurisdiction. 773 	Voluntary	 HRDD	 is	 self-
regulation	by	any	other	name	so	the	problems	with	self-regulation	that	were	identified	(at	
6.2.2)	are	 just	 as	pressing	when	 they	are	 interpreted	 through	 the	 lens	of	 the	UN	Guiding	









apparent	 that	 voluntary	 human	 rights	 schemes	 have	 been	 insufficient	 (see	 6.2.2)	 and	
enforcement	 tools	 are	 necessary	 to	 catalyse	 true	 reform.	 Consequently,	 a	 pragmatic	
approach	is	emerging	as	states	are	beginning	to	directly	impose	human	rights	obligations	on	
companies	 as	 older	 regulatory	 approaches	 seem	 increasingly	 out-of-step	 with	 the	




























but	 new	 academic	 theories	 will	 likely	 follow	 from	 an	 examination	 of	 how	 these	
responsibilities	have	been	applied	by	countries	and	how	these	principles	could	be	refined.780	
Mandatory	HRDD	can	help	states	to	fulfil	their	duty	to	protect	human	rights.	Pillar	
One	 of	 the	 Protect,	 Respect,	 Remedy	 framework	 (state	 duty	 to	 protect)	 and	 Pillar	 Two	
(corporate	 duty	 to	 respect)	 are	 often	 conceived	 as	 “distinct	 rather	 than	 integrated	 and	
complementary.” 781 	This	 is	 myopic	 as	 states	 can	 protect	 rights	 by	 mandating	 that	
corporations	engage	 in	activities	 like	due	diligence	(which	would	also	 fulfil	 the	corporate	
duty	to	respect).	The	UNGP’s	make	clear	that	states	should	“enforce	laws	that	are	aimed	at,	
or	have	the	effect	of,	 requiring	business	enterprises	 to	respect	human	rights.”782	This	will	
likely	 entail	 a	 “smart	 mix	 of	 measures	 –	 national	 and	 international,	 mandatory	 and	
voluntary.”783	Because	there	was	no	requirement	that	the	UNGP’s	be	rendered	mandatory,	
they	are	often	perceived	as	soft	law	or	as	essentially	voluntary.	This	is	a	misconception	as	














that	 states	 are	 committed	 to	 protecting	 rights	 against	 all	 potential	 violators	 but	 it	 is	 the	


















structure	 for	 changing	 how	 they	 moderate	 content	 and	 what	 factors	 they	 prioritise	 in	
platform	 governance.	 This	 chapter	 offers	 an	 actionable	 plan	 on	 how	 human	 rights	

















responsibilities,	 there	 are	 indications	 that	 countries	 are	 recognising	 that	 voluntary	 due	
diligence	by	corporations	 is	an	 imperfect	solution	and	have	 legislated	accordingly.787	This	
has	been	termed	“the	beginning	of	a	paradigm	shift”	as	more	countries	introduce	legislation	
mandating	HRDD.788	These	examples	may	not	seem	conclusive	in	of	themselves	but	when	
assessed	 in	aggregate,	 they	 indicate	a	growing	acceptance	of	 legislating	 for	human	rights	




mandatory	 HRDD.	 These	 initiatives	 are	 intriguing	 because	 they	 could	 indicate	 that	
mandatory	 HRDD	 is	 beginning	 to	 generate	 widespread	 support,	 and	 this	 in	 turn	 could	
facilitate	cooperative	efforts	and/or	attempts	at	harmonisation.	Many	of	these	developments	




















and	 independent	monitoring	mechanisms.”791	These	 finding	were	echoed	by	 the	Working	
Group	 on	 Responsible	 Business	 Conduct,	 which	 called	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 mandatory	
HRDD.792	A	final	example	comes	from	2016,	when	members	of	parliament	in	eight	EU	States	
announced	a	“Green	Card”	asking	the	European	Commission	to	introduce	mandatory	HRDD	
and	 an	 environmental	 duty	 of	 care.	 It	 was	 particularly	 telling	 that	 the	 eight	 countries	





enforceable	measures,	 such	 as	 decisions	 handed	 down	by	 the	 European	Court	of	Human	
Rights	 [ECtHR],	 thus	 reflecting	 an	 interest	 in	 establishing	 mandatory	 human	 rights	
requirements	 in	 Europe. 794 	There	 is	 a	 difference,	 however,	 in	 simply	 recommending	






















amount	 of	 debate	 at	 the	 European	 level	 before	 a	 law	 requiring	 due	 diligence	 was	
introduced.795	
Mandatory	HRDD	is	also	being	explored	at	 the	 international	level.	 In	2017,	 the	UN	
Committee	on	Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights	affirmed	 that	 states	have	 the	duty	 to	
establish	HRDD	obligations	 for	 companies	 and	 to	 improve	 access	 to	 remedies	 (including	
through	 corporate	 liability). 796 	This	 duty,	 however,	 seems	 unenforceable	 but	 it	 does	




































for	 future	 actions	 that	 necessitate	 compensation.799	The	 restorative	 section	 (Article	 Ten)	





The	 draft	 treaty	 does	 not	 rule	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 regulator.	 The	 text	 of	 the	
document	states	“states	shall	take	all	necessary	 legislative,	administrative	or	other	action	
including	 the	 establishment	 of	 adequate	 monitoring	 mechanisms	 to	 ensure	 effective	
implementation	of	 this	Convention.”802	It	 is,	however,	more	 focussed	on	enforcing	human	
rights	obligations	in	court.	The	draft	treaty	does	require	states	to	set	up	a	compensation	fund,	






prominent	 critic	 is	 John	 Ruggie,	 who	 has	 argued	 that	 a	 single	 treaty	 cannot	 capture	 the	





























subsequently	been	enacted	or	 considered.810	It	 is	particularly	ground-breaking	because	 it	
imposes	a	general	duty	to	not	only	consider	the	company’s	own	actions	but	also	monitor	the	



















human	 rights	 issues	 in	 their	 supply	 chain. 811 	The	 law	 requires	 that	 companies	 create,	
publish,	and	implement	vigilance	plans	for	addressing	environmental	and	human	rights	risks	
posed	 by	 their	 business	 operations.812	Companies	 can	 be	 penalised	 for	 not	 creating	 such	







have	 already	 been	 some	 interesting	 cases	 in	 France	 under	 the	 law.	 Lawsuits	 have	 been	
brought	against	Samsung	France	(over	child	labour	and	labour	conditions)	and	against	the	


























are	 based	 in	 other	 countries.	 It	 therefore	 becomes	 difficult	 to	 truly	 hold	 companies	 to	
account.	Indeed,	In	the	two	years	since	the	law’s	introduction,	accountability	has	emerged	as	







law	 published	 by	 the	 government,	 despite	 repeated	 civil	 society	 requests. 819 	It	 is	 very	
difficult	for	outsiders	to	ascertain	which	companies	this	law	applies	to	because	of	the	need	
for	specific	information	on	how	many	employees	a	subsidiary	has	worldwide	or	whether	a	





escape	 compliance	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 accountability	 and	 transparency	 measures,	 thus	
diminishing	the	efficacy	of	this	ground-breaking	law.	These	issues	could	be	avoided	in	the	
UK	 by	 designating	 a	 regulator	 to	 hold	 companies	 accountable	 for	 their	 due	 diligence	



























half	 of	 German	 companies	 to	 not	 engage	with	 these	 processes.822	In	 2019,	 a	 draft	 of	 the	
mandatory	 legislation	was	 leaked	 to	 the	media.	 The	 draft	 bill	 envisions	 strong	 penalties	
including	 “fines	 of	 up	 to	 five	 million	 Euros,	 imprisonment	 and	 exclusion	 from	 public	



























again,	 however,	 as	 the	 law	 only	 applies	 to	 German	 companies,	 the	 major	 social	 media	
companies	would	not	be	caught	by	its	terms.	This	is	unfortunate	as	mandating	human	rights	
responsibilities	could	help	to	restore	the	balance	after	the	Network	Enforcement	Act	tipped	
the	 scales	 too	 strongly	 in	 favour	 of	 censorship.	 That	 being	 said,	 the	 draft	 bill	 offers	 the	
potential	 for	 strong	 accountability	measures	 and	 rectifies	 the	 enforcement	 issues	 in	 the	
French	law.	It	would	be	better	in	the	future,	however,	if	mandatory	HRDD	was	not	used	as	a	





use	 in	production	are	not	related	to	the	conflict	 in	 the	Democratic	Republic	of	 the	Congo	










Regulations	more	 generally.	 These	 requirements	 apply	 to	 a	 number	 of	 activities	 such	 as	
purchasing	a	share	of	ownership	in	the	economic	development	of	resources	(which	includes	









a	contract	providing	 for	 the	participation	 in	royalties,	earning,	or	profits	 in	 the	economic	
development	 of	 resources	 located	 in	 Myanmar. 828 	Despite	 the	 recent	 controversy	 over	
Facebook’s	actions	in	Myanmar,	it	does	not	appear	that	Facebook	would	be	covered	by	these	
requirements	 as	 they	 only	 apply	 to	 American	 companies	 investing	 over	 five	 million	
dollars.829	It	can	be	very	difficult	to	quantify	Facebook’s	“investment”	in	an	area,	as	opposed	
to	a	more	straightforward	consideration	of	profits	because	of	the	company’s	business	model,	
where	 the	 services	 are	 provided	 for	 free	 and	 then	 Facebook	 earns	 profits	 through	
advertising	and	data	acquisition.	The	American	examples	demonstrate	how	it	can	often	be	
easier	 to	 pass	 due	 diligence	 and	 reporting	 requirements	on	 specific	 issues	 (even	 in	 pro-





























an	 increasing	 number	 of	 jurisdictions	 that	 are	 moving	 away	 from	 traditional	 voluntary	
approaches	and	embracing	a	more	hard-line	approach	to	businesses	and	human	rights.	The	
laws	that	are	being	drafted,	however,	represent	a	variety	of	approaches.	Due	diligence	laws	
are	 interesting	 because	while	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 law	may	 remain	 the	 same,	 there	 is	 a	 high	









and	 also	 demands	 that	 companies	 assess	 their	 efforts	 in	 combatting	 these	 problems	 and	
provide	educational	training	about	slavery	and	human	trafficking	to	their	staff.	833	Facebook,	
Twitter,	and	Google	have	all	submitted	statements	pledging	their	commitment	to	abide	by	
the	Modern	 Slavery	 Act	 and	 provide	 details	 about	 how	 they	 are	 addressing	 slavery	 and	
trafficking.834	This	law	was	seen	as	ground-breaking	when	passed	as	it	obliged	companies	to	
engage	 in	 assessments	 of	 how	 their	 actions	 might	 contribute	 to	 slavery	 and	 human	
trafficking.835		


















problems	 they	 might	 happen	 or	 be	 obliged	 to	 identify.	 This	 means	 that	 companies	 can	
disclose	in	their	report	that	they	are	doing	nothing	to	address	modern	slavery	issues	and	
intend	to	keep	doing	nothing	(although	there	may	be	reputational	consequences	for	such	a	












requirements	 and	 that	 “there	 have	 been	 no	 penalties	 to	 date	 for	 non-compliant	
organisations.”841	Another	study	found	that	of	the	reports	that	were	submitted,	35%	of	them	
did	not	discuss	their	risk	assessment	processes	,which	is	surprising	for	statements	that	are	















intended	 to	 be	 based	 around	 a	 due	 diligence	 approach.”842	There	 was	 also	 a	 “failure	 to	
connect	compliance	with	the	law	with	the	awarding	of	public	procurement	contracting.”843	
Once	 again,	 the	 primary	 weakness	 of	 this	 scheme	 appears	 to	 be	 enforcement,	 with	
companies	 choosing	 not	 to	 comply	 (or	 complying	 but	 not	 taking	 any	 action	 beyond	





Act	 should	 reflect	 this	 by	 requiring	more	 from	 companies.845	The	 final	 issue	 is	 that	 in	 a	
similar	fashion	to	the	French	duty	of	vigilance	law,	there	is	no	publicly	accessible	registry	
which	 lists	which	 companies	are	 covered	by	 the	Modern	Slavery	Act.	This	will	 inevitably	
hinder	attempts	by	civil	society	groups	to	hold	companies	accountable	and	it	is	unlikely	an	
NGO	would	be	able	to	identify	which	companies	fall	within	the	parameters	of	the	Act	as	it	is	
estimated	 that	 there	 are	 over	 17,000	 companies	 that	 may	 qualify. 846 	The	 same	 themes	
emerge	from	the	Modern	Slavery	Act	as	from	other	due	diligence	laws:	lack	of	transparency	
and	enforcement	that	will	surely	lead	to	a	lack	of	compliance.		
The	 preceding	 paragraphs	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 UK	 has	 due	 diligence	


















recommended	 by	 the	 UK	 Parliament’s	 joint	 Committee	 on	 Human	 Rights	 in	 2017.	 This	
proposal	 would	 require	 that	 companies	 perform	 HRDD	 and	 would	 allow	 civil	 remedies	
against	parent	companies	if	human	rights	violations	happened.848	It	should	also	be	reiterated	
that	the	UK	supported	the	Green	Card	campaign	in	the	European	Union.	It	is	possible	that	
recent	 concerns	 about	 social	media	 companies	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	GDPR	 (which	










and	 giving	 civil	 society	 a	 common	 language	 (or	what	 Thomas	 refers	 to	 as	 a	 “normative	





vis	 social	media	 platforms	 than	 is	 the	United	Kingdom.	Danielson	 argues,	 therefore,	 that	
sometimes	it	is	more	effective	to	focus	on	agitating	for	higher	corporate	standards	in	“key	















basis	 or	 through	 a	 supranational	 harmonisation	 process.” 852 	In	 some	 ways,	 Germany’s	
Network	 Enforcement	 Act	 is	 playing	 a	 similar	 role	 right	 now,	 inspiring	 other	 countries	
around	the	world	to	enact	 laws	targeting	social	media	platforms	with	heavy	penalties	 for	
non-compliance.	 The	 Network	 Enforcement	 Act,	 however,	 is	 primarily	 focused	 on	 the	
removal	of	content	(see	4.4.2)	and	should	not	be	treated	as	a	positive	model	for	regulating	
social	media.	The	UK	can	instead	offer	a	different,	rights-based	model	for	regulating	social	
media	 platforms,	 one	 that	 could	 have	 positive	 effects	 in	 other	 jurisdictions	 with	 less	
influence.		
This	 section	 has	 considered	 laws	 and	 reports	 from	 a	 range	 of	 different	 national,	








an	 impossibility	 or	 an	 unnecessary	 interference	 now	 but	 over	 time	 (if	 implemented	






have	 also	 led	 to	 calls	 for	 stronger	 regulations	 targeting	 these	 platforms.	 While	 these	








intertwined	 with	 development	 issues	 than	 other	 sectors	 such	 as	 resource	 extraction	 or	
clothing	manufacturing.854		










An	example	of	 this	proxy	 role	 is	 the	willingness	of	 tech	 companies	 to	 comply	with	strict	
blasphemy	 laws,	which	pose	 serious	 threats	 to	 freedom	of	 expression	and	are	 “the	most	









































they	 address	 their	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts”	 (which	 can	 be	 both	 actual	 and	























of	 transparent	 reporting	 about	 its	 policies,	 HRIA’s,	 integration	 and	 remedies. 866 	This	
requirement	reflects	 the	 importance	of	 transparency	 in	achieving	human	rights	reform,	a	
topic	that	has	been	frequently	discussed	in	this	thesis.	Social	media	companies	in	particular	
have	been	 roundly	 castigated	 for	 their	 lack	of	 transparency	at	 every	 stage	 in	 the	 content	
moderation	process,	from	the	refusal	to	provide	detailed	rules	(see	3.3.1),	the	reluctance	to	






consultations),	 and	 communicated	 directly	 to	 parties	 with	 whom	 they	 have	 business	
relationships	and	other	parties	such	as	states.868	The	human	rights	principles	 that	will	be	


















These	human	rights	policies	should	explicitly	state	 systems	of	 accountability	 (such	as	
who	 to	 contact	 if	 stakeholders	 are	 concerned	 about	 human	 rights	 issues)	 and	 should	 be	
supported	with	personnel	training	(including	the	training	of	the	policy	development	teams	















language”	 can	 be	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 importance	 of	 respecting	 human	 rights,	 it	 is	 also	
important	that	detailed	rules	be	created	to	ensure	that	these	policies	are	not	just	a	symbolic	











gesture.873	As	mentioned	previously	 (see	6.2.3),	BSR	 recommended	 that	Facebook	have	 a	
specific,	 stand-alone	human	rights	policy	 instead	of	 attempting	 to	 infuse	 their	 terms	and	
conditions	 with	 human	 rights	 values. 874 	Accordingly,	 all	 social	 media	 platforms	 should	
develop	 specific	 human	 rights	 policies	 and	 make	 them	 publicly	 available.	 It	 would	 be	
possible	 to	 have	 variations	 in	 their	 policies,	 of	 course,	 as	 countries	 adopt	 different	







enough)	 to	 businesses	 with	 which	 they	 have	 contractual	 relationships	 (such	 as	 the	
contracting	 companies	 they	 use	 when	 they	 outsource	 moderation),	 the	 countries	 that	
interact	with	platforms	on	 issues	of	 illegal	content	and	removal,	and	 in	particularly	risky	
situations,	affected	stakeholders	such	as	groups	representing	the	Rohingya	in	Myanmar.		
Adopting	explicit	human	rights	policies	 is	 important	because	 it	provides	a	benchmark	
against	which	 users	 and	 states	 can	 compare	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 platform.	 It	 shifts	 the	
discourse	that	occurs	between	platforms	and	users	from	a	discourse	on	a	self-made	body	of	





















tools	 to	 predict,	 assess,	 and	 prevent	 risks	 and	 the	 types	 of	 assessments	 companies	 are	
engaged	 in	 continue	 to	 grow.	 For	 example,	 companies	 regularly	 perform	 environmental	
impact	assessments	and	data	impact	assessments.	These	assessments	are	at	the	core	of	any	




identifying,	 preventing,	 and	 remedying	 risks.	 Drawing	 on	 expertise	 and	 consulting	 with	
stakeholders	 (before	 important	 decisions	 are	 made) 880 	can	 provide	 new	 insights	 and	
different	 perspectives.881	HRIA’s	 can	 help	 solve	 or	 prevent	 problems	 that	 could	 result	 in	
negative	media	 coverage,	 shareholder	 ire,	 and	 legal	 consequences.	 Conducting	 thorough	
assessments	also	signals	that	companies	are	behaving	in	an	ethical	manner	(assuming	they	
then	integrate	their	findings)	and	are	moving	beyond	verbal	commitments	to	respect	human	
rights	 and	 are	 acting	 on	 these	 intentions.	 Of	 course,	 these	 assessments	 will	 be	 more	














complicated	 when	 one	 is	 considering	 rights-conflicts	 or	 balancing	 exercises	 (such	 as	







be	performed	every	 time	a	material	 change	 that	will	 likely	 result	 in	a	heightened	 risk	of	
human	rights	violations	(such	as	political	unrest)	occurs.	In	all	other	circumstances,	HRIA’s	






HRIA’s	 and	 these	 factors	 will	 help	 to	 define	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 HRIA. 887 	The	 first	 is	 the	
geographical	 context	 in	which	 their	 business	activities	 take	 place.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 certain	
countries	will	pose	greater	human	rights	risks	than	other	states	based	on	the	political	climate	
and	 factors	 like	 a	 recent	 or	 ongoing	 conflict.	 Additional	 care	would	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 in	
countries	with	weak	human	rights	protections,	autocratic	governments,	or	high	degrees	of	



















cause	 in	 these	 countries.	 When	 considering	 those	 impacts,	 one	 must	 be	 mindful	 of	 the	
different	roles	a	company	may	play,	such	as	“producers,	service	providers,	employers,	and	
neighbours.”889	This	 is	 important	because	their	role	may	affect	 the	appropriate	steps	that	
should	be	taken.		
Finally,	 companies	 should	 consider	 whether	 they	 might	 contribute	 to	 human	 rights	
violations	through	their	relationships	with	states,	businesses,	and	non-state	actors	in	that	
country.890	The	goal	in	HRDD	is,	to	the	extent	that	is	possible,	for	corporations	to	“assume	
the	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 human	 rights	 for	 the	 entire	 corporate	 group,	 not	 atomise	 it	
down	 to	various	 constituent	units	 that	may	operate	 in	poorly	 regulated	 contexts.”891	It	 is	
important	that	companies	aggregate	risks	across	the	whole	enterprise,	which	is	why	Ruggie	
argues	 that	 companies	 should	 integrate	 human	 rights	 concerns	 into	 company	 risk	
management	 systems	 that	 already	 exist	 at	 the	 company.892	In	 short,	 while	 HRIA’s	 are	 a	
complex	 process,	 the	 corresponding	 reward	 is	 an	 identification	 of	 risks	 that	 could	 be	
damaging	 to	 both	 the	 public	 and	 the	 company,	which	 should	 offset	 some	 of	 the	 natural	
resistance	that	will	occur	after	mandatory	HRDD	is	introduced.		













and	 any	 envisioned	 transitions	 from	 human	 to	 algorithmic	 processes. 894 	Social	 media	
companies	 should	 also	 assess	 the	 human	 rights	 issues	 posed	 by	 the	 companies	 they	




context	 will	 require	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 country-withheld	 content	 or	 specific	 moderation	
changes.	Social	media	companies	operate	in	a	variety	of	different	markets	and	cultures	and	
the	content	moderation	challenges	they	experience	would	vary	across	those	contexts.	Social	
media	 companies	would	 accordingly	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 impacts	 they	would	 have	 in	 a	
country	 as	 a	 platform	 for	 users	 and	 an	 employer	 of	 general	 staff	 (such	 as	moderators).	
Another	important	consideration	is	ensuring	that	platforms	consider	their	“supply	chains”	
when	conducting	HRIA’s.	Applying	the	notion	of	a	supply	chain	to	a	social	media	company	is	
interesting	 because	while	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	moderators	 that	 are	 contracted	 to	work	 for	
platforms	are	part	of	 the	 supply	 chain,	 there	 is	 some	ambiguity	whether	 the	people	who	
produce	content	(users)	would	also	be	suppliers.	At	the	very	least,	content-creators	who	are	





















content	 or	 hand	 over	 information	 about	 users	 to	 that	 government.	 Social	 media	 can	
legitimise	and	de-legitimise	issues	based	on	who	they	permit	to	use	their	platform	and	what	
content	can	be	shared	(such	as	how	they	apply	the	“terrorist”	label)	so	it	is	essential	that	they	
consider	 how	 their	 relationships	 contribute	 to	 alleviating	 or	 exacerbating	 human	 rights	
issues.	Anticipating	these	challenges	ahead	of	time	will	allow	platforms	to	devise	appropriate	
responses	to	these	requests.897	When	assessing	the	impacts	a	company	has	on	human	rights,	
it	 is	 important	 to	 adopt	 the	 perspective	 of	 potential	 victims,	 who	 will	 likely	 have	 	 a	
significantly	lower	tolerance	for	human	rights	risks	than	the	company.898			
When	conducting	HRIA’s,	it	is	essential	that	platforms	do	not	solely	identify	external	risks	





based	 on	 their	 own	 internal	 criteria	 will	 also	 have	 human	 rights	 implications.	 This	

































a	 greater	 obligation	 if	 they	 caused	 the	 impact	 as	 opposed	 to	merely	 being	 linked	 to	 the	
impact.904	It	 is	 likely	 that	 if	 social	media	 platforms	were	 to	 conduct	 HRIA’s	 for	 all	 their	
products	and	services	then	they	would	see	a	diverse	range	of	impacts	that	vary	in	the	factors	
BSR	 identified	 and	 how	 closely	 connected	 the	 platform	 was	 to	 the	 risk.	 A	 social	 media	













company’s	role	as	a	platform	means	 that	 they	will	 often	be	 linked	 to	 impacts	around	 the	
world	 and	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 UN	 Guiding	 Principles	 expects	 all	 impacts	 to	 be	
addressed	although	the	remedy	may	vary.905			





























public	 but	 also	 that	 platforms	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 selectively	 share	 less	 controversial	
information	in	a	bid	to	appear	transparent.		
It	 is	possible	 that	after	conducting	an	HRIA,	a	platform	may	conclude	that	 the	risks	to	
human	 rights	 in	 a	 particular	 country	 outweigh	 the	 benefits	 of	 their	 presence	 in	 that	
jurisdiction.910 	In	 particular,	 they	 may	 determine	 that	 complying	 with	 national	 laws	 on	
content	 would	 result	 in	 greater	 restrictions	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 (such	 as	 forced	
cooperation	with	authorities	to	identify	rule-breakers)	than	if	that	social	media	company	did	
not	 operate	 in	 that	 jurisdiction. 911 	Currently,	 there	 is	 little	 incentive	 for	 social	 media	
companies	 to	 stay	 out	 of	 those	 problematic	 jurisdictions,	 with	 even	 Google	 considering	
whether	it	should	create	a	censored	version	of	their	search	engine	for	the	Chinese	market.912	
It	has	been	demonstrated,	however,	 that	not	only	do	platforms	cooperate	with	 laws	 that	
violate	 Article	 19	 of	 the	 of	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (free	
expression)	 but	 that	 they	 even	 take	 pre-emptive	 measures,	 adjusting	 their	 terms	 and	
conditions	 to	 comply	 with	 repressive	 countries	 before	 they	 have	 even	 been	 asked. 913	
Mandatory	HRDD,	however,	could	act	as	a	counter-balance	to	the	inclination	of	platforms	to	
expand	into	authoritarian	countries,	requiring	that	platforms	explain	why	they	entered	or	





















HRIA’s.	 It	 must	 be	 acknowledged	 that	 there	 will	 be	 some	 growing	 pains	 as	 companies	
acclimatise	to	 the	new	perspective	they	must	adopt	when	conducting	business.	However,	
there	is	a	wealth	of	resources	available	online	to	assist	companies	in	conducting	HRIA’s	and	






in	 their	 ICT	 Sector	 report	 on	 applying	 the	 UNGP’s. 916 	Perhaps	 platforms	 could	 create	
databases	that	would	assist	them	in	maintaining	a	wide	range	of	HRIA’s,	update	them	with	
ease,	 and	 solicit	 contributions	 from	 affected	 stakeholders.	 Currently,	 there	 are	 no	major	
incentives	 for	 companies	 to	 conduct	 HRIA’s	 in	 the	 UK.	 Conversely,	 there	 is	 a	 social	
disincentive	as	companies	that	“that	are	transparent	about	risks	and	challenges	are	criticised	
for	not	doing	enough	whereas	less	responsible	competitors	go	below	the	radar	of	NGOs	and	






these	 risks	 from	occurring	 (or	 reoccurring	 in	some	scenarios).918	The	 results	of	 the	HRIA	


















into	a	 specific	department.	The	 same	 issue	exists	 at	 the	government-level,	where	human	
rights	concerns	are	treated	as	separate	species	(“segregated	within	its	own	conceptual	and	
typically	 weak	 institutional	 box”)921	from	 other	 governmental	 considerations	 that	 shape	
economic	policy.	The	left	hand	must	know	what	the	right	hand	is	doing	for	true	reform	to	
occur,	and	this	can	be	challenging	in	large	companies.	Failure	to	coordinate	activities	will	
likely	 lead	 to	 contradictory	 actions	 at	 every	 level	 of	 business.922	Accordingly,	 Ruggie	 has	
called	 integration	 “the	 biggest	 challenge	 in	 fulfilling	 the	 corporate	 responsibility	 to	
protect.” 923 	This	 has	 been	 confirmed	 by	 studies	 of	 multinational	 companies	 where	
integration	of	human	rights	assessments	into	core	business	practices	was	perceived	as	the	
most	difficult	aspect	of	HRDD.924	It	is	relatively	easy	to	create	a	human	rights	policy	and	even	























the	 rights-holder’s	 perspectives	 instead	 of	 considering	 what	 constitutes	 a	 risk	 to	 the	





most	 public	 attention	 (as	 opposed	 to	 the	 risks	 that	 pose	 the	 greatest	 threat	 to	 human	
rights).928	Some	of	the	due	diligence	legislation	explored	above	inadvertently	contributes	to	
this	because	specific	 legislation	on	conflict	minerals,	 child	 labour,	or	modern	 slavery	will	





have	 often	 engaged	 in	 the	 common	 regulatory	 mistake	 of	 “random	 agenda	 selection”	
whereby	“regulators	focus	on	high-salience	political	issues	rather	than	the	issues	that	pose	
the	greatest	threat	to	public	safety.”929	In	the	world	of	social	media,	the	clearest	example	of	
a	 severe	 risk	was	when	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 Facebook	was	 being	 used	 as	 a	 platform	 to	














other	 examples	 of	 risks	 that	 were	 left	 unattended	 by	 platforms	 and	 became	 serious	
controversies	such	as	Twitter’s	challenges	with	hate	speech	and	extremist	content.	There	
have	 been	many	 issues	 identified	with	 how	 platforms	moderate	 content	 but	 integration	
requires	more	than	just	an	investigation,	it	requires	protracted	effort	and	a	commitment	to	







effectiveness	of	 their	 actions.931	This	 tracking	should	draw	on	 feedback	 from	a	variety	of	






and	 quantitative	 indicators. 933 	Choosing	 the	 appropriate	 metrics	 or	 Key	 Performance	
Indicators	(KPI’s)	 is	 important	as	companies	may	 inadvertently	gather	 information	about	
irrelevant	factors	or	fail	to	identify	best	practices	in	their	field.934	This	might	involve	some	
























is	a	 low	priority.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 introduction	of	mandatory	HRDD	will	make	tracking	
performance	a	higher	priority	for	companies.		
Social	media	companies	would	have	an	advantage	over	more	traditional	businesses	when	
it	 comes	 to	 tracking	 performance.	 Digital	 tools	 would	 streamline	 evidence	 gathering,	
automate	 pattern	 identification	 and	 trend	 forecasting,	 and	 make	 it	 easier	 to	 identify	
ineffective	 reforms.	 Platforms	 already	 gather	 information	 about	 the	 content	moderation	




set	 of	 companies	 that	 are	 frequently	 implicated	 in	 surveillance	 scandals.938	Social	media	
companies	could	also	help	to	introduce	best	practices	and	develop	tools	that	would	then	be	
used	by	other	companies	that	are	less	developed	in	their	approach	to	tracking	performance.		









financial	 or	 non-financial	 compensation	 and	 punitive	 sanctions	 (whether	 criminal	 or	
administrative,	 such	 as	 fines),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 prevention	 of	 harm	 through,	 for	 example,	
injunctions	or	guarantees	of	non-repetition.”939	Having	a	system	of	redress	 is	essential	as	
corporations	may	not	be	able	 to	 identify	and	prevent	all	human	rights	 issues	before	they	
manifest.	 They	 comprise	 one	 of	 the	 three	 Pillars	 in	 the	 Protect,	 Respect,	 and	 Remedy	







a	 failure	 to	 fulfil	 these	 duties	will	 only	 generate	more	 duties.941	States	must	 ensure	 that	
victims	of	abuses	in	their	jurisdiction	have	access	to	an	effective	remedy.942	This	can	entail	





Companies	must	 create	 industry-level	 or	 company-level	 grievance	mechanisms	 to	
allow	people	who	feel	their	human	rights	have	been	violated	to	register	complaints.	Smaller	
companies	may	 benefit	 from	 creating	 collective	 grievance	mechanisms	 allowing	 them	 to	
























by	 the	 process,	 thus	 “compounding	 a	 sense	 of	 grievance.” 950 	A	 grievance	 mechanism,	
therefore,	 must	 be	 legitimate	 (enabling	 trust	 from	 stakeholders	 and	 ensuring	
accountability),	accessible,	predictable,	equitable,	transparent,	rights-compatible,	a	source	
of	 continuous	 learning,	 and	 based	 on	 engagement	 and	 dialogue. 951 		 This	 requirement	
dovetails	 with	 another	 principle	 of	 good	 regulation:	 the	 due	 process	 requirement	 (that	
procedures	are	fair,	accessible,	and	open).952	Baldwin	and	Cave	argue	“Attention	is	paid	to	
equality,	 fairness,	and	consistency	of	 treatment	but	also	to	 the	 levels	of	participation	that	
regulatory	decisions	and	policy	processes	allow	to	the	public,	 to	consumers,	and	to	other	
affected	parties.”953	In	fact,	many	of	the	principles	that	form	a	strong	grievance	mechanism	












have	 been	 discussed	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 as	 being	 key	 components	 of	 a	 social	 media	
content	moderation	process.		
Finally,	 it	must	be	 reiterated	 that	while	 the	provision	of	 remedies	 is	 essential	 in	a	
scheme	that	fulfils	both	the	state	and	corporate	duties	towards	human	rights,	preventative	
measures	should	always	be	preferred	to	remedial	actions.	Buhmann	explains:	
“human	 rights	 damage	 is	 rarely	 fully	 remediable:	 an	 arm	 lost	 in	 an	 occupational	
health	 and	 safety	 accident	 cannot	 be	 replaced;	 a	 childhood	 lost	 to	 factory	 labour	
cannot	 be	 relived;	 lethal	 chemicals	 polluting	 drinking	 water	 or	 agricultural	 land	
cannot	 disappear	 overnight;	 and	 the	 impacts	 of	 environmental	 damage	 to	 the	















there	 is	 an	 issue	 with	 human	 rights.	 The	 content	 moderation	 process	 can	 therefore	 be	











platform	 in	 a	 similar	 way	 to	 the	 extended	 appeals	 process	 proposed	 	 earlier	 (at	 5.4).	
Moderators	would	be	given	special	human	rights	training	on	issues	that	are	relevant	to	social	
media	 and	would	 triage	 complaints,	weeding	out	 vexatious	 claims,	 addressing	 individual	
problems	that	are	easily	resolved	and	passing	on	legitimate	concerns	to	the	policy	teams	at	
the	platforms	for	collation,	consideration,	and	identification	of	systemic	issues.			










the	 UNGP’s.	 These	 processes	 include	 policies,	 HRIA’s,	 implementation,	 tracking	
performance,	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 remedies.	 All	 of	 these	 processes	 would	 need	 to	 be	




most	 recently,	 data	 protection.	 Human	 rights,	 therefore,	 can	 inform	 the	 development	 of	
important	new	processes	as	companies	are	provided	with	“a	globally	recognised	framework	
for	designing	those	tools	and	a	common	vocabulary	for	explaining	their	nature,	purpose	and	
application	 to	users	and	States.”956	The	UNGP’s	offer	a	 starting	point	 for	 legislators	when	
mandating	due	diligence	but	it	is	likely	that	further	refinements	will	be	required	when	these	












focus	 on	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 the	 proposed	 solution.	 Implementing	 a	 national	 law	
mandating	HRDD	should	be	construed	as	the	first	step	in	encouraging	corporate	respect	for	
human	rights.	It	also	helps	the	UK	to	meets	its	obligations	under	the	UNGP’s,	which	require	
that	states	protect	against	abuses	by	businesses	 in	 their	 territory	and	“set	out	clearly	 the	
expectation	 that	 all	 business	 enterprises…respect	 human	 rights	 throughout	 their	
operations.” 957 	Admittedly,	 a	 national	 law	 will	 always	 be	 bounded	 by	 its	 jurisdictional	






























social	 media	 companies.	 This	 approach	 is	 actionable	 and	 offers	 a	 necessary	 antidote	 to	
punitive	plans	to	regulate	social	media	on	the	basis	of	harm	or	the	speed	of	content	removal,	
both	of	which	side-line	important	human	rights	issues.	While	the	focus	of	this	section	is	the	





The	 UK	 would	 need	 to	 introduce	 new	 legislation	 creating	 a	 general	 obligation	 for	
companies	to	carry	out	HRDD.	Businesses	would	owe	this	duty	to	“classes	of	persons	whom	
a	 reasonable	 exercise	of	due	diligence	 identifies	as	 likely	 to	be	at	 risk	 from	 the	business	













regulator	 and	 the	 public.	 The	 emphasis	 would	 be	 on	 ensuring	 that	 companies	 have	 the	
appropriate	frameworks	in	place	and	are	engaging	in	due	diligence	processes.		
If	 a	 social	 media	 company	 is	 taken	 to	 court	 because	 human	 rights	 violations	 have	
occurred,	 any	 good-faith	 attempts	 to	 engage	 in	 due	 diligence	 (so	 long	 as	 it	 resulted	 in	 a	
reasonable	response)	would	be	rewarded	by	a	reduced	likelihood	of	liability	(at	least	under	
the	proposed	 law).962	Companies	 that	 could	display	 sound	due	diligence	procedures	may	
mitigate	or	even	escape	liability	for	certain	actions	by	their	subsidiaries	on	the	grounds	that	
these	human	rights	issues	were	not	reasonably	foreseeable.963	That	being	said,	if	a	human	
rights	 abuse	 did	 occur,	 a	 failure	 to	 exercise	 due	 diligence	 could	 create	 a	 rebuttable	
presumption	 of	 causation	 and	 therefore	 liability.964 	The	 burden,	 therefore,	 rests	 on	 the	




















argues	 that	 this	 is	 essential	 as	 victims	 of	 human	 rights	 abuses	 will	 often	 have	 limited	
resources	and	 information	and	accordingly	may	be	unable	 to	meet	 the	 standard	of	proof	
regardless	of	the	validity	of	their	case.966	This	approach	incentivises	companies	to	monitor	
and	 assess	 human	 rights	 issues	 in	 both	 their	 business	 activities	 and	 those	 of	 their	
subsidiaries	because	the	more	engaged	the	company	is,	the	easier	it	will	be	to	show	that	it	
has	 engaged	 in	 due	 diligence.	 It	 can	 be	 contrasted	with	 the	 “piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil”	
approach	 where	 due	 diligence	 of	 a	 subsidiary	 by	 a	 parent	 company	 is	 disincentivised	
because	it	could	be	used	as	evidence	that	they	are	sufficiently	close	to	impose	liability	on	the	
parent	company	for	a	subsidiary’s	actions.967		
This	 approach	 would	 afford	 platforms	 a	 measure	 of	 discretion	 over	 what	 content	 is	
permitted	 on	 the	 platforms	 while	 ensuring	 that	 the	 processes	 and	 activities	 of	 social	
networks	be	open	to	judicial	and	regulatory	oversight.	This	discretion,	of	course,	would	be	
bounded	by	the	requirements	of	the	law,	so	Child	Sexual	Abuse	Material	(CSAM),	extreme	
pornography,	 and	 terrorist	 content	would	not	be	permitted	because	of	 the	 laws	 that	 are	
already	in	existence	about	that	content.	This	proposed	HRDD	law	has	a	significant	advantage	
over	more	 censorial	 approaches	because	 it	 encourages	platforms	 to	 consider	all	 relevant	
human	rights	issues	instead	of	concluding	that	compliance	must	take	the	form	of	excessive	
content	removal.	Of	course,	the	government	might	also	pass	more	substantive	laws	in	the	
future	 (within	 the	 bounds	 of	 their	 human	 rights	 obligations	 of	 course)	 but	 a	 residual	
discretion	would	exist	for	platforms	in	areas	that	weren’t	the	target	of	specific	legislation.	
There	would	still	be	a	diversity	of	platforms	with	different	environments	but	all	platforms	
would	 be	 more	 responsive	 to	 human	 rights	 issues.	 This	 form	 of	 regulation	 would	 be	
principle-based	and	allow	 flexibility,	which	 Information	Commissioner	Elizabeth	Denham	
argued	 was	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 any	 attempt	 to	 successfully	 regulate	 social	media.968	






















cost.” 971 	Take,	 for	 example,	 Snapchat,	 which	 has	 a	 very	 narrow	 range	 of	 offerings	 as	
compared	 to	 Facebook,	 whose	 platform	 is	 constantly	 adding	 new	 functionalities.	 While	
Facebook	has	more	resources	to	conduct	HRDD,	it	also	has	more	services	it	needs	to	assess.	
The	UNGP’s	also	state	that	the	responsibility	of	companies	to	respect	human	rights	“applies	
to	 all	 enterprises	 regardless	 of	 their	 size,	 sector,	 operational	 context,	 ownership	 and	
structure.” 972 	Whether	 there	 may	 be	 smaller	 start-ups	 with	 more	 complex	 HRDD	
requirements,	instead	of	providing	exemptions	for	smaller	companies,	the	UK	government	
could	 instead	 introduce	 concessions	 (such	 as	 the	 GDPR	 permitting	 a	 group	 of	 small	
companies	to	share	a	single	data	protection	officer)	and	provide	educational	resources	to	
assist	 companies	 with	 compliance. 973 	After	 all,	 smaller	 companies	 can	 still	 cause	 or	
















smaller	 companies	 just	 at	 the	 moment	 in	 history	 when	 technology	 has	 enabled	 small	
companies	to	have	large	impacts.	It	is	also	important	that	companies	integrate	human	rights	
considerations	 into	 their	 activities	 from	 the	beginning	because	 it	 can	be	more	difficult	 to	
make	changes	later	if	the	company	suddenly	becomes	extremely	successful	and	then	meets	
the	 threshold	 for	 a	 law	 that	 only	 applies	 to	 larger	 companies.	HRDD,	 therefore,	must	 be	
characterised	as	simply	the	cost	of	doing	business	in	the	UK.		
7.4.3:	Jurisdiction	
As	 a	 domestic	 provision,	 it	 would	 only	 be	 applicable	 to	British	 companies	 and	 to	
companies	that	direct	 their	services	 into	the	UK.	British	companies	would	be	expected	to	












claim	 is	 “partial	 and	 thus	 restricted	 to	 those	business	 activities	which	 directly	 affect	 the	
country.” 976 	This	 is	 a	 similar	 approach	 to	 the	 GDPR,	 which	 applies	 to	 all	 data	












extraterritorial	 activities	 of	 businesses	 domiciled	 in	 their	 territory	 “provided	 there	 is	 a	





is	 considered	 appropriate	 to	 assert	 legal	 jurisdiction	 over	 companies	 based	 outside	 the	
territory	 if	 they	 direct	 (or	 target)	 their	 services	 to	 customers	 in	 the	 territory.	 This	 is	




spectrum.984	On	 one	 side	 are	 companies	 clearly	doing	 business	with	Americans	 over	 the	
Internet.	 As	 they	 are	 ‘purposefully	 availing	 themselves’	 of	 activities	 in	 that	 territory	 (a	
similar	notion	to	voluntarily	directing	data	into	a	jurisdiction),	exercising	jurisdiction	would	
be	proper.	On	the	other	end	of	 the	spectrum	would	be	passive	websites	 that	simply	post	

























on	 the	 website. 988 	Of	 course,	 targeting	 does	 have	 critics 989 	but	 it	 seems	 a	 particularly	
appropriate	tool	to	use	in	considering	the	responsibilities	of	social	media	companies,	who	
have	benefitted	 from	 their	 technological	 abilities	 to	 identify	where	users	are	 located	and	
serve	them	localised	advertisements.		
Targeting,	would	therefore,	be	a	factual	analysis.	One	essentially	looks	at	the	facts	to	
determine	 whether	 a	 company	 is	 “participating	 in	 the	 commercial	 life	 of	 that	 foreign	
country.”990	It	is	therefore	important	to	identify	“those	who	have	continuous	and	persistent	
communication	with	 residents	 of	 the	 state.”991	In	 relation	 to	 social	media	 platforms,	 one	
might	consider,	for	example	localised	advertisements,	advertising	revenue	generated	in	the	
UK	and	whether	the	platform	has	the	technical	means	to	identify	where	their	users	are	based.	



















Since	 these	 platforms	 are	 already	 subject	 to	 the	 GDPR	 and	 must	 comply	 with	 those	
requirements,	it	is	clear	that	companies	are	aware	that	they	have	users	in	the	UK	(as	well	as	
across	Europe)	and	 since	 these	 companies	already	comply	with	national	 laws	 (using,	 for	






within	 a	 particular	 country	 that	 would	 in	 the	 US	 have	 been	 protected	 by	 the	 First	
Amendment.992	It	is	also	possible	that	these	companies	would	perceive	this	regulatory	bid	






	Second,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 GDPR	 has	 shown	 that	 when	 faced	 with	 a	 choice	 of	


















population	 (or	 45	 million	 people)	 are	 considered	 “active	 social	 media	 users”	 with	 the	
average	British	person	spending	1	hour	50	minutes	a	day	on	social	media.994	This	is	quite	a	
valuable	market,	a	wealthy	country	with	high	social	media	penetration	so	it	seems	unlikely	
that	 social	 media	 platforms	 would	 choose	 to	 withdraw	 rather	 than	 comply	 with	 a	 due	









human	 rights.	 Since	 2010,	 regulatory	 bodies	 have	 been	 targeted	 for	 closure,	 with	many	
regulators	 being	 dissolved	 or	 conglomerated	 by	 the	 Conservative	 government. 995 	New	
























David	Cameron’s	 so-called	“bonfire	of	 the	quangos.”1000	Both	approaches	 (creating	a	new	
regulator	or	choosing	the	EHRC)	have	their	advantages	and	disadvantages	but	it	seems	more	
politically	 palatable	 to	 identify	 the	 EHRC	 as	 the	 appropriate	 business	 and	 human	 rights	
(BHR)	 regulator	 and	 then	 empower	 them	 stronger	 enforcement	 tools.	 The	 rest	 of	 this	
section,	however,	would	be	applicable	whichever	approach	was	chosen.		
	 Currently,	 there	 are	 many	 issues	 with	 social	media	 companies	 and	 one	 might	 be	
tempted	to	argue	that	the	obvious	solution	is	to	designate	a	specific	“Social	Media	Regulator”	
for	 all	 of	 the	 problems	 that	 could	 be	 construed	 as	 social	media	 issues.	 This	would	 be	 a	
mistake	however	because	it	creates	a	false	distinction	between	issues	in	social	media	and	
other	 related	 issues	 that	 are	already	managed	by	 regulators.	Competition	 issues	 for	 tech	
companies	 are	 best	 managed	 by	 the	 Competition	 and	 Markets	 Authority	 whereas	 data	
protection	problems	fall	under	the	remit	of	the	Information	Commissioner’s	Office	(ICO).	The	
government	has	also	announced	that	Ofcom	will	likely	receive	new	powers	to	address	safety	
issues	 on	 social	 media	 (such	 as	 cyber-bulling	 and	 self-harm	 content).1001	Therefore,	 the	
human	rights	issues	of	social	media	companies	should	be	assigned	to	a	business	and	human	

















is	no	 longer	a	discrete	universe,	 it	 is	our	world,	and	a	regulator	 that	 fails	to	deal	with	the	
online	and	offline	aspects	of	any	subject	is	doomed	to	become	obsolete.		
The	BHR	regulator	would	monitor	 companies	 for	 compliance,	provide	educational	
resources,	 hear	 complaints	 from	 stakeholders,	 carry	 out	 investigations,	 and	 impose	
sanctions.	They	would	also	maintain	a	publicly	available	central	registry	of	the	HRIA’s	and	











not	denied	 justice	because	of	 a	 lack	of	resources.	 Social	media	 companies	have	extensive	

























first	made	 to	 the	 broadcaster	 but	 will	 accept	 complaints	made	 directly	 to	 it	 in	 the	 first	





This	 chapter	 has	 emphasised	 that	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 devise	 a	 mandatory	 HRDD	
scheme,	 there	 must	 be	 adequate	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 to	 encourage	 corporate	
compliance	 and	 accountability.	 A	 failure	 to	 introduce	 consequences	 for	 non-compliant	
























enforcement	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 “rigorously	 applied”1012 	so	 that	 they	 can	 “incentivise	




regulator	 designed	 to	monitor	 and	 encourage	 compliance	 from	 companies	 (among	 other	
parties).	The	first	enforcement	tool	is	the	information	notice,	which	simply	demands	that	the	
party	provide	information	to	the	ICO	when	they	are	investigating	a	specific	issue.1014	This	






an	 intrusive	method	 but	 it	might	 be	 necessary	 if	 a	 company	 refuses	 to	 cooperate	with	 a	
regulator.	It	is	likely,	however,	that	this	form	of	notice	would	be	used	infrequently	against	
social	media	platforms	as	the	large	platforms	do	not	maintain	a	physical	premises	in	the	UK	
(although	there	are	smaller	start-ups	 in	 the	UK).	The	third	tool	 is	an	enforcement	notice,	
which	is	a	written	notice	that	either	requires	a	party	to	“take	steps	specified	in	the	notice”	or	
“refrain	 from	 taking	 steps	specified	 in	 the	notice.”1016	In	a	mandatory	HRDD	scheme,	 this	









notice	 could	 be	 used	 to	 compel	 platforms	 to	 engage	 in	 particular	 processes	 such	 as	
prioritising	 the	moderation	of	 extremist	 content	after	a	 terrorist	 attack	or	 it	 could	order	
them	 to	 refrain	 from	 certain	 activities	 such	 as	 providing	 information	 about	 political	
dissidents	to	an	autocratic	country.	The	 final	 tool	 is	 the	penalty	notice,	which	notifies	the	
party	that	they	are	being	fined	a	specific	amount	because	of	their	failure	to	comply	with	the	
regulatory	regime.1017	





Cambridge	Analytica	 scandal)	 as	 compared	 to	a	platform	 that	 failed	 to	post	 their	human	
rights	policies	in	their	terms	and	conditions.	A	prudent	approach	would	be	to	echo	the	fines	
embedded	in	the	GDPR’s	scheme	as	a	harmonised	approach	would	be	clearer	for	companies.	
Mirroring	 the	 approach	 of	 the	GDPR	 also	 signals	 to	 companies	 that	 human	 rights	 are	 as	
important	as	data	protection.	For	infractions	of	certain	provisions,	companies	can	face	fines	
of	 up	 to	 ten	million	 euros	or	2%	of	 the	 company’s	 annual	 global	 turnover	 (whichever	 is	
greater).	 For	 infractions	 of	 other	 provisions	 (articles	 that	 could	 be	 termed	 particularly	
essential)	 companies	 can	 face	 fines	 of	 up	 to	 twenty	 million	 euros	 or	 4%	 annual	 global	
turnover.1019	These	fines	must	be	large	enough	that	they	act	as	a	disincentive	to	expand	into	



















that	 their	 procedures	 are	 fair,	 accessible,	 and	 open. 1022 	Another	 way	 of	 phrasing	 these	
requirements	is	that	these	processes	should	have	input	legitimacy	(include	participation	in	
the	 norm-creation	 process),	 throughput	 legitimacy	 (procedural	 due	 process)	 and	 output	
legitimacy	(are	likely	to	achieve	their	desired	outcome).1023	It	is	important	that	companies	
are	not	just	assessed	on	their	HRIA’s	(or	on	their	disclosure	of	such	assessments)	but	rather	
on	 their	 processes	 at	 each	 stage	 of	due	 diligence,	 such	 as	 implementation	 and	 remedies.	
Social	 media	 companies	 would	 therefore	 need	 to	 reform	 every	 stage	 of	 the	 content	
moderation	 process,	 from	 the	 issues	 in	 Creation	 (Chapter	 Three),	 Enforcement	 (Chapter	
Four),	and	Response	(Chapter	Five).	There	must	be	consequences	that	apply	for	a	range	of	
different	actions,	from	failing	to	disclose	information	about	human	rights	policies	and	due	


































give	 these	 platforms	 an	 ethical	 appearance	 unlike	 compliance	 with	 laws	 that	 require	
surveillance	 or	 the	 censorship	 of	 blasphemous	 or	 political	 content.	 These	 enforcement	









dedicated	 to	 mediating	 the	 impacts	 of	 corporate	 activities.	 In	 relation	 to	 social	 media	















required.	 While	 it	 is	 difficult	 at	 this	 time	 to	 provide	 a	 financial	 estimate,	 it	 should	 be	
emphasised	that	regulators	must	be	provided	adequate	funding	to	achieve	their	mandate.	
Failure	 to	 do	 so	will	 result	 in	 disappointing	 results	 and	 the	waste	 of	 thousands	 or	 even	
millions	of	pounds	on	a	half-completed	mission.	Recently,	a	number	of	regulators	(which	
were	created	to	deal	with	hot-button	issues)	have	been	provided	such	low	budgets	that	they	
have	 been	 unable	 to	make	 an	 impact.	 The	Gangmasters	 and	 Labour	Abuse	 authority,	 for	
example,	 was	 originally	 allocated	 an	 annual	 budget	 of	 £4.96	 million. 1029 	Even	 more	























Implementing	 a	 mandatory	 HRDD	 law	 in	 the	 UK	 would	 likely	 have	 a	 number	 of	
consequences	in	the	social	media	field.	First,	users	will	likely	benefit	from	sweeping	reforms	




choose	 to	 apply	 these	 changes	 more	 widely	 because	 of	 their	 perceived	 utility,	 positive	
feedback,	or	because	of	consumer	demands.	Citizen	journalists	and	influencers	who	derive	
income	from	platform	(both	of	whom	were	discussed	as	having	specific	needs	at	5.2.2)	will	
particularly	 benefit	 from	 procedural	 changes	 and	 opportunities	 to	 engage	 with	 the	
platforms.	 NGO’s	 focussed	 on	 digital	 rights	 such	 as	 the	 Open	 Rights	 Group	 and	 Privacy	
International	will	also	be	empowered	to	hold	platforms	accountable	through	the	new	laws	
when	in	the	past	they	could	only	generate	adverse	publicity	for	social	media	companies.			
Second,	 as	 best	 practices	 are	 identified,	 there	 will	 be	 an	 increasing	 amount	 of	
standardisation	 in	 the	 HRDD	 process.	 Social	media	 companies	 can	 be	 the	 leader	 in	 this	






is	 likely	 that	 an	 industry	 for	HRDD	will	develop	 as	 human	 rights	 consultants	 help	 social	
































that	 the	regulation	 is	successful).	Keats	Citron,	 for	example,	explains	that	 forty	years	ago,	
domestic	 violence	 and	 sexual	 harassment	 in	 the	 workplace	 were	 seen	 as	 essentially	
unregulatable. 1032 	Subsequent	 activism	 and	 regulation	 helped	 to	 shift	 societal	 attitudes	






as	 legitimate,	 that	 it	 results	 in	 the	 “collective	 acceptance	 of	 an	 authority	 claim	 by	 the	
overwhelming	 majority	 of	 those	 to	 whom	 the	 claim	 is	 addressed.”1033 	That	 is	 why	 it	 is	
imperative	that	 the	law	not	be	overly	punitive	of	social	media	companies	(which	do	offer	
many	 rights-enhancing	 qualities),	 embody	 elements	 of	 a	 procedural	 due	 process,	 and	 is	
enforced	by	an	 impartial	and	accountable	regulator.	 If	 implemented	correctly,	 the	British	
HRDD	law	could	become	the	gold	standard	of	due	diligence	laws	and	could	inspire	similar	
legislation	 in	other	 countries.1034	This	would	 be	 a	much	 better	 outcome	 for	 social	media	











translate	 them	into	new	methods	of	regulating	the	digital	world.	This	 is	an	essential	 task	
because	a	failure	to	do	so	will	diminish	the	effect	human	rights	has	in	a	world	where	private	
companies	provide	some	of	the	most	accessible	and	widespread	forums	for	expression	and	
















the	goal	was	 to	be	 the	 safest	 country	 for	human	rights?	 It	 is	 a	more	difficult	objective	 to	
achieve	but	the	possibility	of	such	positive	consequences	makes	it	worth	attempting.			
This	 chapter	 has	 proposed	 the	 introduction	of	 a	mandatory	HRDD	 law	 to	 require	
companies	 to	 introduce	a	 framework	 to	respect	human	rights	and	prevent	abuses.	 It	has	
considered	 how	 due	 diligence	 laws	 are	 being	 introduced	 in	 various	 countries,	 what	 due	
diligence	entails,	and	how	an	effective	mandatory	HRDD	law	could	be	implemented	in	the	
UK.	 While	 this	 thesis	 has	 focussed	 on	 the	 human	 rights	 issues	 in	 social	 media	 content	
moderation,	 this	 solution	 is	 broader,	 applicable	 to	 all	 private	 companies.	 Social	 media,	
therefore,	becomes	a	particular	example	of	the	operation	of	mandatory	HRDD	and	how	it	
could	have	a	substantial	impact	on	how	companies	address	human	rights	issues.1036		




common	 language	 for	 countries,	 activists,	 businesspeople,	 and	 academics	 to	 discuss	 the	
impact	 of	 businesses	 on	 human	 rights.	 A	 related	 (but	 more	 specific)	 language	 could	 be	
created	by	introducing	mandatory	HRDD	in	the	UK.	Expectations	of	social	media	companies	












































is	 likely	 that	 many	 of	 our	 assumptions	 about	 the	 internet,	 assumptions	 that	 have	 been	
codified	into	discussions	about	regulating	these	spaces	must	be	reviewed	and	updated.		
While	there	are	many	issues	at	social	media	companies	that	could	be	discussed	(such	
as	 competition	 or	 data	 protection	 concerns),	 this	 thesis	 has	 focussed	 on	 the	 content	
moderation	process.	This	is	a	fascinating	area	of	study	because	it	combines	a	host	of	typical	
content	problems	 (balancing	 competing	values,	delineating	 the	margins	of	permissibility,	
privileging	certain	narratives)	with	new	challenges	concerning	the	volume	of	content,	the	
globalised	 nature	 of	 social	 media	 platforms,	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 regulating	
technologies	such	as	algorithms.	Chapters	Three,	Four,	and	Five	considered	each	stage	of	the	




Early	optimism	about	 social	media	 companies	and	 their	potential	 for	encouraging	
human	rights	and	democracy	has	been	replaced	with	a	“techlash”	where	tech	companies	are	
“coming	 under	 greater	 scrutiny.” 1040 	It	 is	 imperative,	 however	 that	 the	 regulations	 we	
introduce	are	not	overly	reactionary	and	do	not	incentivise	censorship,	which	was	the	case	
with	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 with	 the	 proposals	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 Six.	 This	 thesis	 has	
consistently	argued	that	 the	procedural	protection	of	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	is	

















states	 have	 been	 particularly	 committed	 to	 protecting	 human	 rights	 on	 social	 media	
platforms.	It	is	time,	therefore,	to	rectify	the	schism	between	“free	speech	as	a	legal	concept	




Collingridge’s	 dilemma	 states	 “when	 change	 is	 easy,	 the	 need	 for	 it	 cannot	 be	
foreseen;	when	the	need	for	change	is	apparent,	change	has	become	expensive,	difficult,	and	
time-consuming.”1042	Unfortunately,	social	media	has	now	become	so	engrained	in	everyday	




without	sacrificing	 the	positive	aspects	of	 the	moderation	 systems	these	 companies	have	
constructed	such	as	their	innovation	and	scalability.	We	are	starting	to	have	a	dialogue	about	
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